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The Gaelic Athletic Association and the H-Blocks Crisis, 1976 -  1981
Mark Reynolds
This thesis will explore how the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) was affected by the 
escalating series of protests initiated by Irish republican prisoners in the Maze Prison (H- 
Blocks) during the period 1976 -  1981. The thesis will detail the pressures that were placed 
upon the various units of the GAA, from internal and external sources, to publicly support the 
demands o f the protesting prisoners. The thesis will question how the GAA, an organisation 
perceived by many as nationalist/republican in outlook, responded to these demands, while at 
the same time responding to those from within and outside the association who were against 
any form of GAA support for the prisoners.
The support the GAA gave to the prisoners will be explored in the context o f the historical 
relationship between the GAA and Irish political prisoners, the relationship between the GAA 
and An Garda Siochana, and the rulebook of the GAA which, post-1979 stipulated that the 
GAA was a non-party-political organisation. The thesis will question if the support that some 
clubs, predominantly clubs in Northern Ireland, gave to the prisoners was universally 
appreciated within the GAA or if such support caused internal divisions. The thesis will also 
ask if the crisis affected the GAA on a short-term basis only, or if  it left a lasting legacy.
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Introduction
The 1976-1981 H-Blocks crisis was a seminal moment in the history of modem Ireland and 
the Irish republican movement. The crisis began in 1976 when republican prisoners initiated a 
series of escalating protests in an attempt to regain special-category-status, and ended with the 
1981 hunger strike, during which ten men died. Several books have been published about the 
crisis, and continue to be published today, almost thirty-five years after its conclusion. Danny 
Morrison, writing in Hunger Strike: Reflections on the 1981 Hunger Strike, calls the 1981 
hunger strike ‘the historic event of the North since the foundation of the state in 1921’ and 
states that ‘many republicans refer to the hunger strike as their “ 1916”.’1 As F. Stuart Ross has 
shown, in Smashing H-Block, The Rise and Fall o f  the Popular Campaign against 
Criminalisation,2 the street campaign that accompanied the escalating protests by the prisoners 
briefly facilitated the coming together of the usually fragmented nationalist community in 
Northern Ireland. Thomas Hennessey has further shown that a ‘variety of special factors’ in 
the lead up to the 1980 hunger strike had hardened local nationalist attitudes towards the British 
security forces, and that ‘many in the community, while holding no truck with the Provos’ 
campaign of violence, supported the hunger strikers out of an emotional ‘herd’ attachment, and 
as an expression of ‘anti-establishment/anti-Brit solidarity.’5 The National H-Block 
Committee, formed in 1979 to spearhead a street campaign in support of the prisoners, appealed 
to the trade union movement, community organisations, journalists and cultural organisations, 
including Conradh na Gaelige and the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA), to issue statements 
in support o f the prisoners and to have a visible presence at the various local and national H- 
Block marches. For a very brief period, the H-Blocks crisis united the various shades of 
nationalism, republicanism and republican-socialism, but, as shall be discussed in Chapter 
Three, this unification did not last until the conclusion of the hunger strikes.
Paradoxically, the hunger strike is credited with rejuvenating the IRA, while at the same 
time the election of republican prisoners Bobby Sands, Kieran Doherty and Paddy Agnew is 
credited with popularising constitutional politics within the republican movement. Gerry
1 Danny Morrison, Hunger Strike: Reflections on the 1981 Hunger Strike (Kerry: M ount Eagle Publications, 
2006), p. 19.
2 F. Stuart Ross, Smashing H-Block The Rise and Fall o f the Popular Campaign against Crim inalisation, 1976- 
1982 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011).
3 Thomas Hennessey, Hunger Strike. M argare t Thatcher's B attle  w ith  the IRA, 1980-1981 (Kildare: Irish
Academic Press, 2014), p. 104.
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Adams, speaking in 2011, stated that the ‘Hunger Strike changed the political landscape in 
Ireland’ and that ‘the political gains [made by the republican movement] since then owe 
much...to the sacrifice, resolve and perseverance of the Hunger Strikers’.4 Politically, the 
hunger strikes affected both the Irish and British governments, although Hennessey has shown 
that the hunger strike was ‘more of a problem for Dublin for than London: for Charles Haughey 
and Garret Fitzgerald it became the main political issue in their diplomatic relations because it 
had such an impact domestically’, whereas for Margaret Thatcher, who had ‘no real domestic 
pressure in Great Britain, it was one of a long series of issues, including severe economic 
issues.’5
While the effects the H-Blocks crisis had on modem Ireland and the republican 
movement has received much scholarly attention, the effects that the crisis had on the GAA 
has not received the same attention. This is despite repeated assertions from former GAA 
officials that the H-Blocks crisis was one of the most difficult periods in the history o f the 
association.5 This thesis seeks to address that gap in the history of the GAA, by both detailing 
and analysing the actions (and inactions) of the GAA during the crisis.
To be properly understood, the relationship between the GAA and the H-Block 
pnsoners must be explored in the context of the historical relationship between the GAA and 
republican prisoners. There has always been a relationship between the GAA and Irish political 
prisoners. Two of the original patrons of the association, Charles Stewart Parnell and Michael 
Davitt, had previously been imprisoned for political activities;7 the issue played a role during 
the 1887/1888 split and reconstruction,8 while, in the context o f the ‘Ranch War’,9 Rule 8 
(excluding the British military from the association) was amended in 1909 to exclude jail
4 Hennessey, Hunger Strike, p. 468.
5 Hennessey, Hunger Strike, p. 460.
6 Paddy McFlynn, '75 Years Out o f 125: A Lifetime in the GAA' in Ddnal McAnallen, David Hassan & Roddy 
Hegarty (eds.), The Evolution o f the GAA. Uloidh, Eire agus Eile (Armagh: Stair Ulaidh, 2009), pp. 11-19.
7 Parnell was imprisoned in Kilmainham Jail in 1881 under the terms o f Protection o f the Person and Property  
Act, 1881. Davitt was imprisoned on two occasions; in 1870 he was convicted of Treason Felony' and served 
seven years, o f a fifteen year sentence, in Dartmoor Prison; fo llow ing an outspoken speech against the Chief
Secretary o f Ireland, Davitt's ticket o f leave was revoked in 1881 and he spent one year in Portland Prison.
Sean McConville, Irish Politica l Prisoners, 1848-1922, Theatres o f W ar (London: Routiedge, 2005).
Ä A t the 1887 Convention it was Edward Bennett's refusal to  pass a motion o f sympathy w ith  the imprisoned 
William O'Brien tha t caused most consternation amongst constitutional nationalists; at the 1888 Convention 
the IRB proposed the imprisoned John Mandeville as President as a means o f stopping Davin's re turn to  the  
post. W.F. iVlandle, The Gaelic A th le tic  Association & Irish Nationalist Politics 1884-1924 (Dublin: Gill and 
Macmillan, 1987).
9 See Chapter 3 o f Fergus Campbell, Land and Revolution: N ationalis t Politics in the West o f  Ire land 1891-1921 
(Oxford: Oxford Press, 2004).
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warders from membership of the GAA.10 It was during the Irish Revolutionary years, 1916- 
1923, that the relationship between the GAA and political prisoners evolved - the association 
became actively involved with prisoners and in prisoner welfare issues. This relationship, 
however, was not always harmonious; having supported the political prisoners throughout the 
War of Independence, the GAA had to reschedule three (delayed) 1923 All-Ireland finals, as 
republicans had actively pressurised clubs and county boards to cancel scheduled games, as a 
means of protesting against the continued detention of republican prisoners. The relationship 
between the GAA and political prisoners, during the period 1916-1969, manifested itself in 
three different ways. First, Gaelic games, with the support of the GAA, were played in 
internment camps and prisons, including Frongoch, Ballykinlar, the Curragh internment camps 
and Belfast Jail, as an act of cultural resistance. Second, the GAA contributed to the various 
prison welfare funds during this period, including the Irish National Aid and Volunteer 
Dependents Fund, the Irish Republican Prisoners Dependents Fund, the Irish Prisoners 
National Aid Society, the Green Cross Committee and An Cumann Cabhrach. Third, the GAA 
publicly supported prisoners during periods of prison protests, including hunger strikes. As 
shall be discussed in Chapter One, these three facets of the relationship between the GAA and 
political prisoners were maintained after the outbreak o f the ‘Troubles’ in 1969, but were 
radically altered by the political status protests that were initiated by the republican prisoners 
in 1976.
There are many publications that deal with the historical relationship between the GAA 
and republican politics, some of which detail the relationship between the GAA and political 
prisoners. Several publications focus on the role the GAA played during the revolutionary 
period of 1913-1923, to the point that William Murphy has commented that the role of the 
GAA ‘during the Irish Revolution has received more, if  often fragmented, attention than most 
aspects o f the association’s history.’"  Both de Burea12 and Mandle13, in their respective 
seminal publications, detail the links between the GAA and the revolutionary politics, with 
both authors somewhat overstating the importance of the GAA to the independence struggle. 
Some of the more recently published articles and publications, including those by Richard
10 1909 Annual Convention M inutes, Central Council M inu te Book [CCMB] 1899-1911, p. 453.
11 W illiam  Murphy, 'The GAA during the Irish Revolution, 1913-1923' in M ike Cronin, W illiam  Murphy and Paul 
Rouse (eds.k The Gaelic A th le tic  Association 1884-2009 {Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2009), pp. 61-76.
12 Marcus de Eturca, The GAA: A History (Dublin: Cumann Lüthchleas Gael, 1980).
13 Mandle, The Gaelic A th le tic  Association 8t Irish N ationalis t Politics 1884-1924.
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McElligott14 and Dónal McAnallen,15 have taken a more balanced approach and agree with 
Murphy’s memorable phrase that the GAA appeared ‘to have been a playground of the 
revolution more often than it was a player in the revolution.’16 Eamonn Boyce’s prison memoirs 
give a detailed and insightful understanding of the importance of the GAA, and Gaelic games, 
to those imprisoned in Belfast Jail during the ‘Border Campaign’ of 1956-1961.17 While not as 
numerous as those dealing with the period 1913-1923, there are some publications that deal 
with how the GAA reacted to reality of the partition of Ireland and, later still, the outbreak of 
the ‘Troubles’. Mike Cronin argues that the GAA in Northern Ireland continued to play the 
role it had played in pre-partition Ireland, in that the association played a central role in defining 
nationalist identity and, to a certain extent, was a vehicle for nationalist agitation.18 Similarly, 
David Hassan writes that during the ‘Troubles’, the GAA, as an All-Ireland body, represented 
a sporting manifestation of northern nationalism’s ‘political utopia’ but, in reality, the Dublin 
based leadership could do little for its northern members, other than offer the occasional 
expression o f sympathy.19 While some publications, including How the GAA Survived the 
Troubles,20 Leading Through the Troubles, A Life in the GAA21 and The Outsider22 make 
reference to how the H-B locks crisis affected the GAA, the crisis is not the main focus of these 
publications and it is not really discussed in any great detail.
This thesis seeks to explain how the GAA, an organisation perceived by many as 
nationalist and republican in outlook, reacted to the H-Blocks crisis. The thesis will ask how 
the various units within the hierarchy of the GAA - clubs, county boards, provincial councils 
and the national leadership committees (Central Council and Coiste Bainisti) - responded to 
the pressures that were placed upon them from internal and external sources to publicly support 
the demands o f  the protesting prisoners. The actions that some GAA units, clubs in Northern
14 Richard McElllgot, '1916 and the Radicalization o f the Gaelic A th le tic Association', Éire-lreland, Volume 48, 
Issue 1&2, 2013, pp. 95-111.
15 Donal McAnallen, 'The Radicalisation o f the Gaelic A th le tic Association in Ulster, 1912-1923: The Role of 
Owen O 'D u ff / ,  The In terna tiona l Journal o f  the History o f  Sport, Volume 31, Issue7, 2014, pp. 704-723.
16 Murphy, 'The GAA during the Irish Revolution, 1913-1923’ in Cronin, M urphy &  Rouse (eds.), The Gaelic 
A th letic  Association 1884-2009, p. 76.
17 Anna Bryson fed.). The Insider. The Belfast Prison Diaries o f  Eamonn Boyce, 1956-1962 (Dublin: The Lilliput 
Press, 2007).
18 M ike Cronin, Sport and Nationalism in Ireland, Gaelic Games, Soccer and Irish Iden tity  since 1884 (Dublin: 
Four Courts Press, 1999).
19 David Hassan, T he  GAA in U lster' in Cronin, Murphy & Rouse (eds,), The Gaelic A th le tic  Association 1884- 
2009, pp. 77-92.
20 Desmond Fahy, How the GAA Survived the Troubles (Dublin: W olfhound Press, 2001).
21 Paddy MacFlynn, Leading Through the Troubles, A Life in the GAA -  Paddy MacFlynn (Tyrone: Lumen 
Publishing, 2013).
22 Peter Quinn, The Outsider (Dublin: Irish Sports Publishing, 2013).
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Ireland in particular, took in support of the protesting prisoners will be detailed. The actions of 
these clubs, however, will be explored in the wider context of events and factors that existed at 
the time that restricted association support for the prisoners. The two key factors that restricted 
the association’s support for the prisoners were the public rows that erupted between the 
national leaderships of the GAA and the Garda Representative Association (GRA) and Rule 7 
of the GAA’s rule book. In 1980 and 1981 the GAA was accused by the GRA of being 
ambiguous in its condemnation of republican violence. In the resultant public row, played out 
through the media, the GAA was portrayed as being sympathetic to IRA violence. The 
leadership of the GAA bore these accusations in mind when considering the appropriate level 
o f support that the association could lend to the republican prisoners. Post-1979, Rule 7 of the 
GAA’s rulebook stated that the association was a ‘non-party-political’ association. The 
participation of National H-Block candidates in the 1981 general election in the Republic of 
Ireland, and to a lesser extent the 1981 Fermanagh/South Tyrone by-election, was interpreted 
by some within the GAA as an entry to party politics and, thus, support for the H-Block 
campaign was deemed to be in contravention o f Rule 7. There was also a vocal minority, led 
by Tom Woulfe and John O ’Grady, who vigorously opposed any GAA support for, or 
involvement with, the protesting H-Block prisoners, and who used the media to further their 
case. The thesis will question if the actions of some clubs, who came out in support of the 
prisoners, caused divisions within the association. Finally, this thesis will analyse the effect the 
H-Blocks crisis had on the GAA, and ask if the crisis affected the association on a short-term 
basis only or if the crisis left a lasting legacy within the GAA.
Chapter one o f this thesis will detail the relationship between the GAA and Irish 
political prisoners, internees and convicted prisoners, during the period 1969-1976. This 
relationship will be explored in the wider context of the GAA’s reaction to the outbreak of the 
‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland. The chapter will ask what type of support the GAA provided 
to those interned and imprisoned as a result of the outbreak of political violence, and it will 
also explore the role that Gaelic games played within the Long Kesh compound.
Chapter Two will address how the GAA responded to the series of escalating prison 
protests that took place within the H-Blocks between 1976 and 1980, including the 1980 hunger 
strike. This chapter will ask how the ending of internment and the initiation of the protests by 
convicted republican prisoners changed the dynamics of the relationship between the GAA and 
the H-Block prisoners. This chapter will examine the early relationship between the GAA and 
the National H-Block Committee, and will also address how the campaign mobilised by the
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National H-Bock Committee affected the GAA and GAA members. The reaction of the GAA 
to the 1980 hunger strike will be explored in the context o f the public row that erupted between 
the GAA and the GRA over allegations that the GAA was ambiguous in its condemnation of 
republican violence.
Chapter Three o f this thesis will explore how the GAA reacted to the 1981 hunger 
strike. This chapter will detail the pressure the GAA came under, from internal and external 
sources, to support those on hunger strike. The chapter will detail and analyse the actions that 
the various units of the GAA took in support of the hunger strike. It will also look at the reaction 
o f other GAA members who were opposed to any support for the prisoners from the association 
and, furthermore, it will detail how those from outside of the GAA viewed any GAA support 
for the hunger strikers. The ramifications of the National H-Block Committee’s decision to 
enter candidates in the by-election in Fermanagh/South Tyrone and the 1981 general election 
in the Republic o f Ireland will be detailed in the context o f the GAA’s ‘non-party-political’ 
rule, and the resultant fall-out from the directive issued by Liam Mulvihill, Director-General 
o f the GAA, that all forms of GAA support for the prisoners must cease will be analysed. The 
reaction o f the GAA to the deaths of the ten hunger strikes, five of whom were GAA members, 
will be discussed, as will the reaction of the GAA to the conclusion of the hunger strike.
The conclusion of the thesis will reflect on the crisis and ask whether it had a lasting 
impact upon the association. The crisis had the potential to affect the GAA’s medium to long 
relationships to the Irish and British governments, the Irish and British security forces, the 
republican and loyalist communities, and the media. The conclusion will question if such 
consequences are evident. Perhaps more importantly, the crisis had the potential to change the 
GAA. The conclusion will question if the crisis influenced or changed the policies of the 
association, while at the same time asking if the crisis affected the association’s image o f itself 
and its sense of purpose. This conclusion will also analyse if the crisis had a long term effect 
on the relationship between the GAA in Northern Ireland and the GAA in the Republic of 
Ireland.
Mike Cronin, in Sport and Nationalism in Ireland, explains that, against the backdrop 
of the ‘Troubles’ the history of ‘sport matters because it is .. .a mirror for the troubles that lead 
to the killing. To understand the deaths in Northern Ireland as a battle between two identities 
on opposing sides of a sectarian divide is to understand sport.’23 David Hassan, in ‘Sport,
23 Cronin, Sport ond Nationalism  in Ireland, p. 143.
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Identity and Irish Nationalism in Northern Ireland’ explains that Northern Irish nationalism 
cannot be defined as an all-encompassing doctrine and that within this nationalism exist 
differing views, ranging from those who, more than anything else, desire to see a United Ireland 
to those who simply want to be able to express their Irish identity and who care little for the 
constitutional question.24 This thesis will use the GAA as a prism to investigate how the H- 
Blocks crisis, and the hunger strikes in particular, affected the nationalist community in 
Northern Ireland. Similar to Smashing H-Block, this thesis will investigate how the different 
facets of Northern Irish nationalism responded to a political and humanitarian crisis and how 
this crisis both united and divided the nationalist community. This thesis, however, will 
investigate how the leadership of the GAA kept the association from splitting in the context of 
such nationalist division.
24 David Hassan, 'Sport, Identity and Irish Nationalism in Northern Ireland' in Bairner, Alan (ed.). Sport and the  
Irish Histories, Identities, Issues (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2005), pp. 123-139.
Chapter One: 1969-1976
The outbreak (1969) and early years (1969-1976) of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland 
represented a significant challenge to the GAA, the Ulster GAA in particular. Throughout the 
‘Troubles’, the Ulster GAA sought to maintain its broad non-political nationalist stance but ‘in 
practice it could not avoid becoming involved in an ethno-sectarian conflict that was to 
dominate national and international affairs for the latter part of the twentieth century in 
Northern Ireland.’1 While the GAA, at a macro-level, attempted to remain detached from the 
‘Troubles’, at local levels, association clubs and members were ‘actively engaged in both the 
civil rights campaign and the spiralling problems that engulfed the region’.2 The outbreak of 
the ‘Troubles’, and the consequent re-introduction of internment in Northern Ireland in August 
1971, dramatically increased the prison populations throughout Ireland and England, with 
internees (Northern Ireland only) and sentenced prisoners dispersed throughout the penal 
systems. During the period of internment, which officially ended on 5 December 1975, a total 
of 2,060 suspected republicans and 109 suspected loyalists were interned, predominantly in the 
Long Kesh Camp, situated on the outskirts of Lisburn.3 In addition to the internees, several 
hundred Irish republican convicts were dispersed in jails throughout Ireland and England 
during this period. Many of those interned and imprisoned as a result of the political turmoil 
were GAA members. This chapter will detail the relationship that existed between the GAA 
and political prisoners (convicted republican prisoners and internees) between 1969 and 1976, 
the year when political-status protests commenced. The relationship between the GAA and 
political prisoners will be explored in the wider context of how the GAA reacted to the outbreak 
and early years of the ‘Troubles’.
Throughout the period 1969-1976 the relationship between the GAA and political 
prisoners was similar to that which had existed during previous republican campaigns and this 
again manifested itself in three different ways. First, the GAA raised funds for the dependents 
o f those interned and imprisoned; second, the GAA publicly condemned internment and 
supported those interned, while also giving limited support, on humanitarian grounds, to the 
various republican prison protests; and, third, Gaelic games, with the support o f the GAA, were
1 Hassan, 'The GAA in U lster', p. 87.
2 Hassan, T he  GAA in UlsteH, p. 87.
3 Kieran McEvoy, P aram ilitary Imprisonment in Northern Ireland, Resistance, M anagem ent and Release 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 212.
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played in Long Kesh as a symbolic act of republican resistance. While exploring each of these 
in turn, this chapter will assess the discussions that took place within the GAA as to the 
appropriate response o f the association to the ‘Troubles’ generally and political prisoners in 
particular. It will ask whether the responses varied across time and according to place. It will 
explore how the GAA of the late 1960s and 1970s, formed by its tradition, self-image and 
nationalist rhetoric, confronted the complex and evolving realities of contemporary politics.
I.
Throughout the period 1969-1976, the GAA raised funds which were used for a variety 
o f ‘Troubles’ related purposes. In late 1969, and throughout 1970, the funds were focused on 
helping those who had crossed the border to escape the conflict and were housed in Irish Army 
camps,4 and in helping to rebuild houses5 that had been burned down during the ‘Belfast 
pogroms’.6 Following the re-introduction o f internment in Northern Ireland, in August 1971, 
the funds were diverted to support the internees and their families. In his report to the 1972 
Annual Congress, held in April 1972, Sean O Siochain, General Secretary, wrote that the GAA 
identified itself with the ‘National Cause...mainly through providing the essential week-to- 
week financial help for the wives and children left without the breadwinner’,7 with Pat Fanning 
(Padraig O Fainin), GAA president, adding that the association could be ‘particularly proud of 
the manner in which it moved to meet the distress and hardship that was the inevitable 
consequence of internment and other repressive measures.’8 As late as March 1975, Donal 
Keenan (Donal O Cianain), GAA president, stated that fundraising ‘will continue for a long 
time to come’ and called on GAA members to ensure ‘that there is a sufficient amount of money 
at central level to give to those.. .women and children whose menfolk are still incarcerated and 
may be for a long time to come.’9
During this period, 1969-1976, a number of different fundraising ventures were 
initiated by the GAA, with varying results. The accounts of the association provide very limited 
information on the specific amounts raised but information contained within the GAA annual 
reports and meeting minutes give an indication o f the methodologies and amounts raised. When
4 Executive Comm ittee m inutes, September-October 1969, CCMB 1969, pp. 206, 216 & 232.
51970 Annual Congress minutes, CCMB 1970, p. 63.
6J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army, The IRA 1916-1979 {Dublin: Poolbeg Press Lim ited, 1989), p. 365.
7 Report to  1972 Annual Congress, Bound Volume collecting GAA Congress Booklets 1962-1972, p. 750.
8 1972 Annual Congress m inutes, CCMB 1972, p. 87.
31975 Annual Congress minutes, CCMB 1975, pp. 79-80.
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the ‘Troubles’ broke out fundraising was conducted at county board level10 which proved a 
considerable success; at the 1970 Annual Congress it was reported that £48,000 had been 
collected and ‘distributed to two centres in Belfast, one being the principal rehabilitation centre 
in Belfast and the other the Bombay Reconstruction’11 with a sum of money remaining ‘for 
emergencies, whether they are in Derry or Belfast.’12 In September 1971, it was decided that a 
full day, 3 October 1971, would be dedicated to ‘Northern R elief, but the poor returns from 
this, £4,932.13 prompted the GAA to ask each county board to organise a church-gate collection 
for 5 December 1971,14 later changed to 2 January 1972. A press release emphasised that the 
‘money collected will be channelled by the Central Council to the County Committees of the 
affected areas, for disbursement by accredited relief organisations, whose bona fides are above 
reproach’ and that the ‘fund will apply solely to relieving the financial difficulties of families 
left without the support of the breadwinner because of internment, or for any other reason 
arising from the present disturbances in the Six County area.’15 The press statement further 
detailed that the GAA had already contributed £15,000 ‘either directly or through the good 
offices o f the Irish Red Cross’ and that ‘the average weekly totals paid out...are: Belfast 
£1,500, Deny £1,000, Lurgan and Armagh £500, with lesser amounts in other affected areas. 
The average weekly payment per family is £5.’16 This church-gate collection was also 
advertised in the GAA sections of the provincial and local newspapers, including the Munster 
Express,17 Connacht Tribune, 18 Leitrim Observer19 and the Kerryman.20 Reaction to this 
localised collection was positive with the Mayo21 and Galway22 county boards raising £2,000 
and £3,000 respectively while Carrickmacross GAA (Monaghan), having raised £153, called 
it ‘one of the largest sums ever collected at a church gate in the town.’23 In February 1972, two 
weeks after Bloody Sunday when anti-British sentiment was high, the GAA Executive
10 Central Council m inutes, 10 January 1970, CCMB1970, p. 5.
11 The Bombay Street Housing Association was a voluntary body established to  rebuild the 44 houses burned 
down in August 1969; Peter Quinn (fu ture GAA president) was the Association's accountant. 'Bombay 
Street, Belfast, Reconstruction Fund' Anglo-Celt, 2 October 1970, p. 13.
121970 Annua I Congress minutes, CCMB 1970, p. 63.
13 Executive Committee m inutes, 22 October 1971, CCMB 1971, p. 234.
14 Central Council m inutes, 23 October 1971, CCMB 1971, p, 239.
15 Irish Independent, 30 December 1971.
16 Irish Press, 31 December 1971.
17 M unster Express, 31 December 1971.
18 Connacht Tribune, 31 December 1977.
19 Leitrim Observer, 1 January 1972.
20 Kerryman, LJanuary 1972.
21 Connacht Tribune, 11 February 1972.
22 Connacht Tribune, 21 January 1972.
23 Anglo-Celt, 7 January 1972.
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Committee requested that each club donate a minimum of £2 per week to the fund24 with a 
further appeal issued at the 1972 Annual Congress for clubs to ‘play their full part in helping 
alleviate distress caused by internment and other repressive measures.’25 At this Annual 
Congress it was reported that ‘the amount of money collected to date for the relief of distress 
is in excess of £60,000 - if the weekly contributions o f the players and clubs in the 6 counties 
were added, the grand total, since last August, would be approximately £80,000.’26 Sean O 
Siochain further expressed his hope that a regular weekly or monthly subscription by players 
and members, through their clubs, would be established.27
The 1972 Annual Congress was held at a time o f great political change in Northern 
Ireland: following an upsurge in violence (in reaction to Bloody Sunday) the Stormont 
administration was suspended in March 1972, with the promise of ‘a British Minister to rule in 
Belfast...[the] phasing out of internment and massive economic aid for the Six Counties’.28 
William Whh el aw was appointed Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in March 1972 and 
he began quickly the phased release of the internees, with the first men released in April. The 
release o f the first batch of internees, approximately 100 men, was met with mixed reactions: 
the move was welcomed by the Dail parties and Northern Ireland public representatives but 
dismissed by the Civil Rights Association and Sinn Fein, who called the releases ‘a further 
effort to divide the civilian population from the Republican movement.’29 It was also feared 
that the piecemeal releases would impact negatively on fundraising for the internees: John 
Feeney wrote in the Irish Press that those fundraising for the dependents of internees ‘fear that 
there will be a huge drop in funds once the numbers interned begin to dwindle’, adding that 
‘the need for money will be more pressing when the internees are released. They will all be 
unemployed, and in many areas will remain so due to the suspicions o f many employers and 
the lack o f work available to Catholics.’30
The phased release o f internees continued throughout 1972: in June, there were 416 
men interned,31 by August the number had dropped to 2 8 3 32 while in December 242 men
34 Executive Committee m inutes, 18 February 1972, CCMB 1972, p. 25.
25 1972 Annual Congress minutes, CCMB 1972, p. 98.
26 Report to  1972 Annual Congress, Bound Volume collecting GAA Congress Booklets 1962-1972, p. 750.
27 M unster Express, 31 March 1972.
28 Ulster Herald, 1 April 1972.
29 Irish Independent, 8 April 1972,
50 Irish Press, 8 April 1972.
31 Irish Independent, 8 June 1972.
32 Irish Press, 9 August 1972.
1 6
remained in Long Kesh.33 Throughout 1972, the release of the internees was firmly linked to 
the ending o f paramilitary violence.34 In the lead up to the Official IRA (OIRA) and Provisional 
IRA (PIRA) 1972 ceasefires, both groups came under moral35 and political36 pressure to end 
their armed campaigns, with the release of all internees inextricably linked to a cessation of 
paramilitary hostilities.37 Father Denis Faul38 and Conor Cruise O’Brien, (Irish) Labour Party 
spokesman on Northern Ireland, went further and accused the IRA of wanting to keep the 
internees in Long Kesh ‘in order to maintain the alienation of the Catholic community’ and ‘as 
a barrier preventing the elected representatives of the Catholic people, and especially the SDLP, 
from engaging in normal political activity.’39 This created the perception that it was republican 
violence, and not British policy, keeping men interned in Long Kesh. Furthermore, the passing 
of the Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order, in November 1972,40 led Lord 
Windlesham, Minister of State for Northern Ireland, to declare that ‘internment as such is now 
a thing o f the past.’41 On the second anniversary o f internment Hugh McKeown wrote in the 
Irish Independent that ‘since the introduction of the interim custody order, the main hue and 
cry against internment seems to have died down. The media no longer devote much space or 
time to it, and many are under the mistaken impression that the detention of political prisoners 
has been toned down.’42
Reflecting this decline in public interest toward internment, GAA fundraising for 
internees declined sharply throughout 1973 despite the fact that the number o f internees rose 
throughout the year to reach 610 by December 1973.43 (In total 1,000 people were sentenced 
or detained throughout 1973 bringing the total number of detainees to 2,50g.44) In February 
1973 the Coiste Bainisti (Management Committee) o f the GAA ruled that ‘in view of the failure 
o f the Association to arrange for a free Sunday in every County, it was decided that a percentage
33 Irish Press, 8 December 1972.
34 Irish Independent, 8 June 1972.
35 Irish Independent, 3 April 1972.
36 Irish Independent, 8 April 1972.
37 Irish Independent, 22 April 1972.
38 Irish Press, 24 April 1972.
39 Irish Press, 24 May 1972,
40 The Detention o f Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order perm itted the Secretary o f State to apply against any 
suspect an in te rim  custody order fo r 28 days, at the end o f which tim e his case has to be referred to one o f 
the three Commissioners appointed by the British government. Irish Independent, 12 November 1972.
41 Irish Independent, 11 November 1972.
42 Irish Independent, 9 August 1973.
43 Ulster Herald, 22 December 1973, p. 6.
44 Irish Independent, 22 December 1973.
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of all gates taken on one Sunday out o f three be set aside for the Funds'4' with the later addition 
that ‘an increased charge of 5p would be made in each Province in July at their principal final 
- County Committees...to arrange for a similar collection.’46 In October 1973 the GAA decided 
to hold another national church-gate collection — the press release issued stated that the GAA 
‘aided by a generous public have to date distributed over £70,000...and the fund was kept 
solvent during recent months through subventions to the tune o f £8,000 taken from principal 
G.A.A. championship gates in all four provinces.’47 In December 1973, Donal Keenan, GAA 
president, having received £7,562 from the October church-gate collection that was held in 
some of the counties only,48 ‘emphasised the grave need for funds and urged the remainder of 
the Counties to have the collection taken up.’49
The phased release o f internees resumed and continued throughout 1974 and 1975, with 
the releases firmly linked to the pattern of political violence. The Gardiner Report, published 
in January 1975, recommended the continuation of internment (and the ending of special - 
category-status for sentenced paramilitary prisoners) but by the third month of the 1975 PIRA 
ceasefire (February 1975 -  January 1976), 230 internees had been released (leaving 346 in 
Long Kesh) including the last two ‘original internees’50 and the final eight women interned in 
Armagh Prison.51 GAA fundraising for internees during this two year period was limited. In 
1973 the four provincial councils donated a total of £6,050 to the ‘Northern Relief Fund’ while 
in 1974 Ulster was the only provincial council who donated money, £500, to the fund.52 To put 
this two-year GAA total of £6,050 into context, £198,000 was distributed by the Green Cross 
Committee between July 1974 and July 1975.53 On 5 December 1975 the last 47 internees were 
freed54 and the policy o f internment officially ended. By August 1976 the Coiste Bainisti 
declared their fund ‘depleted’ and, in addition to asking the county boards to embark on another 
collecting drive, decided to hold a raffle for colour television at the 1976 hurling and football 
finals.55
45 Coiste Bainisti minutes, 2 February 1973, CCMB 1973, p. 17.
46 Coiste Bainisti m inutes, 23 June 1973, CCMB 1973, p. 193.
47 Anglo-Celt, 5 October 1973.
48 Coiste Bainisti m inutes, 28 November 1973, CCMB 1973, p. 334.
49 Central Council m inutes, 8 December 1973, CCMB 1973, p. 340.
50 Irish Press, 19 April 1975.
51 Irish Press, 29 April 1975.
52 Report to 1975 Annual Congress, Bound Volume collecting GAA Congress Booklets 1973-1976, p. 442.
53 Irish Press, 1 July 1975.
54 Irish Press, 6 December 1975.
55 Coiste Bainisti m inutes, 21 August 1976, CCMB 1976, p. 196.
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GAA fundraising for internees and political prisoners was not confined to Ireland: there 
was a brief, and wholly unsuccessful, relationship between the GAA and Irish Northern Aid 
(Noraid) between 1970 and 1972. The outbreak of the ‘Troubles’ in Ireland politicised the 
GAA in America; reports and images of Civil Rights protestors being attacked, and the heavy- 
handed, nationalist-targeted, response of the security forces, angered sections of Irish-America 
and ‘many quickly reconnected with what had been a largely dormant sense o f Irishness, one 
that for some increasingly became characterised by an intense antipathy towards the Unionist 
establishment in Northern Ireland and the British presence there’.56 The GAA, as one of the 
leading Irish organisations in America, became an outlet through which this politicised sense 
of Irishness was expressed.
From its inception, Noraid57 looked to the GAA, and other Irish and Irish-American 
institutions, for support. The overlap in membership between the two organisations, and the 
support of John ‘Kerry’ O’Donnell, one of the most influential men in US GAA circles,58 
ensured that the GAA, and Gaelic Park in New York in particular, were at the forefront of 
Noraid activities. Since the first GAA county-team tour of America, by the Tipperary hurling 
team in 1926, GAA officials in America realised that tours o f Irish teams, preferably the All- 
Ireland or National League champions, had the ability to draw much larger crowds and raise 
more revenue than local fundraising initiatives could ever achieve. It was to this end that 
Michael Flannery, on behalf of a ‘Fund-raising Committee in New York’, appeared at the 21 
August 1971 GAA Executive Committee meeting, in Croke Park, and appealed that the Antrim 
football team, a ‘symbolic choice’ of teams,59 be given permission to undertake a September 
fundraising tour of America. Flannery explained that the Committee in New York was 
supported by prominent businessmen, top trade union officials and newspaper executives and
56 Paul Darby, Gaelic Games, Nationalism and the Irish Diaspora in the U nited States (Dublin: University 
College Press, 2009), p. 186.
57 Noraid was founded in New York in 1970 and quickly became the main support group fo r m ilitan t 
republicanism. The found ing members o f Noraid, M atthew  Higgins, M ichael Flannery, Jack McCarthy and 
John McGowan, were all 'Irish-born veterans o f the revolutionary period, all anti-treatyites, all em igrated  
during the 1920s and all were prom inent in the New York G.A.A. and Irish County Associations/ Brian 
Hanley, 'The Politics o f Noraid', Irish Political Studies 19, (2007), p. 16.
58 John O'Donnell was born in Kerry, em igrating to  Montreal in 1918 before moving to  New York. In 1935, 
against the backdrop o f the Great Depression, O'Donnell bought his firs t saloon bar in 1935, adding fou r 
more to his po rtfo lio  throughout the next decade. O'Donnell's invo lvement in the GAA began in 1929 when  
he jo ined the Kerry foo tba ll club as a player; he subsequently served in a number of adm inistrative roles, 
including President o f the New York GAA. O'Donnell is best known fo r raising the funds to secure a long­
term lease (w ith O 'Donnell as sole proprie tor) to Innisfail Park (renamed Gaelic Park) in 1944. Darby, Gaelic 
Games, N ationalism  and the Irish Diaspora in the United States, p. 105.
59 Irish Times, 27 August 1971.
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that he expected the tour to raise $100,000.6° The Executive Committee agreed to the tour, on 
the condition that all the funds collected ‘be channelled through the Central Council.. .to ensure 
that the funds would be devoted exclusively for the relief of distress.’61 It was this condition 
that led to the cancellation of the tour: Flannery’s fundraising committee refused to accept that 
the hands be channelled through the Central Council and the GAA subsequently refused Antrim 
permission to travel.62 This clearly highlights the concerns that the GAA held about the 
disbursement of Noraid funds in Ireland; during the tumultuous opening years of the 
‘Troubles’, Noraid (while later claiming to be a republican prisoner support group) openly 
raised funds for arms for the republican movement. This it often did in connection with GAA 
related events - in an article advertising a series of fundraising games in Gaelic Park, New 
York, in 1972, Matthew Higgins admitted that Noraid had no control over how the raised funds 
were spent in Ireland and stated that if the republican movement ‘want they can spend it on 
weapons, but that is their concern.’63
GAA tours to America had been cancelled in 1970, mainly due to the disruption the 
absence of players from Ireland was having on the Irish club competitions. When the GAA 
decided to resume these tours, in 1972, they scheduled that Derry would play the National 
Football League Winners (or runners-up) and Limerick would play the National Hurling 
League winners (or runners-up), in Gaelic Park (New York) in June 1972, and that the proceeds 
would ‘go towards the Relief o f Distress in the 6 Counties after the present overdraft on the 
International Fund (£4,000) has been cleared.’64 However, eventual winners of the National 
Football League, Kerry, forfeited their June tour to New York when they accepted an invitation, 
from John Kerry O’Donnell, President of the New York GAA Board, to participate in the 
Cardinal Cushing games, in Gaelic Park in May. In addition to the Cardinal Cushing games, 
Kerry arranged to play games in Hartford and Boston with the ‘proceeds o f the latter fixture to 
be donated for the relief of distress in Northern Ireland’65 with the funds spent on bringing 
‘groups of children from republican families in Northern Ireland to holiday in the Irish 
Republic.’66 A revised tour timetable for the June New York games was drawn up67 which
60 Executive Committee m inutes, 21 August 1971, CCMB 1971, p. 181.
61 Executive Committee m inutes, 21 August 1971, CCMB 1971, p. 181.
62 Irish Times, 30 August 1971.
63 Darby, Gaelic Games, Nationalism  and the Irish Diaspora in the United States, p. 190.
64 Executive Comm ittee m inutes, 25 March 1972, CCMB 1972, p. 45.
65 Irish Times, 18 April 1972.
66 Darby, Gaelic Games, Nationalism  and the Irish Diaspora in the United States, p. 189.
67 Executive Comm ittee m inutes, 12 May 1972, CCMB 1972, p. 129.
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eventually scheduled Derry (football) travelling to New York in June68 with a further 
programme of games planned for Gaelic Park in September including a Cork v Limerick 
hurling match and “An Irish County” v New York Football game on 10 September 1972. Pat 
Fanning, GAA president, outlined that ‘Labour Unions [are] being organised to support the 
event for Relief of Distress in the North and V.I.P.s such as Ted Kennedy [are] being invited’.69 
This trip was cancelled70 when the GAA in New York informed the Executive Committee in 
Ireland that Gaelic Park would not be available on 10 September as it had been ‘reserved for a 
local programme to raise funds for relief of distress in Northern Ireland.’71 When the GAA in 
New York later wrote to state that Gaelic Park would, in fact, be available on 10 September 
the Executive Committee re-affirmed their decision to cancel the tour ‘because of the short 
notice and the many uncertainties connected with the proposed tour.’72
This cancelled 1972 tour marked the end of the very brief relationship between the 
GAA (in Ireland) and Noraid. Irish republican violence throughout 1972 saw support levels for 
Noraid fall in America,73 and in October 1972 Desmond O ’Malley, Irish Minister for Justice, 
appealed to Irish-Americans not to contribute to Noraid. His message, carried on the front page 
o f the Irish Times, would have been heard by GAA members throughout Ireland. In his appeal, 
O’Malley stated that money collected by Noraid ‘is finding its way into the hands of the I.R.A. 
and is being used to finance their campaign of violence. ’ He asked that people contribute to the 
Red Cross or their Church instead.74
II.
Throughout the period 1969-1976, the GAA publicly condemned internment and 
supported those interned, while also giving limited support, on humanitarian grounds, to the 
various republican prison protests. The GAA also campaigned directly on behalf of two 
republican prisoners, Donal Whelan and Desmond Ferguson, both of whom were former GAA 
players. The GAA voiced its concerns, internally, about internment as soon as the measure was 
proposed by the Irish government. On 5 December 1970, the Irish government threatened to 
reintroduce internment without trial due to a ‘secret armed conspiracy...to kidnap one or more
68 Irish Times, 12 June 1972.
69 Executive Comm ittee m inutes, 14 July 1972, CCMB 1972, p. 141.
70 Executive Comm ittee m inutes, 28 July 1972, CCMB 1972, p. 157.
71 Irish Times, 4 August 1972.
72 Executive Comm ittee m inutes 11 August 1972, CCMB 1972, p. 163.
73 Hanley, 'The Politics o f Noraid', p. 4.
74 Irish Times, 25 October 1972.
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prominent persons...with...plans to carry out armed bank robberies’.75 The prospect of 
internment in the Republic of Ireland immediately led to public fears that internment would 
also be introduced in Northern Ireland, claims which were initially denied by the British 
Government.76 The Central Council of the GAA suspended their 11 December meeting to 
discuss internment ‘in both parts of the country’ and drafted a statement ‘expressing concern 
regarding the matter’, but agreed that Sean O Siochain would contact An Taoiseach, Jack 
Lynch,77 before publishing the statement.78 At their next meeting, the Central Council 
unanimously agreed not to publish the statement as ‘the concern of the Council had been 
conveyed to the Taoiseach’.79
When internment was introduced in Northern Ireland, on 9 August 1971, there was a 
‘general but not universal condemnation in the Republic...[ranging] from outright 
condemnation to a Fine Gael call for international supervision of the exercise of the emergency 
powers.’80 The GAA, at all levels, condemned the introduction o f internment: Pat Fanning, 
GAA president, was one of a number of speakers at an anti-internment rally held in Casement 
Park, Belfast, on 12 September 1971.81 The following April, at the 1972 Annual Congress, 
Fanning was unequivocal in his condemnation of internment and support for the internees, 
interned GAA members in particular. When addressing Congress, Fanning stated that GAA 
clubs had ‘suffered through the crime of internment’ before commenting
A t this Congress today there are empty chairs. T hey were the chairs o f  m en w ho w ere appointed to attend 
as County delegates. They are not w ith us because they are interned in British concentration camps. Their 
seats are left vacant as a sym bol and as a tribute. T hese men are in the G .A .A . tradition. I send them  
greetings in your name. In your name I salute them .82
One o f those missing from the 1972 Annual Congress was Patrick J. McClean, vice- 
president of the West Tyrone GAA Board, who, in January 1972, although interned in Long 
Kesh, was chosen by the Tyrone county board to represent the county at both the Ulster
75 Irish rim es, 5 December 1970.
76 Irish Times, 7 December 1970.
77 Jack Lynch is the 'u ltim a te  example o f one who enjoyed success in the GAA and in politics '; Lynch won six 
All-Ireland senior medals In a row  between 1941 and 1946, five In hurling and one in foo tba ll. As his GAA 
career ended. Lynch stood and won a seat fo r Fianna Fail In the 1948 election, he was promoted through  
the ranks and served in various m inisterial positions, before being elected Taoiseach in 1966, Mike Cronin, 
Mark Duncan and Paul Rouse, The GAA A People's H istory (Cork: The Collins Press, 2009), pp. 163-166.
78 Central Council m inutes, 11 December 1970, CCMB 1970, p. 285.
79 Central Council m inutes, 19 December 1970, CCMB 1970, p. 287.
80 Irish Times, 10 August 1971.
81 Cronin, Duncan & Rouse, The GAA A People's History, p. 167.
82 1972 Annual Congress minutes, CCMB 1972, pp. 86-87.
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Convention, in March 1972, and the 1972 Annual Congress.83 In his report to the 1972 Tyrone 
County Convention, the secretary, Padraig O’Neill, stated that the work of the GAA ‘has been 
hampered and. disrupted by the arrest, detention and unlawful internment o f our members, 
officials, players and club members’ but that it represented an opportunity for the ‘Gaels of 
Tyrone...[to]...stress our solidarity with those who have been unjustly and unlawfully 
imprisoned or are suffering in other ways for the right to live and work as free men in their 
own country.’84 Some units, however, were unsure and somewhat reluctant as to how to 
respond to internment: when representatives of Parnells and Fingallians contacted the Dublin 
county board to protest against internment, the county chairman, James Gray (Seamus De 
Grae), stated that ‘this was a very delicate matter and [given] the fact that efforts were being 
made by the Chairmen of the county boards in the 6 Counties he thought it better not to pursue 
the matter.’85 Throughout this condemnation the GAA sought to maintain its non-political 
stance: when five internees, GAA members from Down, criticised Tony Williamson, chairman 
of the South Down GAA Board, for running as an Alliance Party candidate for Newry and 
Moume Council in the 1973 Northern Ireland local government elections, Sean O Siochain 
issued a brief statement that ‘the right of the individual member to pursue his political beliefs, 
removed from his G.A.A. activities and connection is basic and absolute.’86
When internment officially ended, on 5 December 1975, the GAA, through Annual 
Congress, highlighted, and demanded an end to, ‘internment by remand’ whereby men were 
arrested and held, without charge, for up to twelve months; at the end o f this period they would 
be brought to court where no charges would be brought against them.87 In addition, the GAA, 
between 1969 and 1976, voiced its concerns for the welfare o f sentenced republican prisoners. 
At the 1972 Annual Congress a London motion ‘That the G.A.A. make a protest at the 
treatment of Irish political prisoners’88 was passed, with another London motion passed in 1974 
‘That the G.A.A. does its utmost to ensure that members o f the Association in British jails be 
given fair and humane treatment.’ Responding to this motion, Donal Keenan, GAA president, 
stated that the GAA had previously made representations about the treatment and detention of 
prisoners in British jails and that the association ‘would do their utmost to get fair and humane
83 Irish Times, 2QJanuary 1972.
84 Secretary's Report to  the 1972 Tyrone County Convention, p. 3.
85 Dublin County Board m inutes, 30 August 1971, Dublin County Board M inu te  Book 1966-1980, p. 372.
86 Irish Press, 24 May 1973.
87 1976 Annual Congress minutes, CCMB 1976, pp, 86-87.
88 1972 Annual Congress minutes, CCMB 1972, p. 98.
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treatment for all the people in British jails.’89 Similarly, in February 1975, the Coiste Bainisti 
‘decided to appeal to the Minister for Justice to ease the plight o f the prisoners in Portlaoise 
Jail and, thereby, create a better climate towards a permanent peace.’90
Republican prisoners initiated a number of hunger strikes during the period 1969-1976, 
with the GAA offering limited support to a small number of these protests. The GAA did not 
offer any support to the Billy McKee led 1972 hunger strike that resulted in republican 
prisoners being transferred to Long Kesh and being granted ‘special-category-status’. When 
PIRA prisoners in English jails mounted a series of hunger strikes, between 1973 and 1976, 
demanding repatriation to Long Kesh and Armagh prisons, where they would be afforded de 
facto  political status,91 the GAA gave limited support to the prisoners’ demands. A public 
campaign was mounted on behalf of the prisoners, the Price sisters in particular, with detailed 
descriptions and public demonstrations of force-feeding crucial in building support for the 
prisoners.92 In January 1974, the Armagh GAA convention passed a resolution calling for the 
Price sisters to be allowed to serve their prison sentences in Ireland and sent copies of this 
resolution to every county board in Ireland asking for their support.93 Other county boards 
passed similar resolutions at their own conventions including Tyrone,94 Derry,95 Dublin,96 
Mayo,97 Cavan and Leitrim.98 In March 1974 the Ulster Provincial Council also passed a 
resolution in support of the sisters,99 while the Central Council ‘agreed that a letter be sent to 
the Minister for External Affairs in support of the Price Sisters transfer back to Ireland.’100 The 
limits o f  the association’s support for the prisoners is evident in that there was no 
condemnation, or expression of sympathy, at national level, when Michael Gaughan (3 June 
1974) and Frank Stagg (12 February 1976) died on separate hunger strikes.
During the period 1969-1976, the GAA campaigned on behalf o f two individual 
prisoners, both former players. In 1973 Donal Whelan (Domhnall O Faolain), an All-Ireland
83 1974 Annual Congress minutes, CCMB 1974, p. 88.
90 Coiste Bainisti m inutes, 1 February 1975, CCMB 1975, p. 12.
91 Ruan O'Donnell, Special Category. The IRA in English Prisons Volume 1 :1968-1978  (Dublin: Irish Academic 
Press, 2012), pp. 177-179.
92 McEvoy, Param ilitary Im prisonm ent in Northern Ireland, p. 81.
93 Irish Independent, 21 January 1974.
94 Ulster Herald, 2 February 1974.
95 Ulster Herald, 9 February 1974,
96 Dublin County Board m inutes, 4 February 1974, Dublin County Board M inu te  Book 1966-1980, p. 427.
97 Connacht Telegraph, 31 January 1974.
98 Anglo-Celt, 1 February 1974.
99 Anglo-Celt, 8 March 1974.
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hurling winner with Waterford in 1959, was removed from his post as headmaster of 
Kilmacthomas Vocational School.101 Whelan had received a two years suspended sentence for 
his role in the Claudia gun-running affair.102 Support for the reinstatement of Whelan was 
expressed at county, provincial and national levels, with the Central Council making 
representations on the matter to the Irish Government. At the 1974 Annual Congress, a 
Waterford sponsored motion was passed, insisting that ‘ Ard-Chomhairle strive by every means 
available to it, for the reinstatement in his post of Domfrnall Ó Faolain.’103 In discussing the 
motion, Tommy Lynch (Tomás Ó Loingsigh), Armagh delegate, stated that ‘in the North they 
are used to injustices of all kinds, it happens daily. But even in their darkest days if a 
schoolteacher was imprisoned his job was there for him when he came out.’104 Responding to 
the motion, Donal Keenan assured Congress that the GAA had made ‘strong representations’ 
to have Whelan reinstated and spoke of an unspecified plan (that Whelan had agreed to) and 
urged Congress not to take further action until ‘such time as they report back to the Central 
Council their success or failure in these negotiations.’105 The lack of progress in these 
negotiations is evident: at the 1975 Annual Congress a similar motion was proposed106 with 
the proposer, John Murphy, stating that the government was non-committal in previous 
negotiations on the matter.107 (In August 1980, Donal Whelan was reinstated as the headmaster 
of Kilmachthomas Vocational School; when the post was advertised Whelan was the only 
applicant -  the Waterford Vocational Education Committee recommended him for the post, 
with the Minister for Education approving it.108)
The Offences against the State (Amendment) Act was passed in Ireland in 1972. Central 
to the Act was a provision that the ‘mere unsupported statement of a Chief Superintendent of 
the Garda Siochana would be accepted as evidence that an accused person was a member o f an 
unlawful association.’109 Desmond (Dessie) Ferguson (Deasún Mac Fheargusa), an All-Ireland 
football winner with Dublin in 1958 and 1963, was arrested and charged, in 1975, with 
membership of the Provisional IRA.110 During Ferguson’s trial, Chief Superintendent Richard
101 Irish Times, 18 September 1973.
102 Irish Times, 30 March 1973.
103 1974 Annual Congress M inutes, CCMB 1974, p. 68.
104 1974 Annual Congress M inutes, CCMB 1974, p. 69.
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Cotterell told the court that he believed Ferguson was a member o f the IRA ‘on the basis of 
confidential information’ but Cotterell refused to disclose these reports to the defence 
counsel.111 Ferguson’s trial was a ‘test-case’ aimed at the Offences Against the State Act and 
‘although the Chief Superintendent involved refused repeatedly to answer questions as to the 
basis of his opinion, claiming “privilege”’, Ferguson was convicted of membership o f the 
Provisional IRA, ‘solely on the basis of the Chief Superintendent’s stated opinion.’112 The 
Coiste Bainisti, at their July 1975 meeting, discussed Ferguson’s prison sentence and decided 
to apply to the Governor of Portlaoise Prison for permission to visit Ferguson.113 The following 
month, James Gray, Dublin delegate, gave notice to the Leinster Council of Dublin county 
board’s intentions to ‘launch a protest in the event of Des Ferguson’s employment being placed 
in jeopardy after the expiration of his current term of imprisonment.’114 In September 1975 the 
Coiste Bainisti reported that they had received resolutions o f protest at Ferguson’s 
imprisonment from Monaghan, Tipperary, Meath and Waterford but the Governor of Portlaoise 
had refused to allow representatives meet with Ferguson.115 At their November meeting, the 
Coiste Bainisti explained that the Minister for Justice had informed them that they were denied 
access to Ferguson as, in the Government’s view, ‘such a visit would be interpreted as 
condoning the serious illegality for which he was imprisoned.’116
III.
The period of internment at Long Kesh, 1969-1975, has been termed, by Kieran 
McEvoy, as one o f ‘reactive containment’ through which ‘levels o f violence and violent 
perpetrators [were] contained while a political solution was sought.’117 Internees were initially 
held in Crumlin Road Prison, Magilligan Prison and, for a short period, the Maidstone prison 
ship, but the Long Kesh camp became the main holding centre for internees. Following a 
hunger strike led by Billy McKee, in Crumlin Road prison in 1972, republican convicts were 
transferred from Crumlin Road Prison to a separate section of Long Kesh and granted special- 
category-status, which amounted to de facto prisoner-of-war status.118 This meant that during
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the period 1969-1976 Long Kesh held several classes of detainees including republican 
internees, loyalist internees, sentenced republican prisoners (from both the Official and 
Provisional factions of the IRA) and sentenced loyalist prisoners. The Long Kesh camp was 
divided into three sections, with a total of twenty-two compounds, or cages as the republican 
internees and prisoners referred to them. Each cage contained up to four nissen huts that each 
accommodated up to eighty men.
Sport formed part of the everyday life of both the republican internees and convicts, but 
with some differences between the two types of prisoners. Within each cage there was a small 
tarmac playing pitch, more suited to five-a-side soccer, while within the overall camp, there 
were two football pitches, with soccer goalposts, known as the ‘wee pitch’ and the ‘big pitch’. 
Internees and convicts were allowed access to these two pitches at regular intervals. Hurling 
was played by some of the republican internees, but, for security purposes, hurling was not 
allowed to be played by the republican convicts. For many republican internees, Long Kesh 
marked the first time that they played hurling -  Joe Doherty, who was interned in Long Kesh 
in 1972, explained that, although he grew up a ‘young Brit’, supporting English and Northern 
Irish soccer teams, when he entered Long Kesh his ‘whole life opened up’ as it was there that 
he started learning the Irish language, studying Irish history and playing Gaelic games. Doherty 
explained that the first time he held a hurl, apart from when hurls were used for drilling 
purposes with Na Fianna Eireann, was in the internment cages o f Long Kesh. Doherty 
explained that when he first entered Long Kesh as an internee,
I w as in the cage that they had hurling sticks in ...[so] I went out and did a w ee bit o f  training there...It 
w as only w hen I w ent into Long Kesh as an internee that w e  were taken out onto the pitch so that’s when  
w e were p laying hurling. W e used to learn it . .. w e were certainly taken out on the field  and learned how  
to hit the ball and catch the ball we did a w ee bit o f  sm all training.
Hurling amongst the internees was played on an ad hoc basis and there was no real level of 
organisation attached to the sport. Doherty remembers that, whilst there were a few 
participants, there were not enough hurlers to play a match and that some of the internees 
‘basically did one or two hours out on the pitch once a week -  somebody would just bring out 
the hurls, if  somebody was there and he was a hurler he’d show you.’119 This is in contrast to 
the level of enthusiasm and organisation attached to the playing of Gaelic football amongst the 
internees, and the sentenced prisoners. Bobby Devlin, in his Long Kesh memoirs, An Interlude
119 Interview  w ith  Joe Doherty, Belfast, 28 February 2014.
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with Seagulls, wrote of intense inter-cage Gaelic football competitions amongst the internees, 
often with medals presented to the winning cage.120
Gaelic football was even more organised amongst the sentenced republican prisoners 
who, unlike the internees, were subject to the IRA’s strict military regime.121 The sentenced 
prisoners also had the ‘advantage’ of knowing how long their sentence was and they could plan 
their prison lives accordingly, involving themselves in educational, cultural and sporting 
activities. (Many internees, who did not know for how long they would be held in Long Kesh, 
found it hard to motivate themselves and, as such, disengaged from the activities surrounding 
them.) By 1976, the sentenced PIRA prisoners occupied five cages - 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13. 
Within their respective cages, the prisoners played, on an almost daily basis, soccer, Gaelic 
football, baseball, volleyball and, when it snowed, rugby.122 For practical purposes, soccer was 
the most popular sport played within the cages, as when Gaelic football was played, the ball 
would regularly go over the fence and the prisoners would have to ask the prison guards to 
return the ball. When the weather was bad, the prisoners in Cage 11 often emptied the contents 
o f the end hut, which acted as a meeting / canteen hut, and played three-a-side soccer in this 
hut.123
The convicted republican prisoners were also allowed access to one o f the ‘wee’ and 
‘big’ football pitches ‘three or four times a week’, where they played soccer and Gaelic 
football, with ‘a balance of matches played’ and neither code outweighing the other. The 
prisoners organised an inter-cage Gaelic football league, with the inaugural competition taking 
place in 1976. Each of the five participating cages had a selection panel, usually three members, 
who would pick the team to play the cage’s scheduled match. A cage not involved in a 
particular match would supply the referee and umpires for the match. The matches themselves 
were played according to regulation GAA rules, with the main differences being that the pitch 
was a gravel pitch and only contained soccer goal posts. (It is unclear if  points were counted in 
these matches -  Joe Doherty explained that points were not counted and it was goals only, 
while Liam Stone maintained that points were counted and that the umpire would have to 
adjudicate whether the ball went inside the imaginary points-posts.) Cage 10 won the inaugural 
inter-cage competition, with Cage 11 winning each subsequent competition until the cessation
120 Bobby Devlin, An Interlude w ith  Seagulls: Memories o f  a Long Kesh Internee (Belfast: Bobby Devlin, 1982).
121 David Beresford, Ten M en Dead (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994), p. 22.
322 In terview  w ith  Liam Stone, Belfast, 28 February 2014.
123 In terv iew  w ith  Liam Stone, Belfast, 28 February 2014.
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of the league in 1983. Liam Stone, who was in Cage 10 in 1976 and transferred to Cage 11 in 
1977, is in the unique position of being on each winning team in the history of the Long Kesh 
inter-cage Gaelic football competition. The phasing out of special-category-status from 
paramilitary prisoners, from 1 March 1976 onwards, had a detrimental effect on the 
organisation of the Gaelic football competitions, and sport in general, within the Long Kesh 
camp. Republican prisoners convicted of an offence after 1 March 1976 were sent to the newly 
constructed cellular H-Blocks; as special-category prisoners were released, and with no new 
entrants, the population of the Long Kesh camp dwindled. By 1978 there were only enough 
republican prisoners in Long Kesh to fill four cages -  by 1980 there were only three cages. The 
decrease in prisoner population, and the reduction in the number of inhabited cages, had a 
detrimental impact on the competition and inter-cage rivalry
As with previous periods of republican detention, the GAA supported the playing of 
Gaelic games within Long Kesh by supplying clothing and equipment. The players in Long 
Kesh played the inter-cage leagues wearing full kits provided by some GAA clubs, with GAA 
clubs also providing the footballs. Members of the winning team received a medal or small 
shield, supplied by a GAA club, with the Jimmy Steele Memorial Trophy124 presented to the 
winning team. The authorities in Long Kesh allowed the GAA to supply this material -  at the 
1976 GAA Annual Congress, the Armagh delegate complained that the Governor o f Portlaoise 
Prison would not allow Armagh delegates deliver a set o f jerseys to the republican prisoners 
and that ‘they had already delivered a set to Long Kesh and a set to MagilHgan and there were 
no problems whatsoever.’125
The playing of Gaelic games by both the internees and the special-category prisoners 
was a deliberate ideological act of defiance. Gaelic games were used as a weapon within the 
Long Kesh camp. Joe Doherty explained that, in addition to promoting the Irish language, 
history and music, the view amongst the internees was that ‘you certainly weren’t playing your 
full role, if you weren’t promoting Gaelic football.’ Liam Stone agreed and explained that the 
republican prisoners
wanted to show  our defiance, show that notwithstanding the fact that w e were in them circum stances, w e
were in that environm ent -  that as conscious Irish republicans w e were going to play gam es associated
124 Jimmy Steele was an IRA man o f the 1930s-1950s; he escaped from  Crumlin Road Prison in 1943 and, while  
on the run, facilita ted the escape o f 21 prisoners from Derry Prison. The Jimmy Steele Memorial Trophy Is 
currently used by the Golf Committee o f the Roddy McCorley Society, Belfast.
125 1976 Annual Congress minutes, CCMB 1976, p. 87.
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with Irish culture, our native gam es....W e were conscious that w e were there as Irish republicans and we 
w ould be promoting our native games, even within the confines.126
As Brian Hanley has shown, in ‘Irish Republican attitudes to sport since 1921 the outbreak 
of the ‘Troubles’ changed much about republicanism in a cultural sense. Republicans in 
Belfast, Derry and other urban areas saw no contradiction in being members of the IRA and 
supporting English and Scottish soccer clubs.127 This cultural shift was reflected in the Long 
Kesh camp where the prisoners played both Gaelic football and soccer. This was in stark 
contrast to previous bouts of republican internment and imprisonment, where the playing of 
‘foreign games’ was a contentious issue amongst republican prisoners. Only a decade 
previously, the proposed inclusion of soccer in the feis organised by the republican prisoners 
in Belfast Jail, imprisoned as part of the ‘Border Campaign’ (1956-1962), led to a serious 
argument amongst the prisoners.128
IV.
The response of the GAA to the introduction of internment, and the imprisonment of 
republicans, has to be placed in the context of the association’s overall response to the early 
years o f the ‘Troubles’. While the ban on ‘foreign games’ was rescinded by the GAA in 1971, 
the ban on members of the British military becoming members of the GAA remained. The 
people most instrumental in having the ban on foreign games removed, Tom Woulfe and John 
O’Grady in particular, focused their attentions on attempting to remove the ban on the British 
military and, as shall be discussed in the following chapters, became the most vocal opponents 
of any GAA involvement in the H-Blocks campaign.
In many ways, the response of the GAA to the outbreak of the ‘Troubles’ mirrors that 
of the response of society in the Republic of Ireland. Diarmaid Ferriter, in Ambiguous Republic: 
Ireland in the 1970s, has shown that while the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland forced people in 
the Republic o f Ireland to ‘think seriously about the border for the first time in decades’ there 
was also a ‘concerted political determination to ensure that the Troubles were contained in 
Northern Ireland and would not spill over the border.’129 While Bloody Sunday was a seminal 
moment in the history of Ireland, the resultant anger, protests and calls for a United Ireland in
126 Interview w ith Liam Stone, Belfast, 28 February 2014.
127 Brian Hanley, 'Irish Republican attitudes to sport since 192T in McAnallen, Hassan & Hegarty (eds.), The 
Evolution o f  the GAA Ulaidh, pp. 175-184.
12S Bryson, (ed.), The Insider, p. 413,
129 Diarmaid Ferriter, Ambiguous Republic: Ireland in the 1970s (London: Profile Books Ltd, 2012), p. 121.
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the Republic were reactionary and short lived, with John A. Murphy later writing that IRA 
violence had ‘numbed’ the ‘so-called aspiration to a united Ireland’ by 1976. (By 1976, 1,794 
people had been killed in the ‘Troubles’.) Several declarations of support for the ‘struggle for 
freedom’ were expressed by the GAA at their 1972 Annual Congress, held two months after 
Bloody Sunday. In his report to this Congress, Sean O Siochain wrote that the GAA identified 
itself with ‘the National cause in the struggle for civil rights and liberty in the Six Counties’, 
while at the Congress itself a Cork motion was unanimously passed that the GAA supports ‘the 
people of the North of Ireland in their struggle for freedom.’ Also at this Congress, an Antrim 
motion sought to amend Rule 7 of the GAA’s rulebook, which stated that the GAA was a non­
political association, to include that ‘active support be given to the struggle in the North for 
National Unity.’ While this motion was not passed, presumably on a technicality, the minutes 
record that Congress ‘agreed with [the] spirit of [the] motion’, with Pat Fanning, GAA 
president, explaining that the motion remained on the agenda ‘lest its removal...might lead 
anybody to the false conclusion that the Association was other than with the people of the North 
in their struggle.’130 As the conflict continued, however, the GAA, rather than supporting the 
‘struggle’ as a whole, focused instead on the specific issues of the British military occupations 
o f GAA grounds, the treatment of political prisoners and support for internees. Between 1973 
and 1976 no motions of support for the wider ‘national struggle’ were passed -  while two 
motions to this effect were proposed in 1973 and 1976, both were withdrawn after discussion. 
There is no doubt, however, that a more general support for republicanism and Irish unity 
informed and guided many of those who agitated for the GAA to support the republican 
prisoners.
As with previous republican campaigns, the GAA showed its solidarity with internees 
and prisoners predominantly through fundraising. Against the backdrop of intensive violence, 
the GAA had to ensure that any support, financial or otherwise, it offered to the internees and 
prisoners could not be perceived as support for IRA violence. In previous campaigns the GAA 
donated money to external organisations including National Aid (1916), Irish Republican 
Prisoners Fund (1917), Green Cross Society (1941) and An Cumann Cabhrach (1959) but 
throughout the opening years of the ‘Troubles’, the GAA maintained full control over the 
disbursement of the funds it raised. This insistence on maintaining full control over the raised 
funds deprived the GAA of a potential $ 100,000 when the association refused to allow the 
Antrim football team undertake a fundraising tom of America in September 1971. The reason
130 29-72 Annual Congress M inutes, CCMB 1972, p. 98.
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for stance this was clear though: GAA fundraising took place in the shadow of the 1970 ‘Arms 
Trial’ when £76,000 of the Irish government’s 1969 grant-in-aid for the relief of distress in 
Northern Ireland could not be accounted for, with two cabinet ministers removed from office 
for allegedly attempting to import arms to Northern Ireland with the funds. If any evidence was 
uncovered of GAA money being donated to republican paramilitary organisations, the 
repercussions for the association would have been severe, from the British and Irish 
governments, British military and, in particular, loyalist paramilitaries. Equally, post-1972, 
when the GAA expressed support for republican prisoners it was on humanitarian grounds 
only, with the association not expressing support for the actions or ideology that led to the 
prisoners being incarcerated. When the GAA raised the matter of prisoners in English jails and 
Portlaoise Prison their statements were carefully worded to reflect that their concerns were on 
humanitarian grounds only. On the two occasions the GAA directly campaigned for individual 
IRA prisoners, the association was, in fact, campaigning against the issues behind the sentences 
(return to employment and the Offences Against the State Act) rather than showing any support 
for the actions of the men or their paramilitary allegiance.
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Chapter Two: 1976-1980
The January L975 Gardiner Report recommended an end to special-category-status, a privilege 
won by republican hunger strikers in 1972, at the ‘earliest practicable opportunity’ and that 
politically motivated prisoners should be detained in a separate prison. Almost immediately, in 
February 1975,1 construction on what became known as the ‘H-Blocks’ commenced. This new 
prison complex, officially titled ‘HMP Maze’ but called Long Kesh by republicans, consisted 
of eight ‘H ’ shaped cellular prison structures which, according to the Northern Ireland Office 
(NIO), provided ‘prison accommodation on a par with the best in Western Europe.’2 In 
November 1975, Merlyn Rees, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, announced that special- 
category-status was to be phased out. This announcement triggered what became known as the 
‘Prison War’5 - an ideological war between the British government and paramilitary prisoners, 
Provisional IRA prisoners in particular. Under the new scheme announced by Rees, any 
paramilitary prisoner sentenced for an offence committed after 1 March 1976 was to be denied 
special-category-status and treated as an ordinary prisoner. (This was amended in April 1980 
so that any prisoner sentenced after 1980, no matter when the offence was committed, was not 
afforded special-category-status). The acceptance of criminal status was anathema to the 
republican movement for a number of reasons, predominantly the implied criminalisation of 
their armed campaign. Criminalisation would have had important propaganda implications for 
the republican movement and they considered it an ideological challenge to their position. 
Beginning with Kieran Nugent, the first republican prisoner sentenced for an offence 
committed after 1 March 1976, the republican prisoners undertook a series o f escalating 
protests that culminated in the 1980 and 1981 H-Block hunger strikes. Outside of the prison, a 
limited protest campaign was initiated by both Sinn Fein and the semi-autonomous Relatives 
Action Committees, but it was not until the formation of the National H-Block Committee, in 
October 1979, that these protests had a meaningful impact upon public opinion outside o f the 
republican communities.
This chapter will address how the GAA reacted to the escalating campaign that took 
place between 1976 and 1980, with an examination o f the early relationship between the GAA 
and the National H-Block Committee. The reaction of the GAA to the 1980 hunger strike will
1 Irish Times, 6 February 1975.
2 H-Biocks The fa c ts  (Northern Ireland Office, 1980), p. 2.
3 Richard English, Arm ed Struggle The History o f  the IRA (London: Pan Books, 2004), pp. 187-226.
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be explored, in the context of the public dispute that arose between the GAA and the Garda 
Representative Association (GRA) over the association’s alleged ambivalence to republican 
violence. Finally, this chapter will analyse the proceedings of the county and provincial 
conventions that took place shortly after the conclusion of the 1980 hunger strike, in an attempt 
to ascertain if the response of GAA units to the hunger strike, and associated matters, varied 
according to time, place and external factors, in particular the killing of three Gardai at the 
outset of the hunger strike.
I.
While there were some street protests in support of the H-Block prisoners during the 
period between the removal of special-category-status (March 1976) and the formation of the 
National H-Block Committee (October 1979), these protests were not part of a structured and 
co-ordinated campaign. Throughout this three year period, protests were staged by Sinn Fein, 
the Relatives Action Committees (RACs),4 and various other republican-socialist groupings. 
On occasions, the H-Block marches held by one group were boycotted by another: when a 
socialist-republican H-Blocks march was held in Bumtollet in January 1979, it was supported 
by the RACs but boycotted by Sinn Fein who condemned the organisers for applying to the 
RUC for permission to hold the march.5 This section will detail the GAA’s involvement in 
these protests and, furthermore, it will investigate the affect these protests had on the GAA. 
The involvement o f the GAA in these protests must be discussed in the context of Rule 7 of 
the GAA’s rulebook, which, until March 1979, stated that the GAA was a ‘non-political and 
non-sectarian’ association, with units and representatives prohibited from participating ‘in any 
political movement.’
The GAA’s first involvement in the prison protests o f this period came about due to a 
protest in support of a 1977 IRA hunger strike in Portlaoise prison, rather than the H-Blocks, 
but the incident served as a warning to the association about the level of emotion attached to 
republican hunger strikes and their potential to split opinion within the GAA.
4 The Relatives’ Action Committees (RACs) consisted of families, friends and com munity members o f the  
prisoners; the ir aim was to  publicise the plight o f the protesting prisoners. W hile heavily influenced by Sinn 
Fein, the RACs stressed the ir political autonomy in an a ttem p t to  w iden the ir support. In August 1978 a 
Central Coordinating Committee was established to  coordinate the activities o f these committees. Ross, 
Smashing H-Block.
5 Ross, Smashing H-Block, p, 53.
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In March 1977 approximately 100 republican prisoners went on hunger strike at 
Portlaoise prison with a series of demands.6 At the GAA’s 1977 Annual Congress, which was 
held six days after a 3 April public protest in Portlaoise in support of the prisoners ended in 
violence,7 a Kerry motion proposed ‘That anxiety be expressed and concern of the [sic] 
inhuman treatment of political prisoners in Portlaoise and other jails in this country and in 
England.’ In proposing the motion, Gerald McKenna, Kerry Chairman, explained that he did 
not allow any major discussion when the motion was raised at the Kerry county convention, 
but he felt that ‘as an Association they had the right to express anxiety and concern on the 
humanitarian basis of fellow human beings and that they would never be afraid or ashamed to 
do that’. Con Muiphy8 (Conchur O Murchu), GAA president, addressed Congress and stated 
that ‘the Association in every part o f Ireland acts with great responsibility, great calm, great 
cohesion and, at the same time, great determination that there would be justice for all’ and 
‘with a full sense o f the Association’s responsibility to society and its place in the 
community...he urged the powers that be, at home and abroad, to allay any fears of disquiet 
regarding the humane treatment of prisoners.’ Delegates accepted Murphy’s statement as 
‘expressing the feelings o f all members of Congress’ and the Kerry motion was not put to the 
delegates for acceptance or rejection.9
On the weekend of 16-17 April, there were further protests in Dublin with the protestors 
trying to capitalise on the 43,500 people attending the National Football League final between 
Dublin and Kerry at Croke Park on Sunday, 17 April. Before the start o f this match, protestors 
carrying banners in support of the Portlaoise hunger strikers entered the pitch but they were 
quickly removed by Gardai, who were ‘vigorously helped by two of the Dublin players, John 
McCarthy and David Hickey [who] chased, tackled and held the young men’, resulting in the 
arrest of six protestors.10 Dublin, as reigning All-Ireland football champions, were scheduled 
to accompany Cork (All-Ireland hurling champions) and the football and hurling All-Stars
6 The Irish Times listed the demands o f the prisoners as ‘the right to  free association; an end to  degrading and 
hum iliating s trip  searches; an end to solitary confinement; open visits; the right to  engage in craft work; the  
right to educational facilities; adequate recreation and exercise facilities; the right to  communicate w ith  the  
legal adviser o f the ir choice and an end to bruta lity. Irish Times, 26 March 1977.
7 Irish Times, 4 April 1977.
8 Con Murphy, who was GAA president during 1976-1979, was republican in outlook but, according to  Liam 
Mulvihill, never allowed his politics to  interfere in his GAA presidential duties.
9 1977 Annual Congress M inutes, CCMB 1977, p. 107.
10 Irish Times, 18 April 1977.
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teams on an 18-day tour of America, in May 1977, visiting Chicago, Los Angeles, San 
Francisco and New York.
The seemingly minor Croke Park incursion took on significance when, on 20 April, 
Tom O’Donoghue, Chairman of the North American Board o f the GAA, issued a statement 
that his board was opposed to Hickey and McCarthy participating in any of the games within 
the North American Board’s jurisdiction. O’Donoghue claimed that Irish-Americans, GAA 
members in particular, were ‘shocked and outraged’ at photographs that appeared in 
newspapers showing Hickey and McCarthy ‘violently attacking persons pleading for mercy for 
the hunger-strikers at Portlaoise Prison’. O’Donoghue accused Hickey and McCarthy of 
‘[disgracing] the uniform of the Dublin team and the spirit of the G.A.A. by using Croke Park 
to violently express their political hostility to the hunger-strikers.’11 The situation escalated the 
following day, 21 April, when the New York Board (a separate entity from the North American 
Board) issued their own statement that, while denying the imposition of a ban on any members 
scheduled to travel to America, insisted that in the ‘interests o f safety and preserving the 
harmony o f this great Irish occasion’ it would be ‘inadvisable’ for Hickey and McCarthy to 
play in New York.12 John ‘Kerry’ O’Donnell, owner of Gaelic Park, New York, also informed 
the Irish Times that ‘in his opinion, the players would be “ill-advised” to appear at the New 
York venue.13 This statement was, however, repudiated by Terry Connaughton, a former 
President o f the New York Board, who urged the Dublin team to ‘ignore any statements from 
John ‘Kerry5 O ’Donnell’, adding that the New York GAA was ‘not up in arms over what 
happened in Croke Park...as John Kerry O’Donnell would like people at home to believe.’14
In Dublin there was widespread anger at the imposition of a ‘ban’ on the two players; 
this anger was particularly focused at Fr. Sean McManus, the founding member o f the Irish 
National Caucus15 -  the body influential in having the GAA ‘ban’ on McCarthy and Hickey 
imposed. While McCarthy had withdrawn from the tour for personal reasons, Hickey signalled 
his intentions to participate in the tour stating that ‘Fr McManus had no jurisdiction over the 
team picked by Dublin.’16
11 Central Council Officers Committee minutes, 22 April 1977, CCMB 1977, p. 126.
12 Central Council Officers Committee minutes, 22 April 1977, CCMB 1977, p. 126.
13 Irish Times, 21 April 1977.
14 Irish Independent, 22 April 1977.
15 Father Sean McManus, a vocal supporter o f the IRA, was born in Fermanagh but moved to  the United States 
in 1972. In 1974, McManus founded the Irish National Caucus, an Irish-American lobby group tha t aimed to  
counterbalance the British influences in the United States government.
16 Irish Press, 21 April 1977.
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The ‘ban’ and ‘advice’ from the two American boards was a direct challenge to the 
authority of the Central Council. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s the relationship 
between the GAA in Ireland and America, New York in particular, was strained, with Pat 
Fanning, GAA president between 1970 and 1973, describing the relationship between the 
Central Council and the New York Board as ‘something o f a sour joke over the past twenty 
years.’17 The demand that Hickey and McCarthy be excluded placed the Central Council in a 
dilemma: the Council could not be seen to be dictated to by any unit o f the association but if 
protests against Hickey materialised in New York, or elsewhere, this could cause serious 
embarrassment to both the player and the GAA as an organisation. It was decided to hold a 
meeting of the officers of the Central Council, on 22 April, when the matter would be fully 
discussed and a statement issued. On the day of the meeting the scheduled tour was receiving 
widespread media coverage, featuring on the front pages o f the Irish Times, Irish Independent 
and Irish Press. Jack Lynch, the leader of the opposition, released a statement noting that he 
‘fully approved of the action taken’ by Hickey and McCarthy and he had ‘the fullest confidence 
in the leadership of the GAA that they will not allow themselves to be dictated to by any unit 
of the organisation... especially when the motivation comes from the Irish National Caucus’.18 
At the meeting itself, the statements from the North American and New York boards were 
considered, as were the three additional statements issued by the Chicago Divisional Board, 
United Irish Societies San Francisco and the Irish Cultural Society Los Angeles, all of which 
pledged full support to the Central Council. Con Murphy, presented three options to the 
meeting -  proceed with the tour as planned; cancel a city or cities; or cancel the tour in its 
entirety. The Central Council ‘taking into consideration the numerous expressions of support 
and desire for strong action from many parts o f Ireland’ released a statement reaffirming its 
position as the ‘governing body of the Association’ and warned that it would ‘not accept 
dictation in this or any other circumstances, from inside or outside the Association’. Further, it 
announced that the tour was to proceed as originally planned, with ‘Hickey in the party.’19
This statement was released to the media and appeared in newspapers the following 
day, 23 April. The statement was, however, overshadowed by the news that the Portlaoise 
hunger strike had been called off without any apparent concessions to the prisoners.20 The Irish
17 Darby, Gaelic Games, Nationalism and the Irish Diaspora in the U nited States, p. 165.
18 Irish Times, 22 April 1977.
19 Central Council Officers Committee minutes, 22 April 1977, CCMB 1977, p. 127.
20 Irish Times, 23 April 1977.
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National Caucus in America lifted their ‘ban’ on Hickey travelling21 and the North American 
Board then lifted their own ‘ban’.22 The teams, including Hickey, left for America to fulfil the 
schedule; while a contingency plan to by-pass New York in the event o f protests was made, 
reports from the four American venues were on the whole positive.23
This very brief episode (the ‘ban’ on Hickey lasted only three days) highlighted how 
potentially divisive republican prison protests, and hunger strikes in particular, could be to the 
GAA. Although no real protests materialised, the 1977 incident showed how strong opinion in 
America could be and the potential internal strife this could generate. In justifying the initial 
stance of the North American Board, O’Donoghue later told the Irish Times that he was acting 
in the interests of the hunger strikers and that ‘feelings among the Irish in America were running 
at fever-pitch as a result of the hunger-strike and the Croke Park incident...This situation 
wasn’t properly realised in Ireland.24 While the significance o f the situation may not have been 
‘properly realised’ by the GAA in Ireland, Paddy Downey, Irish Times journalist, grasped the 
seriousness o f the issue. In April 1977 he wrote that calling off the tour would have been a 
‘disaster’ for the GAA and ‘might well have split the GAA irreparably because of the highly 
emotive and delicate political issues involved.’ While acknowledging the regular intrusion of 
politics upon sport in Ireland, Downey maintained that while the GAA was ‘made up of diverse 
political opinions’, the association, as a body, ‘must be seen to observe its own rules - and one 
of those rules states very explicitly that the organisation is non-political and non-sectarian.’ 
Downey recalled that the GAA survived the Parnell split and the Civil War and commented 
that ‘having achieved those victories it would be ironic as well as tragic if it allowed the 
political issues o f the moment - enormous though they be - to split its own ranks and destroy 
the great work that has been through most of a century. 25
Two further incidents occurred during the following year, 1978, which again tested the 
GAA’s observance of its ‘non-political’ rule. In July 1978, the Antrim county board allowed a 
Sinn Fein H-Block demonstration to take place in Casement Park, while in August 1978, the 
Derry county board cancelled fixtures to allow its members attend a H-Block demonstration. 
At the half-time interval of the Ulster Senior football semi-final, between Derry and Down, on 
2 July, a loudspeaker van was driven around the perimeter o f the Casement Park pitch
21 Irish Independent, 23 April 1977.
22 Irish Press, 23 April 1977.
23 Irish Press, 23 May 1977.
24 Irish Times, 30 April 1977.
25 Irish Times, 22 April 1977.
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requesting that the 8,000 spectators remained in the stadium after the game to attend a H-Block 
protest. Both the half-time address and the after-match demonstration had been approved by 
the Antrim county board. After the game ‘about 500 supporters of the rally marched around 
the running track and stopped in front of the main ground stadium where speakers...addressed 
the crowd.’26 While Sinn Fein denied that most GAA fans had left the ground before the protest, 
the Chairman of the Antrim county board, Mr. Rooney, reported to a 3 July County Committee 
meeting that ‘people who left the ground early were verbally abused outside the ground with 
foul and filthy language. At the finish of the game the front gates were forcibly closed by a few 
individuals and kept closed for about 15 minutes before they were eventually opened to let the 
fans leave.’27
The Derry county board cancelled all GAA fixtures scheduled for 27 August 1978 to 
allow its members to attend a Coalisland to Dungannon (Tyrone) march in support of the 
protesting H-Blocks prisoners. This march, held on the tenth anniversary of the first Civil 
Rights march, was organised by the Central Coordinating Committee of the Relatives’ Action 
Committees and was attended by an estimated 25,000 people. The Derry county board was the 
only GAA board that cancelled fixtures in support of this protest. Patrick Mullan, Secretary of 
the county board, explained that the unanimous decision was taken on humanitarian grounds 
as ‘many Derry GAA members are prisoners in H Block and relatives and friends wanted to 
go to the demonstration.’28 However, the county board was accused by some of its own 
members o f not adhering to the ‘non-political and non-sectarian code’ while, externally, the 
board was accused of ‘pandering to the Provisional I.R.A.’29 (The cancellation of fixtures in 
Derry would be mentioned in the ‘Steering Group on the Civil Activities o f Paramilitary 
Organisations’ 1979 background paper on the GAA.30)
The prison protests that followed the removal o f special-category-status marked the 
beginning of the GAA’s involvement in the ‘prison-campaign’ that lasted between 1976 and 
1981. While internment had united all shades of nationalist opinion throughout Ireland, the
26 Irish Independent, 3 July 1978.
27 Antrim  County Board m inutes, 3 July 1978.
28 Irish Press, 26 August 1978.
29 Irish Press, 26 August 1978.
80 In May 1979, at the request o f the British Army, the Steering Group on the Civil Activities o f Paramilitary 
Organisations (SG (CAPO)) produced a background paper on the GAA. This paper summarised the history o f 
the GAA, its sources o f funding and political affiliations. The repo rt concluded tha t while some members o f 
the GAA were sympathetic to  (or involved in) param ilitary activity, the Association was a 'respectable  
national organisation' w ith  'no evidence to suggest a general invo lvement at any level by the GAA in 
terrorism  or o ther param ilitary activity.' PRONI ENV/19/1/2A
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protests within the H-Blocks, which were carried out by convicted paramilitary prisoners, 
were not universally supported by the nationalist community. This was particularly true 
within the GAA, where GAA involvement in the prison-campaign proved to be a very 
divisive issue. On the three occasions the GAA became involved in the prison campaign, 
between 1976 and 1978, the association was accused, by both those outside and within the 
association, o f breaking its own ‘non-political’ rule. As shall be discussed below, this ‘non- 
political’ rule was amended in March 1979.
II.
The 1979 Annual Congress, held in Dublin on 24-25 March 1979, was a significant 
milestone in the history of the GAA’s involvement in the H-Blocks prison protest campaign. 
At this Annual Congress, a motion was passed that changed the non-political rule of the GAA 
to a non-party-political rule, while another motion was passed that declared unequivocal 
support for the ‘struggle’ for ‘National liberation’. The passing of these two motions was to 
have future repercussions for the GAA’s involvement in the prison campaign and the 
association’s relationship with the GRA. Furthermore, a two-part motion in support of the H- 
Block prisoners was passed at the Congress and the H-Blocks were included in Con Murphy’s 
presidential address to Congress while, two days before the Congress, the GAA issued a 
statement on the H-Blocks.
The wording, and application, of the GAA’s ‘non-political’ rule was debated at length 
by members o f the GAA during the republican ‘prison war’. The crux of this debate, raised at 
seven consecutive Annual Congress meetings (1978-1984 inclusive), was whether the 
association could involve itself in any political matters. The minority view was that the 
association could not comment or involve itself in any political matters whatsoever; the 
majority view was that the association could comment or become involved in issues of national 
significance, so long as these issues were not party-political. In 1978, Rule 7 of the Official 
Guide stated that the ‘Association shall be non-political and non-sectarian. Political questions 
shall neither be raised nor discussed at its meetings. A Council, Committee, Club or 
representative thereof shall not take part as such in any political movement.’31 Having been 
withdrawn for re-drafting in 1978,32 a Longford sponsored motion amending Rule 7 to read 
‘The Association shall be non-party political....Party political questions shall neither be raised
31 GAA Official Guide (Treorai Oifigiuil), 1978, p. 7.
32 1978 Annual Congress M inutes Booklet, p. 40.
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nor discussed... A Council, Committee, Club or representative thereof shall not take part as 
such in any party-political movement...’ was passed at the 1979 Annual Congress.33 This 
amendment to Rule 7 was opposed by one delegate, Tom Woulfe, the Dublin county board 
member who had led the campaign to abolish the ban on ‘foreign games’. As neither the Irish 
Independent, Sunday Independent nor the Irish Press reported on this rule change, and as the 
minutes simply note that the motion was opposed by Woulfe, we are somewhat unsure as to 
Woulfe’s motivation. While this rule change was to have serious consequences for the GAA’s 
involvement in the H-Blocks campaign, the main motivation behind the change was the British 
Army occupation of GAA pitches, Saint Oliver Plunkett Park, Crossmaglen (Armagh) in 
particular. Liam Mulvihill (Liam O Maolmhichil), Longford chairman at the time, explained 
that
w e felt, and I was one o f  the main drivers behind this, that to say the G A A  w as non-political couldn’t be 
defended at that tim e because there were so many issues that had com e up — the H -B locks was one o f  
them but it was more to do with the British Army and the occupation o f  Crossm aglen... W e felt that non­
party-political w as a better description...It had to be seen  as political -  that is political with a small ‘p ’ -  
anything that w as party-political was a capital ‘P ’ and that w as w here the G A A  should not go .34
On 22 March, however, two days before the 1979 Annual Congress, the GAA released 
a statement that the ‘conditions in H Block Long Kesh and the treatment o f prisoners there is 
a cause o f concern to the Gaelic Athletic Association which deplores violence and advocates 
decent standards and respect for fellow men.’35 The statement added that the association, on 
humanitarian grounds, had been making efforts to get the British Authorities to ‘find a solution 
to the problem’ but that no progress was made. The statement further revealed that members 
of the association ‘visited a prisoner, observed other prisoners...met concerned parents and 
relatives o f the prisoners and other responsible well informed people’ and concluded that ‘there 
is no doubt but that the prisoners on protest are subject to indecent and inhumane treatment’.36 
Murphy, in his presidential address, made reference to this statement and added that the GAA 
‘strongly protest on humanitarian grounds and appeal to all with any responsibility, particularly 
to our Irish Government, to see that this treatment of prisoners by the British authorities in 
Ireland is stopped.’ Later in the Congress, Murphy, in response to a two-part motion tabled by 
the Kerry and Fermanagh county boards seeking help and support for members of the GAA in
33 1979 Annual Congress M inutes Booklet, p. 20.
34 Interview w ith  Liam M ulv ih ill, Croke Park, 23 April 2014.
35 GAA News Release, 22 March 1979, H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
36 GAA News Release, 22 March 1979, H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
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the H-Blocks and condemning conditions in the prison, assured delegates that the GAA did not 
deliberately delay making their 22 March statement, but that ‘requests...were being put to them 
at the time not to make a statement for the time being’ and that Murphy believed the statement 
‘should close the book.’37The two-part H-Block motion was subsequently passed by Congress.
Earlier in the Congress, a motion was passed that was to have ramifications for the 
association in their future dispute with the GRA. The wording of this Clare motion included 
the phrase that that the GAA ‘be seen and heard through the National Media to unequivocally 
support the struggle for National liberation and the right to self-determination of the Irish 
people in the 32 counties without interference from foreign powers.’ In proposing this motion, 
B. O ’Beachain admitted that ‘one could take several interpretations out o f the motion’ and 
suggested that the words ‘struggle’ and ‘unequivocally’ be removed to leave a ‘very reasonable 
motion.’ Nevertheless, O ’Beachain stated that the GAA’s ‘fundamental philosophy was that 
the freedom of the Irish historic nation to decide its own destiny without foreign interference 
was paramount’ and the motion was passed with no amendments.38
The minutes for the 1979 Annual Congress record that the H-Blocks and ‘support for 
National liberation’ motions were both passed with no opposition from any delegates. As 
discussed, Tom Woulfe, who was to become a consistent critic of GAA involvement in the H- 
Blocks campaign, opposed the change to Rule 7 so it is somewhat surprising that he did not 
oppose either of these motions. These March 1979 developments, while of huge significance 
to the GAA’s involvement in the H-Blocks campaign, received little attention in the Irish 
media. The 22 March statement merited only a paragraph in the Irish In d ependen t and Irish 
Press.40 The change to Rule 7 and passing of the H-Block motions were only mentioned in the 
Irish Times. Paddy Downey, writing in the Irish Times prior to Congress, warned that amending 
Rule 7 would be unwise,41 while, following Congress, the journalist Sean Kilfeather wrote an 
open letter, published in the Irish Times, to the new GAA president, Patrick McFlynn (Padraig 
MacFlionn), in which he sharply criticised the amendment to Rule 7 and the passing o f a series 
of ‘Troubles’ related motions. Kilfeather also used his open letter to highlight the very thin 
interpretative line between ‘political’ and ‘party-political’. Kilfeather argued that the H-Blocks 
issue was a matter of dispute between the republican prisoners and the various British and
37 GAA 1979 Annual Congress M inutes, p. 28.
38 GAA 1979 Annual Congress M inutes, p. 27.
39 Irish Independent, 23 March 1979.
40 Irish Press, 23 March 1979.
41 Irish Times, 21 March 1979.
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Northern Irish political parties, and, as such, ‘that makes the various motions passed on 
Saturday PARTY political motions and as such in breach of the rules even as amended.’ 
Kilfeather asked McFlynn, ‘Did you not feel that the silence on practically all of these motions 
on Saturday was a dangerous silence?’42
The proceedings o f the 1979 Annual Congress marked a real turning point in the GAA’s 
involvement in the H-Blocks campaign. The 22 March statement and the passing of the H- 
Blocks motions publicly announced that the GAA, at the highest level, was concerned about 
the conditions within the H-Blocks and, furthermore, association representatives, including the 
GAA president, had actively visited the H-Blocks and spoken to the relatives of prisoners. Of 
more importance, however, was the change to Rule 7. The amended rule now allowed units 
and representatives o f the GAA to engage in the H-Blocks campaign which, while political in 
nature, was presented as a non-party political campaign. The timing of the change to Rule 7 
was significant as it preceded the October 1979 formation o f the National H-Block Committee, 
a non-party-political pressure group established to spearhead the H-Blocks campaign. As shall 
be discussed in the following section, the change to Rule 7 allowed the GAA to meet and 
develop a relationship with the new National H-Block Committee.
III.
Throughout 1978 the prison-protests were receiving little attention outside of the 
republican communities in Northern Ireland. In April 1978 the Irish Times reported that public 
support for the prisoners was ‘minimal’ with the biggest rallies for political status ‘only 
[attracting] a couple o f thousand people.’'13 The first major breakthrough for the H-Blocks 
campaign came in August 1978, when Cardinal Tomás Ó Fiaich visited the H-Blocks and 
issued a statement comparing the conditions within the protesting blocks to the ‘slums of 
Calcutta’.44 Following this, two key inter-connected events took place that affected both the 
prison-protest movement and the GAA; firstly, Sinn Féin, in 1979, decided to make a concerted 
political effort, through public protests, to win public support for the restoration of special- 
category-status while, secondly, in October 1979, the National H-Block Committee was 
formed. This section will focus on how the invigorated prison campaign affected the GAA and 
explore the relationship between the GAA and the National H-Block Committee.
42 Irish Times, 28 March 1979.
43 Irish Times, 15 April 1978.
44 Gerry Adams, Hope and H istory M aking Peace in Ireland (Kerry: M ount Eagle Publications, 2003), p. 8.
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In 1978, two years into the prison protest, Sinn Fein still ‘lacked a structured national 
political response to the prison crisis’ but at their 1978 Ard-Fheis, Ruairi O Bradaigh 
‘signposted it as a priority for the movement.’45 Beginning in 1979, the new republican 
newspaper, An Phoblacht/Republican News46 gave widespread coverage to the issue, while 
Sinn Fein established a ‘POW Department’ to mobilise public opinion on the issue of political 
status, a H-Block Committee which focused on protesting prisoners in Northern Ireland jails, 
and a H-Block Information Service. By 1979, however, the republican prisoners were actively 
considering a hunger strike to coincide with the September visit of Pope John Paul II. The 
names of ten prisoners willing to undertake a hunger strike were sent to the IRA leadership but 
the prisoners were persuaded to give Sinn Fein ‘one last try at bringing about a settlement 
through protest action.’47
One o f these protests took place in Casement Park, Belfast, and had negative 
consequences for the GAA. On 12 August 1979, a Sinn Fein demonstration was held in 
Casement Park to mark the tenth anniversary of the deployment of British troops in Northern 
Ireland. The issue of the H-Block prisoners featured prominently on the agenda. More than 
6,000 people attended the demonstration, who, according to the Irish Press, ‘cheered 
rapturously as an IRA gunman.. .brandishing a machine gun, briefly made his way through the 
crowd on to the stage.’48 As a result of this demonstration John O ’Grady resigned from the post 
o f Tipperary GAA Public Relations Officer, in protest at the GAA allowing ‘itself to be used 
for extremist propaganda purposes.’49 In his letter of resignation, O ’Grady explained that his 
job as columnist with the Tipperary Star was interfering with his duties as PRO and that ‘recent 
happenings in Casement Park where Provisional Sinn Fein were granted the use of the pitch by 
the G.A.A. to display their power did not help either.’50 Tom Woulfe also criticised the use of 
Casement Park, stating that the demonstration indicated the ‘current winds of extremism in the 
GAA’ and called on the association’s management committee to issue a public statement 
disassociating the GAA from paramilitary extremism.51 On 17 August, the GAA released a
45 Ross, Smashing H-Block, p. 54.
46 An Phoblacht/Republican News was an amalgamation o f the southern based newspaper An Phoblocht and 
the northern based newspaper Republican News.
47 Beresford, Ten M en Dead, pp. 33-34.
48 Irish Press, 13 August 1979.
49 Irish Press, 15 August 1979.
“ Tipperary County Board minutes, 3 September 1979, Tipperary M inu te Book 1975-1982, p. 300.
51 Irish Press, 16 August 1979.
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statement disassociating itself from the Casement Park demonstration and reiterating the 
association’s ‘condemnation of violence from whatever source’.52
In August 1979, republican prisoner, Bobby Sands, in a communication to the IRA 
leadership, wrote o f ways to reinvigorate the prison campaign. Sands suggested a ‘Smash H- 
Block’ campaign consisting of a poster campaign, door-to-door canvassing and a letter-writing 
drive.53 Sinn Fein held an internal party conference in September 1979 with the sole aim of 
devising ways to avoid a prison hunger strike. It was at this September conference that Sinn 
Fein made the decision to participate in the October 1979 Central Relatives Action Co- 
Ordinating Committee’s ‘Smash H-Block’ conference. Prior to this, Sinn Fein attempted to 
portray the prison-struggle as part of its overall ‘national struggle’ and the party differed with 
the RACs, and other prison protestors, on a number of occasions. In deciding to participate in 
the October 1979 conference, Sinn Fein decided it would be more flexible in its approach to a 
broad front but would not insist that all present explicitly support the ‘armed struggle’. Sinn 
Fein submitted six motions for consideration to this October 1979 conference, including that 
‘this campaign...should be orientated towards mobilising national support particularly 
amongst the organised Labour Movement, community organisations and cultural organisations 
and also mobilising international support.’54
At this ‘Smash H-Block’ conference, held in Belfast on 21 October, a seventeen- 
member National H-Block Committee (later known as the National H-Block/Armagh 
Committee) was established, with Piaras O Duill as chairman and Christina Carney as 
secretary, ‘to spearhead a national campaign o f publicity and o f militant protests in order to 
force the British government to concede political prisoner status.’55 The National H-Block 
Committee launched an international protest campaign ‘helped by the prisoners who busily 
churned out smuggled letters by the thousand to VIPs around the world, appealing for help.’56 
As part of this national and international publicity campaign, units o f the GAA, in the latter 
half of 1979, received correspondence from the H-Block prisoners. Letters to the Kerry and 
Dublin football teams, almost identical in content, appealed to the GAA to support the ‘Smash 
H-Block’ campaign. In the letters, the prisoners described their living conditions in ‘one of 
Englands [sic] concentration camps in Ireland’ and asked both the Dublin and Kerry football
52 Irish Press, 18 August 1979,
53 Ross, Smashing H-Block, p. 61.
M National H-Block/Armagh Committee papers, Northern Ireland Political Collection, Linen Hall Library.
55 Ross, Smashing H-Block, p. 63.
5e Beresford, Ten Men Dead, p. 34.
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teams to add their ‘weight or voice in whatever way you can to help Smash H-Block, every 
little gesture of help no matter how small could help save the life of an Irish political prisoner.’57
As agreed at their inaugural October 1979 conference, the National H-Block Committee 
held a conference in Dublin, on 16 December, for the purpose o f electing a ‘sub­
committee. . .that will direct a single issue campaign in the 26 counties’ with the hope that ‘such 
a campaign will widen and consolidate support for the “blanket” prisoners with special 
emphasis on humanitarian principles.’ At this conference a motion was passed that the twenty- 
six counties sub-committee ‘should orient the campaign to winning and mobilising broad 
support, particularly among the organised labour movement, community organisations and 
cultural organisations’, and that the campaign should be promoted by ‘Seeking support from 
organisations and individuals to sponser [sic] major advertisements in the national 
press... [and]... Organising days of action aimed at involving specific sections of the population 
such as Trade Unions, Sporting, Cultural and women’s groups etc.’58
In the build-up to this 16 December conference, invitations were issued to social, 
cultural, and political groups and personnel, including the GAA. These invitations explained 
the aims of the conference and asked the recipient groups to sponsor the conference. While the 
Abbey Theatre, Conradh na Gaeilge and Comhaltas Ceoltôiri Éireann were included on the list 
of sponsors for this conference, the GAA was not named as a sponsor-organisation. Liam 
Cotter, however, attended the conference on behalf of Kerry GAA and informed delegates that 
Kerry GAA ‘had passed a motion on political status for the H-Block prisoners and this had 
been forwarded to the [1980] GAA Congress.’59 This frustrated Tom Woulfe. In a letter to the 
Irish Press, Woulfe recalled that Central Council’s refusal to entertain the 1934 Kerry motion 
calling for the release o f political prisoners paid ‘handsomely in public prestige’ and urged the 
1980 Central Council to ‘give politics -  non-party politics in particular -  a wide berth.’60 
Despite this, the Kerry motion - ‘That Congress condemns torture in H-Block on humanitarian 
grounds’ - was passed at the 1980 Annual Congress, held in Down on 29/30 March 1980. 
Woulfe attempted to argue that the motion did not go far enough and Congress should extend 
sympathy to all those who had suffered from violence in Ireland but Patrick McFlynn, GAA
57 Undated le tte r from  Long Kesh Republican Prisoners to  the Dublin foo tba ll team, H-Block File, GAA Library 
and Archive.
58 National H -B lock/A rm agh Committee papers, Northern Ireland Political Collection, Linen Hall Library.
59 Irish Press, 17 December 1979.
60 Irish Press, 20 December 1979.
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president, requested that Woulfe ‘stick with the motion as it stood’,61 stating that ‘a similar 
motion was before Congress last year also and the position of the Association in relation to this 
was very clear...This was being done purely on humanitarian grounds like many other bodies 
and noted clergy.’62
While the passing of the H-Block motion was reported in the press, meriting a front 
page headline - ‘GAA condemns H-Block “torture”’ - in the Irish Times,63 the story was 
somewhat overshadowed by the continued debate surrounding the non-party-political rule, 
Rule 7,64 and the British military’s occupation of Saint Oliver Plunkett Park.65 The adoption of 
the H-Block motion was, however, seized upon by the National H-Block Committee as 
evidence of GAA support for the prisoners ‘five demands’.66 At the 15 June 1980 National H- 
Block ‘recall conference’, held in Belfast - a conference the GAA was invited to attend and to 
which Antrim GAA sent a message of support - Piaras O Duill, in his chairman’s address, 
informed attendees that ‘motions condemning H-Blocks...had been passed...by trade union 
branches and organisations such as the G.A.A. and Conradh na Gaeilge’ O Duill added that 
while resolutions were not enough, they were ‘at least a sign that there is a growing awareness 
of the issues involved.’67 Similarly, local H-Block Committees started including the name of 
the GAA in advertising literature. In a pamphlet advertising a march in Limerick, on 13 
September 1980, the Limerick Smash H-Block Committee included a line that organisations 
including the GAA had all ‘spoken out publicly in condemnation of the plight o f the prisoners 
in their fight for political status.’68
Also at the 15 June National H-Block Committee recall conference, a motion was 
passed calling ‘for the setting up of sub-committees, to organise intervention similar to Trade 
Union intervention in other spheres, e.g. Womens [sic] Movement, students, sporting and
61 Irish Independent, 31 March 1980.
62 1980 Annual Congress M inutes, p. 69.
63 Irish Times, 3 L March 1980.
54 Irish Independent, 31 March 1980.
65 Irish Press, 31 March 1980.
66 In January 1980 the republican prisoners, after careful consideration and debate, published the ir 'five  
demands'. These demands were designed to focus the campaign on a very specific programme while, at the  
same tim e, give the British plenty o f room to  manoeuvre as there was no emotive term inology attached. 
The demands were (1) the right to wear the ir own clothes, (2) no prison work, (3) free association w ith  
o ther POWs, (4) a visit, parcel and letters and (5) re turn o f remission lost due to  protest action on the  
blanket. Brian Campbell, Nor Meekly Serve my Time, The H-Block Struggle 1976-1981 (Belfast: Beyond the  
Pale Publications, 1994), p. 104.
67 National H-Block /  Armagh Committee papers. Northern Ireland Political Collection, Linen Hall Library.
63 Limerick Smash H Block Committee pamphlet advertising 13 September 1980 march in Limerick, GAA
Library and Archive.
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cultural organisations.’69 While a trade union sub-committee was established by the National 
H-Block Committee, no other sub-committees were formally established.70 Jim Gibney later 
explained that the resources were not available to the National H-Block Committee to form 
several sub-committees so, instead, O Duill appointed various members of the national 
committee to meet with representatives from different sectors of society.71 An internal memo 
was disseminated within the National H-Block Committee detailing how the committee should 
approach the various groups. Under the heading ‘Sporting Organisations’ this memo detailed 
that
(a) G A A  -  National Committee will write to the G .A .A . and request them to
1. Issue statement o f  support
2. Circulate branches about the H -B lock activities.
3. A sk Clubs to support the local rallies.
4. Organise fund-raising and support football match, e.g. selected Kerry team  
and selected Armagh team.
5. Bring banners and football teams to activities.
6. M eet with members o f  the H -B lock  Com m ittee to d iscuss the situation.
(b) Other sporting organisations -  National Com m ittee w ill write to them  and request as 
above.72
While the above memo clearly indicates that the National H-Block Committee planned to 
approach other sporting organisations, the GAA was the sole sporting body approached by the 
Committee. Jim Gibney explained that, against the backdrop of the National H-Block 
Committee’s message being ‘censored or ignored’, the Committee viewed the GAA as a 
‘hugely popular organisation, with people in it who would have been sympathetic to the 
prisoners’ cause, or certainly not hostile to them.’ The National H-Block Committee realised 
that the GAA could provide the committee with ‘a ready-made audience...one that came 
together at matches all over the island. That was a natural and almost obvious choice for people 
then to focus in on and lobby the GAA.’73
69 National H-Block /  Armagh Committee papers, Northern Ireland Political Collection, Linen Hall Library.
70 Prior to  the fo rm a tion  o f the National H-Block Committee, there was a group o f trade-un ion ists in Belfast 
called the Trade Union Campaign Against Repression (TUCAR) - t h is  group was the genesis o f the H-Block 
trade-union sub-comm ittee.
71 Interview w ith Jim Gibney, Belfast, 4 October 2014.
72 Incomplete and undated internal National H-Block Committee memo. National H-Block /  Armagh 
Committee papers, Northern Ireland Political Collection, Linen Hall Library.
73 Interview w ith  Jim Gibney, Belfast, 4 October 2014.
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The National H-Block Committee, and Sinn Féin, were particularly keen to secure 
GAA support for, and involvement in, the series of local and national H-Block marches that 
the two organisations undertook throughout 1980. When preparing for a 1980 march in 
Armagh, Derry republican Martha McClelland gave a detailed report to the National H-Block 
Committee on the preparations for an upcoming 20 April 1980 Derry march, with the 
committee agreeing ‘that the Armagh organisers would prepare in a similar manner i.e. 
publicise in the newspapers, write to the G.A.A.’74 Similarly, the Sinn Féin POW Department 
issued an internal memo on 3 April, in which they explained the steps they had taken to secure 
support for the Derry march. The memo detailed that Sinn Féin had asked organisations and 
groups, including the GAA, to place advertisements in support of the march in the local 
newspapers, with the aim of a ‘two-week statement blitz in the local press a fortnight before 
the march.’75 Despite the claim, in the 3 April memo, that the GAA inserted notices of support 
for the 20 April march, no GAA clubs inserted an individual advertisement o f support in either 
the Derry Journal or the Irish News prior to the march. (Individual club advertisements were 
to become very popular during the 1980 and 1981 hunger strikes.) Several GAA players and 
clubs were, however, included in the National H-Block Committee’s ‘partial list of those 
endorsing these five demands and the Derry March on April 20th’ which was published in 18 
April edition of the Derry Journal.16
Despite the growing campaign initiated by the National H-Block Committee, the 
protesting prisoners, in October 1980, having been on protest for over four years and with no 
end in sight, decided that the prison-protests would have to reach their conclusion. On 27 
October seven prisoners refused food, marking the start o f the 1980 hunger strike. The 
formation o f the National H-Block Committee, in October 1979, was a seminal moment in the 
history o f the overall prison-campaign. While there was some overlap in membership between 
the National H-Block Committee and Sinn Féin, the National H-Block Committee was 
independent of any political party, and contained members with backgrounds as diverse as the 
Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) and the Social and Democratic Labour Party (SDLP). 
This, according to F. Stuart Ross, opened the door to a purely humanitarian approach with 
political differences set aside for the sole purpose of campaigning on behalf of the prisoners. 
As discussed, the National H-Block Committee was particularly keen to involve the GAA in
74 National H-Block /  Armagh Committee meeting minutes, 12 April 1980, Linen Hall Library.
75 3 April 1980 Sinn Féin memo, Northern Ireland Political Collection, Linen Hall Library.
76 Derry Journal, 18 April 1980.
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all aspects of its campaign. The fact that the National H-Block Committee was a non-party- 
political organisation allowed units of the GAA to respond to the approaches of the Committee, 
without breaching the amended Rule 7. While there was some interaction between the National 
H-Block Committee and various units of the GAA, it was very limited and at a local level only. 
It was not until the commencement of the 1980 hunger strike that the national leadership of the 
GAA met and developed a relationship with the National H-Block Committee.
IV.
The GAA, throughout the build-up and outset of the 1980 H-Block hunger strike, 
became embroiled in an acrimonious debate with the Garda Representative Association (GRA), 
played out through the media, over allegations that the GAA was equivocal in its condemnation 
of republican violence. This dispute affected the way in which the association responded to the 
hunger strike, and the manner in which others viewed their responses. Detective-Garda Seamus 
Quaid (originally from Feohanagh, county Limerick, but a winner of an All-Ireland hurling 
medal with Wexford in 1960) was shot, and killed, in Ballyconnick, Wexford, on 13 October 
1980, while searching a van suspected of transporting arms.77 This followed on from the July 
1980 deaths o f Gardai John Morley and Henry Byme who were shot dead as they attempted to 
arrest three men who had earlier robbed the Bank of Ireland at Ballaghaderreen, Roscommon.78 
Sean Ó Síocháin, former Director-General of the GAA, represented the association at the 
funeral o f Quaid, held on 16 October, while members of the 1960 Wexford hurling team, 
alongside Gardai, formed the funeral cortege. Patrick McFlynn, GAA president, issued a 
statement condemning the ‘cold-blooded and deliberate murder of Seamus Quaid’, adding that 
the ‘G.A.A. has consistently and unequivocally condemned men of violence and does so again 
in these tragic circumstances.’79 This condemnation was carried in the Irish Times,80 Irish 
Independent and Irish Press82 on the day of Quaid’s funeral.
Members of An Garda Síochána, in response to the killing of Seamus Quaid, held a 
special meeting in Enniscorthy, on 23 October, when ‘strong calls were made for the G.A.A. 
to make public its attitude towards the recent deaths of Gardai in Roscommon and Wexford’ 
with the suggestion that ‘if this statement is not forthcoming Gardai should reduce their
77 Irish Times, 14 October 1980.
78 Irish Times, 8 July 1980.
79 GAA News Release, 15 October 1980, H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
80 Irish Times, 16 October 1980.
81 Irish Independent, 16 October 1980.
82 Irish Press, 16 October, 1980.
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involvement in GAA activities.’83 The Enniscorthy meeting also supported criticism levelled 
at the GAA by Fianna Fail Senator Rory Kiely, Chairman of the Limerick GAA county board 
and a personal friend of Quaid,84 and Mick O ’Connell, former Kerry footballer, that the 
association had not cancelled or postponed matches as a mark o f respect to the murdered 
Garda.85 In turn, Frank Murphy, Secretary of the Cork county board, criticised Kiely and 
O ’Connell, saying that they had introduced politics into the affairs o f the GAA.86
McFlynn immediately issued another statement in which he highlighted the historic 
‘close and cordial relationship’ between the GAA and An Garda Siochana, called the loss of 
the three Gardai ‘a grave loss to the Gardai and the GAA’ and reiterated that the GAA ‘has 
consistently and unequivocally condemned violence and men of violence and does so yet 
again.’87 This statement was reported throughout the national media including the Irish 
Independent,88 Irish Times?9 Irish Press90 and Irish News,91 with McFlynn criticising the media 
for not giving more coverage to the Association’s original condemnation of the Quaid 
murder.92 Some days later the Irish Independent reported that at a meeting, on 29 October 1980, 
in Rathmines Garda Station, over seventy Gardai from “P” District unanimously passed a 
motion calling on all members of the force to withdraw from participation in the affairs of the 
GAA ‘until such time as the G.A.A. make clear their attitude to the men of violence.’ A 
spokesman for the District stated that the motion ‘was in direct relation to the deaths of 
Detectives John Morley...and Seamus Quaid...and the G.A.A. not cancelling matches in the 
areas in the immediate aftermath of the shootings, and failing to come out and condemn the 
killings.’93 The Belfast Telegraph reported that, at the Rathmines meeting, ‘allegations were 
made that funds collected at some GAA matches were passed on to the men o f violence’ and 
that there ‘were also allegations that after a minute’s silence was observed in memory of D el 
Quaid at last week’s Wexford County Final that records such as “The Men Behind the Wire” 
were played over the public address system.’94 Coincidently, the day after the Rathmines
83 Irish Independent, 24 October 1980.
84 Belfast Telegraph, 30  October 1980.
85 Irish Times, 25 October 1980.
86 M unster Provincial Council m inutes, 24 October 1980, M unster Provincial Council M inute Book 1980, p. 181.
87 GAA News Release, 24 October 1980, H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
88 Irish Independent, 25 October 1980.
89 Irish Times, 25 October 1980.
90 Irish Press, 25 October 1980.
91 Irish News, 25 October 1980.
92 Irish Press, 25 October 1980.
93 Irish Independent, 30 October 1980.
94 Belfast Telegraph, 30  October 1980.
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motion was passed an auction was held, on 31 October 1980, in the Victor Hotel, Dun 
Laoghaire, to raise funds for the Morley-Byme Dependents Fund. This fund was administered 
through the Bank of Ireland ‘with trustees largely drawn from G.A.A. officials’,95 with the 
Coiste Bainisti96 and the Leinster,97 Munster98 and Connacht99 councils all contributing money 
to the fund.
McFlynn responded to the Gardai’s motion with yet another press release, expressing 
his surprise at the outcome of the Rathmines meeting and again reiterating that the GAA was 
totally opposed to violence and men of violence.100 McFlynn also told the Irish Independent 
that the GAA ‘have in no way indicated that we support subversives’ and that, on the issue o f 
matches not being cancelled in the aftermath of the killings, there is ‘no modus operandi for 
the G.A.A leadership to do this. It is something that is done at local level, just the same as 
matches are postponed after the death of a local club chairman, for instance.’ In the same 
article, Jack Marrinan, General Secretary of the GRA, raised the issue o f songs ‘in support of 
violence’ which had been played at GAA grounds but McFlynn insisted that ‘no crime or 
disrespect has been committed by the G.A.A. in this whole affair’, adding that he thought ‘the 
Gardai are being misguided. A hare has been set by somebody, and it’s all unnecessary and 
unfortunate.,101 The failure to cancel matches and the playing o f songs ‘in support of violence’ 
were symptoms o f a larger concern the Gardai held about the GAA: in the November 1980 
issue of Garda Review it was reported that, over the course of public discussions on the GAA, 
members of the Gardai made ‘later reference...to a recent amendment in the GAA rules which 
allows that Association to engage in non-party politics. The wording of a resolution passed by 
the 1979 GAA Congress stressing that the GAA support “the struggle for national liberation” 
gave grounds for further concern.’102
On 3 November, the Irish Times reported that the GRA were seeking a meeting with 
‘leading officials o f the Gaelic Athletic Association to discuss the concern expressed by 
sections of the force about alleged ambivalence in the GAA to IRA activities.’ The Irish Times 
reported that Marrinan ‘accepted that much of the controversy was caused by
95 Irish Independent, 29 October 1980.
96 Coiste Bainisti m inutes, 7-8 November 1980, CCMB 1980, p. 212.
97 Leinster Provincial Council minutes, 10 December 1980, Leinster Council M inu te Book 1975-1981, p. 3724.
98 1981 Annual Convention Report, p. 75.
99 Connacht Provincial Council M inute Book 1976-1983, p. 171.
100 GAA News Release, 30 October 1980, H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
101 Irish Independent, 31 October 1980.
102 Garda Review, November 1980.
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misunderstandings, but there were good grounds for such misunderstandings.’ Marrinan also 
accepted that ‘the GAA had a moderate leadership which condemned violence’ but argued that 
the ‘motion passed at the 1979 GAA Congress supporting the struggle for national liberation 
was similar to sentiments expressed by subversive groups.’ Finally, Marrinan raised the point 
that ‘a man who had been playing football for five years had to leave the GAA because he 
became a member of the RUC, while at the same time men convicted of subversive offences 
could be accommodated in the GAA even in a playing capacity.103
The Coiste Bainisti of the GAA held a special meeting on 3 November, at which the 
‘allegations made by the Gardaf were discussed. Patrick McFlynn informed the meeting that 
representatives of the association had met with representatives of the GRA where the ‘position 
of the G.A.A. had been made very clear’ and the ‘Gardai for their part had agreed...to do all in 
their power to kill the controversy and control their members.’ At this meeting a joint 
GAA/GRA statement was agreed, which asserted that the ‘Garda representatives were assured 
of the continued support of the G.A.A. in ensuring that law and order prevail in our society and 
the G.A.A. also confirmed that it condemns violence of any kind, including that perpetrated by 
subversive organisations.’ The statement concluded that a ‘number of misunderstandings were 
cleared up to the satisfaction of both sides and it was agreed to maintain close liaison in the 
future.’104 This statement was carried on the front pages of the 4 November newspapers, 
including the Irish Times, Irish Independent and Irish Press, all of which declared that the row 
between the two organisations over. At the 7/8 November Coiste Bainisti meeting it was noted 
that the ‘press release had served to bring the public controversy to an end’ with the decision 
that the GAA would still meet the Association of Sergeants and Inspectors to ‘clear up any 
misunderstandings which that body might have.’105 The GRA reported, through Garda Review, 
that they ‘regarded the outcome of their discussions with the GAA representatives as 
satisfactory’ and that ‘they were quite satisfied that the GAA is an organisation which supports 
the Garda Siochana.. .and.. .that if the public statements which the President o f the GAA has 
made in this respect had received wider publicity some of the misunderstandings would not 
have arisen.’106
103 Irish Times, 3 November 1980.
104 Coiste Baìnisti m inutes, 3 November 1980, H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
105 Coiste Bainisti m inutes, 7-8 November 1980, CCMB 1980, p. 218.
106 Garda Review, November 1980.
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While the dispute between the GAA and the GRA may have been an isolated one, the 
possibility has to be considered that elements within An Garda Siochana, or the GRA. were 
using the death of Seamus Quaid to pressurise the GAA into remaining out of the H-Block 
controversy. Although Quaid’s death took place on the same day the hunger strike was 
announced, 13 October, the hunger strike was widely expected and both the British and Irish 
security forces would have been aware that, in the event of a hunger strike, the GAA would be 
approached by the republican movement to come out in support of the hunger strike. The name 
of the GAA had already appeared on National H-Block Committee literature. On the three 
occasions that the GAA condemned the murder of Quaid, the association also ‘consistently and 
unequivocally condemned men of violence’, yet the reaction of the GRA on each occasion was 
to criticise the GAA for not making clear ‘their attitude to the men of violence.’ Furthermore, 
the stated threat o f the Gardai to withdraw from, and boycott, the GAA did not seem to have 
the support o f all Gardai members. Two high-profile Garda GAA Kerry footballers, Paidi O 
Se, a Limerick based Garda until 1979, and John Egan, whom The Kerryman called ‘probably 
the best known Garda GAA player in the country’, condemned the threatened boycott with 
interviews in the Belfast Telegraph107 and The Kerryman respectively. Egan, in his interview, 
called the row ‘completely over-rated and exaggerated’ and stated ‘I never felt that the GAA 
had any feelings against me because I was a Garda. I have no crib at all with the GAA. It’s 
something that should not have happened. What are people looking for from the GAA?’108
It is also possible that the GRA, or elements within the GRA, used the death of Quaid 
to highlight the perceived republican ethos of the GAA in an attempt to embarrass the 
association over its continued ban on members o f the British security forces, and members of 
the RUC in particular. Peter Quinn explained that the Ulster council was
w ell aware that there was a rump in the Gardai which was strongly opposed to the ban on the security 
forces in the North, especially the RUC, with w hich som e o f  them had c lose  contacts. And w e were 
aware that those sam e people used every opportunity to castigate the G A A  as being republican and 
extremist. W hether that was a majority v iew  within the Gardai, I very much doubt. In my opinion it was 
a small minority w ith a political agenda. And whether that influenced senior people in the G R A  to attempt 
to create the im pression that, in som e way, either North or South o f  the border, G A A  people were anti- 
Gardai, has long been a matter o f  concern to certain G A A  people. But i f  they w ished to give that
107 Belfast Telegraph, 1 November 1980.
108 The Kerryman, 7 November 1980.
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im pression they were wrong -  totally and unequivocally wrong. There was never an anti-Gardai attitude 
w ithin the G A A  in my time on the Ulster Council or since then .109
Whether orchestrated or not, the dispute with the GRA, played out publicly through the 
national media, influenced the GAA’s response to hunger strike, particularly amongst county 
boards in the Republic of Ireland, as shall be discussed below. In Northern Ireland, Father 
Denis Faul blamed the dispute between the GAA and the Gardai for the low turnout of the 
middle class at H-Block demonstrations, saying that these ‘people with clout’ were ‘confused 
and had been intimidated by the row between the GAA and Gardai.’110
V.
This section will focus on how the GAA reacted to the internal and external pressures 
applied to the association during the 1980 H-Block hunger strike. Between October and 
December 1980 the GAA came under strenuous pressure, from both the republican movement 
and, in some cases, GAA members, to publicly support the five demands of the hunger strikers. 
Support for the hunger strikers was not universal, however, and many GAA members remained 
totally opposed to any GAA involvement in the hunger strike. The governing bodies of the 
GAA (the Coiste Bainisti and Ulster Council in particular) had to lead the association through 
this divisive period, cognisant of the rules of the association and the differing views of GAA 
members.
The catalyst for the 1980 hunger strike was the perceived breakdown in Cardinal Tomas 
O Fiaich’s negotiations with Humphrey Atkins, Secretary o f State for Northern Ireland, and 
the Northern Ireland Office (NIO), negotiations which had commenced in March 1980. A 
period of ‘intense and passionate’ debate took place within the H-Blocks with the decision 
taken in September 1980 that a hunger strike would commence in October 1980.111 On 27 
October, seven men, Brendan Hughes (Belfast); Raymond McCartney (Deny); Tommy 
McKeamey (Tyrone); Leo Green (Armagh); Sean McKenna (Down); Tom McFeely (Co. 
Derry) and John Nixon (Armagh), refused food, marking the beginning of the 1980 hunger 
strike. Three of these seven men - Green,112 McKeamey113 and McFeely114 - were members of
109 Interview  w ith  Peter Quinn, Enniskillen, 21 June 2014.
110 Irish Echo, 15 November 1980.
111 Campbell, N or M eekly Serve M y Time, p. 108.
112 Clan na nGael C.L.G. Lurgan, Armagh. An Phoblacht/Republican News, 22 November 1980.
113 Academy and Tyrone M inors. An Phoblacht/Republican News, 6 December 1980.
114 An Phoblacht/Republican News does identify not M cFee l/s  club bu t the paper credits him w ith  w inning  
troph ies at m inor and senior levels, being the 'mounting force' behind the firs t camogie team  in Derry and,
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the G A A . 115 Three fem ale republican prisoners in A rm agh Jail, M airead Farrell, M airead 
N ugent and M ary Doyle, jo ined  the hunger strike on 1 D ecem ber. 116 (W ithin A rm agh Jail, 
female prisoners w ere allowed w ear their own clothes but th irty  republican fem ale prisoners 
had been on a no-w ash protest in support o f dem ands for political status since February 
1980 .'17) On 12 D ecem ber, six U lster Defence A ssociation (UDA ) loyalist p risoners began a 
hunger strike dem anding special-category-status and segregation from  republican prisoners . 118 
On 15/16 D ecem ber thirty  m ore republican prisoners jo ined  the strike, m eaning that a total o f  
46 prisoners (40 republican and six loyalist) were on hunger strike m aking it the ‘largest hunger 
strike cam paign m ounted in N orthern Ireland prisons .’ 119 The republican (H -Blocks) hunger 
strike ended on 18 Decem ber, after 53 days, in a still-disputed m anner. T he U D A  hunger strike 
ended the day before, 17 D ecem ber, while the A rm agh Jail hunger strike ended the day after, 
19 December.
Follow ing the hunger strike, the republican m ovem ent attem pted to portray  an obvious 
failure as a victory. The official statement from the prisoners, issued through An 
Phoblacht/Republican News, claim ed that the strike was called o f f  only after ‘having been 
supplied w ith  a docum ent that contains a new elaboration o f  our five dem ands ’ . 120 A ccording 
to Ed M aloney, the ‘IRA and Sinn Fein leadership outside the prison pretended that the hunger 
strike had ended in v ic to ry ...T he authorised version o f  the first hunger strike, the version put 
forward by Sinn Fein then and ever since, has the B ritish reneging on the docum ent during 
these talks . 121 Thom as H ennessey has called this version o f  events a ‘straightforward lie, issued 
for propaganda pu rposes ’ , 122 w hile Brendan Hughes, in an interview  for the B oston C ollege 
IRA/UVF Oral H istory Project, also dism issed this ‘authorised version ’ o f  the ending o f  the
before his imprisonment, attending every Ail-lreland Senior Football Final. An Phoblacht/Republican News, 
27 December 1980.
us peter Harte, at the 22 November 1980 Coiste Bainisti meeting, stated that four of the seven original 
republican hunger strikers were members of the GAA. (H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.) An 
Phoblacht/Republican News, however, in their weekly ‘Portrait of a Hunger Striker' series, which provided a 
biography of each of seven men, listed only three of the men as GAA members.
116 Irish Times, 1 December 1980.
117 Irish Times, 1 December 1980.
118 Irish Times, 12 December 1980.
119 Irish Times, 16 December 1980.
120 O'Malley, Biting a t the Grave, p. 33.
121 Ed Moloney, Voices from  the Grave, Two Men's War in Ireland (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 2010), p.
241.
122 Hennessey, Hunger Strike, pp. 462-463.
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hunger strike, Hughes explained that he had given M cK enna a guarantee that he  w ould not let 
him  die and he consequently ended the hunger strike on hum anitarian  grounds.'23
W hile the 1980 hunger strike represented a m ajor escalation in the ‘Prison W ar’, 
Hennessey has show n that both the republican m ovem ent and the British governm ent knew 
that the ‘battle would be for public opinion ’ .124 The republican prisoners knew  that the hunger 
strike alone w ould not restore special-category-status. Instead, the hunger strike w as to be used 
by  the republican prisoners as a vehicle to generate national and international sym pathy, and 
support, for the prisoners which would, in turn, pressurise the B ritish  governm ent to concede 
the prisoners ’ dem ands. As the hunger strike began, Hughes called for such support stating that 
‘Death m ost certainly awaits us unless you, on the outside, can build a  united, strong and co ­
ordinated show ing o f  concern .’ 125 Every aspect o f  the strike w as m eticulously planned to 
m axim ise public  sympathy: the prisoners refrained, as m uch as possible, from  referring to 
‘political’ or ‘special-category-status’, but instead talked o f  their ‘five ju s t dem ands’; the seven 
m en chosen to go on hunger strike represented a w ide geographical area - five o f  the six 
N orthern Ireland counties , 126 while prisoners sentenced as a  consequence o f  sectarian or 
particularly infam ous charges were not allowed on the hunger strike .127 The hunger strike itse lf 
was tim ed so that it would peak at Christmas.
W ithin Long Kesh, a ‘renewed letter cam paign began, thereafter churning out hundreds 
o f  letters, w ritten on toilet and cigarette papers, to all and sundry calling for their support for 
the five dem ands . ’ 128 Despite the fact that the prisoners had no pens or w riting paper an 
organised structure was established whereby different blocks, or w ings w ithin the blocks, 
w ould w rite to different organisations, w ith a log kept o f  all letters sent to ensure m axim um  
exposure. C om m unity organisations, trade unions and new spapers w ere all contacted and asked 
to com e out in public support o f  the hunger strikers. The GAA, at all levels, also received letters 
from w ithin the  Long Kesh prison as part o f  this ‘renew ed letter cam paign’. The GAA was the
123 Moloney, Voices fro m  the Grave, p. 239.
124 Hennessey, Hunger Strike, p. 83.
125 Ross, Smashing H-Block, p. 96.
124 Bobby Sands (Belfast) was 'considerably annoyed' and 'gravely disappointed' at having his name removed 
from the original list of ten hunger strikers. When the list was streamlined to seven the leadership decided 
that they 'could only include one representative from Belfast to ensure all other regions were covered.' 
Campbell, Nor Meekly Serve My Time, p. 111.
127 Republican prisoner Brendan 'Bik' McFarlane was not allowed participate in the hunger strike as the nature 
of his charges, an attack on a UVF bar which left five dead, would have had a negative effect on the 
propaganda drive. Campbell, Nor Meekly Serve My Time, p. 111.
128 Campbell, N or Meekly Serve M y Time, p. 110.
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only Irish sporting body that the prisoners contacted in such a m anner. N either o f the soccer 
governing bodies, the Irish Football A ssociation (EFA), who were regarded as a ‘unionist 
bastion’ by republicans , 129 and the Football A ssociation o f  Ireland (FAI), nor the Irish R ugby 
Football U nion (IRFU) w ere contacted by the prisoners. 130 Form er republican prisoner M ichael 
Culbert explained that when the prisoners contacted the GAA, the prisoners ‘were subtly 
m anipulating the constitution o f the GAA to m ake it difficult for them  not to support u s . . .The 
G A A prom otes the concept o f  the ideology o f  a 32 county Ire land .. .and that is w hat w e claim ed 
we were in prison fo r...Y o u  had these moral phrases and phraseology to m ake it d ifficult.’ 
Culbert stated that the prisoners used a ‘m oral b ludgeon’ w hen writing to G A A clubs and asked 
the clubs ‘are you going to  let these young men from  your area die? ’ 131 O ne clear exam ple o f  
this is an undated appeal from the republican prisoners (w ho had retained special-category- 
status), on b eh a lf o f  the B lanketm en, to the ‘m em bership o f  the G .A .A .’ in w hich the prisoners 
urged the GAA to ‘set now  to avert deaths in H -B lock ...m obilise  to divert the British 
G overnm ent from  its illogical and w holly insane stance on the H-B lock im passe. ’ The prisoners 
ended their appeal by stating that ‘the lives o f  the ‘B lanketm en’ in the ‘FT B locks rest in your 
hands.’ 132 C ulbert further explained that it was a m ixture o f  both the perceived nationalist 
ideology and the localised nature o f  the GAA that prom pted the prisoners to w rite to the GAA 
clubs, requesting that these clubs lend the prisoners m oral and public support. A  letter from  
forty-five nam ed special-category prisoners, all o f  w hom  were m em bers o f  the GAA, which 
included their club nam e beside their (typed) signature, appealed to the G A A to ‘step around 
the external and internal constraints’ and ‘contribute to the general cam paign to expose the 
grossness o f  the B ritish  error re: attem pting to rem ove sta tus’ and to ‘give i t ’s [sic] public and 
unequivocal support to the five ju st and reasonable dem ands o f  our com rades . ’ 133 Two o f  the 
hunger strikers, John N ixon 134 and Tom  M cFeely, also w rote to  the GAA, w ith M cFeely 
sending the association a ‘direct and open appeal for [GAA] support for me and my com rades 
at present on H unger Strike in the H-Blocks o f Long K esh ’ . 135
129 Interview with Michael Culbert, Belfast, 24 April 2014.
130 Interview with Michael Culbert, Belfast, 24 April 2014.
131 Interview with Michael Culbert, Belfast, 24 April 2014.
132 Undated appeal from 'Republican POWs' to 'membership of the G.A.A.', Northern Ireland Political 
Collection, Linen Hall Library.
133 Letter from 'Irish Republican POWs (with status)' to GAA, 20 November 1980, H-Block File, GAA Library 
and Archive.
134 Undated handwritten letter from John Nixon, H-Block 3 to the Louth GAA County Board, H-Block File, GAA 
Library and Archive.
135 Undated copy typed letter from Tom McFeely, H-Block 5 to GAA, H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
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W ithin days o f  the hunger strike beginning, a GA A delegation (Patrick M cFlynn, Con 
M urphy, A lf M urray and Liam M ulvihill) met w ith representatives o f  the N ational H-Block 
Com m ittee (Bob M urray , 136 Jim  Gibney, Piaras 6  Duill and Bernadette M cAliskey) and 
discussed ways in w hich the G A A  could potentially contribute to the H -B lock cam paign. From 
the outset, M cFlynn insisted that the GAA ‘m ust at all tim es act independently and must be 
seen not to  get involved in political m atters.’ 137 M cA liskey questioned w hat on-field activities 
could take place, w ith  the suggestions that GAA players could line up to form  the letter ‘H ’ 
before m atches and that a decade o f  the rosary be recited at h a lf  time. M cA liskey questioned if  
clubs m arching behind their banners at H-Block dem onstrations w ould be acceptable. The 
N ational H-Block Com m ittee, w hile acknowledging the difficulties the GA A faced, requested 
that a circular be issued by  the G A A Central Council and read at all m ajor G A A  games, with 
M cA liskey adding that the ‘G.A.A. can play a very constructive role by controlling the youth 
and getting G.A.A. p layers to talk to young people and im press on them  [the] need for peaceful 
action and control.’ M cA liskey further suggested that the GAA issue a statem ent w hich could 
be ‘strongly w orded against all types o f  v io lence’; this, M cA liskey argued, would ‘allow  
another w hole area o f  the population to m ake an appeal on  hum anitarian g rounds.’ M cFlynn, 
in response, inform ed the National H-Block Com m ittee delegation that the G A A ‘w ould go to 
the full lim it o f  w hat can be done but there is a lim it’ and that a statem ent w ould be issued 
shortly . 138 This m eeting was one o f  at least two m eetings that w ere held  betw een the National 
H-Block Com m ittee and the higher echelons o f  the GAA. Jim  G ibney later recalled that the 
m eetings w ere ‘ten se’ and that the National H -Block Com m ittee
were driven by the fact that the conditions in the prison were absolutely horrendous, the appalling living 
conditions and the level of brutality were horrendous, so we didn’t have much sympathy for the niceties 
or the politics surrounding the issues because we were trying to resolve the matter as quickly as 
possible...So I think there was a lot of tension around those meetings between the National H- 
B lock/Armagh Committee and the national leadership of the GAA. I don’t think there was any hostility 
from [the GAA] — I think they were trying to explain to us their difficulties in dealing with these 
matters.139
136 At the 24 November 1980 Antrim County Committee meeting, Bob Murray was described as the 'GAA H- 
Block Organiser'.
137 Unsigned handwritten notes from the undated meeting between the GAA and National H-Block Committee, 
H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
138 Unsigned handwritten notes from the undated meeting between the GAA and National H-Block Committee, 
H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
139 Interview with Jim Gibney, Belfast, 4 October 2014.
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The Coiste Bainisti, at their 3 N ovem ber 1980 special m eeting, discussed the H -Block 
hunger strike. Peter Harte (Peadar O hAirt), Chairm an o f the U lster Council, stated that ‘all the 
counties in  U lster were strongly in favour o f  a statem ent being issued’ and M cFlynn added that 
‘feelings w ere running very high as some county officials and a num ber o f  clubs were under 
trem endous pressure.’ M cFlynn informed the Coiste Bainisti that, at the m eeting with the 
N ational H -Block Com m ittee, it had been agreed that any m oves the G A A m ade on the hunger 
strike w ould (a) be  on hum anitarian grounds only, (b) be o f  such a m anner that all m em bers o f 
the G A A w ould give it their support, (c) it would have to be very  clear that any G A A initiative 
was from  the G A A  and not from outside bodies and (d) that GA A grounds could not be used 
for protests. A rising from  a discussion on the m atter the C oiste Bainisti, at their 3 N ovem ber 
Coiste B ainisti m eeting, drafted a statem ent that included:
The Gaelic Athletic Association, as a national organisation with clubs in all the 32 counties has been 
concerned for some time about the situation of the prisoners in H-Block, Long Kesh... .The Association 
is concerned at recent developments in H-Block and feels that every effort should be made to find a 
solution to the present impasse without delay.
While we have made it clear that we condemn violence and men of violence, we advocate decent 
standards and respect for fellow men and add our voice to those who have expressed their concern, on 
humanitarian grounds, for this continuing situation which can only cause further bitterness and dissension 
in Ireland.140
This statem ent was authorised for release at the next Coiste Bainisti m eeting, held on 7/8 
N ovem ber, w hen it was also decided to issue guidelines to  county officials ‘w ith regards to  
events at local level. ’ 141 The statem ent appeared in  the Irish Press  on 8 N ovem ber142 and the 
Irish Independent on 12 N ovem ber. 143 A s discussed, the GA A, at their 3 N ovem ber m eeting, 
also drafted, and released, the jo in t GAA/GRA statem ent - it is possible that the release o f  the 
H-Block statem ent was delayed by four days to ensure the row  betw een the G A A  and the G R A  
had ended. It is also highly probable that the row  betw een the GAA and the GRA influenced 
the tone and contents o f  the statement, in particular, the condem nation o f  ‘violence and m en o f  
v iolence’.
The republican prisoners in the H-Blocks issued a response to the G A A  statem ent 
calling it ‘not only pathetically weak but a gross insult’ and ‘a betrayal o f  the fundam ental
140 Coiste Bainisti minutes, 3 November 1980, CCM8 1980, p. 211.
141 Coiste Bainisti minutes, 7-8 November 1980, CCMB 1980, p. 219.
142 Irish Press, 8 November 1980.
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principles upon w hich the [GAA] has its basis . ’ 144 The prisoners believed that the GAA 
statem ent was non-com m ittal and they called on the association to com e out in full support o f  
the hunger strikers. Richard O ’Rawe, H-Block 3, w rote his ow n letter to the A ntrim  county 
board (O ’R aw e w as a m em ber o f  the O ’D onnell’s GAC) echoing the sentim ents o f  the 
republican p risoners’ reply, adding that he felt ‘extrem ely betrayed and bitterly disappointed 
at the callously lukew arm  statement issued by the National Board o f  the G .A .A .’ O ’Rawe 
questioned the m otives o f  the GAA statem ent, adding that ‘hum anitarian m otives are 
com m endable but no true Irishman should feel obliged to com prom ise the fact that we are 
political prisoners to facilitate British political expediency . ’ 145 This letter w as subm itted to the 
Antrim  County C om m ittee by Bob M urray (who attended the m eeting as St. P au l’s delegate) 
and read out at a 24 N ovem ber 1980 m eeting .146 O ’R aw e’s dism issal o f  GAA support that was 
based on hum anitarian grounds is an indication o f  the distinct positions that those w ithin the 
prison cam paign held, as it was M cAliskey who had specifically argued for the value o f  GAA 
support that could be presented as hum anitarian in its intervention.
In addition to receiving correspondence from  the republican m ovem ent, the G A A also 
received m aterial from  those opposed to the restoration o f  special-category-status. John 
Arm strong, A rchbishop o f  Arm agh and Prim ate o f  A ll-Ireland, w rote (on behalf o f  the General 
Synod o f  the Church o f  Ireland) to the GAA, in late N ovem ber 1980. In his letter, Arm strong 
wrongly addressed the association as ‘one o f  those...organisations who have come out in 
support o f  the five dem ands’ and he urged the association to study The “H -B lock” Issue: An 
Interim Study, published by the Irish Council o f C hurches’ A dvisory Forum  on H um an Rights 
in June 1980. The A dvisory Forum, in their publication, concluded that it d id  not believe that 
‘a m ore favoured “ special category” for “political” prisoners can be justified . It is not sure that 
a less [sic] favoured status for “political” prisoners is com patible w ith  a dem ocratic society 
w ith a  concern for civilised standards ’ .147 A rm strong, in his letter, added that the ‘de­
crim inalising o f  the  activities o f  serious offenders on both sides o f the political divide 
w o u ld ... [give] a cloak o f  respectability and credibility to the perpetrators o f  vio lent crim e’ and 
he urged the G A A  to reconsider their stance on the issue and ‘bring your influence to bear on
144 Undated republican reply to statement from GAA, H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
145 Undated letter from Richard O'Rawe, Long Kesh, to the Antrim GAA County Board, H-Block File, GAA Library 
and Archive.
146 Antrim County Committee minutes, 24 November 1980.
147 The "H-Block" Issue: An Interim  Study. Irish Council of Churches' Advisory Forum on Human Rights in June 
1980, p. 11.
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the leaders o f  the cam paign o f  violence to bring it to an  end .’ 148 T he British Em bassy in Ireland 
sent the GAA copies o f  the eight-page pam phlet H  Blocks: The Facts, published by the 
Northern Ireland Office in October 1980 and sent to ‘M .P.s, B ritish  Em bassies and every m edia 
organisation around the w orld . ’ 149
W hile the 8 N ovem ber Coiste Bainisti statem ent did not support the prisoners’ 
dem ands, som e U lster clubs, throughout the hunger strike, p laced  advertisem ents in local and 
provincial new spapers declaring their support for the dem ands o f  the hunger strikers. The Irish 
News carried such m essages o f support from groups including R elatives A ction Com m ittees, 
republican social clubs and prisoner support groups. G A A  clubs, how ever, reacted 
independently and in a  varied m anner -  m any U lster clubs did no t p lace advertisem ents in 
new spapers w hile a very b rie f analysis o f  the advertisem ents in the U lster H erald  reveals the 
disparities that existed am ongst Tyrone clubs. Som e Tyrone c lubs 150 agreed w ith  the Central 
Council and called for a hum anitarian solution to the protest; o ther c lu b s 151 declared support 
for the prisoners dem ands and urged people to attend dem onstrations, w hile  Tattyreagh GFC, 
in addition to declaring its support for the prisoners, called on the  British G overnm ent to 
‘rem ove its A rm y o f  O ccupation from Irish so il’ and ‘allow  the  Irish N ation  to exercise 
dem ocratic self-determ ination, free from  foreign interference . ’ 152 G A A  clubs also p laced 
advertisem ents o f  support in the D e n y  Journal,153 the  Fermanagh H erald,154 the Irish Echo155 
and the Irish P ost.156 The South Antrim  clubs w rote a letter, published in the Andersonstown  
News, stating that they, at their 1980 Convention, had  passed a resolution fu lly  supporting the 
‘five basic dem ands o f  the prisoners in H-Blocks and A rm agh Ja ils .’ 157 This w as despite the 
Antrim  county board, in reply to a H -Block query from  St. M alachy’s GA C, requesting that 
clubs ‘let the m atter rest at the m om ent’ and aw ait directions from  the Coiste B ain isti.158 The 
placing o f  advertisem ents in the local and provincial new spapers publicly  linked G A A clubs,
148 Letter from John Armstrong to the Chairman of the GAA, November 1980, H-Block File, GAA Library and 
Archive.
149 Ulster Herald, 8 November 1980.
150 Beragh Red Knights GFC and Dromore GFC. Ulster Herald, 15 November 1980 & 13 December 1980.
151 Greencastle GFC, Saint Ciaran's GFC and Newtownstewart Saint Eugene's GFC. Ulster Herald, 1 November 
1980,15 November 1980 & 13 December 1980.
152 Ulster Herald, 13 December 1980, p. 2.
153 Sean Dolan GFC and Pearse GFC. Derry Journal, 31 October 1980 & 4 November 1980.
154 St. Patrick's GFC, Kinawley GFC, Lisnaskea GFC, Belcoo, Derrylin O'Connell’s GFC and Roslea GFC. 
Fermanagh Heraldf, 29 November 1980, 6 December 1980 & 20 December 1980.
155 Tyrone GAA of New York. Irish Echo, 20 December 1980.
156 Tir Conaiil Gaels. Irish Post, 29 November 1980.
157 Andersonstown News, 1 November 1980.
158 Antrim County Committee minutes, 20 October 1980.
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and by  extension the G A A  as a whole, to the hunger strikes and could be interpreted as a party- 
political act. W hile the Central Council ‘made clear their d issatisfaction’ about the placing o f  
such advertisem ents to  the U lster Council, the U lster council, according to Peter Quinn,
took a decision that i f  we decided to discipline clubs - as we could have done because there was a 
breach, or at least it could have been interpreted as a breach, o f our rules in that they could be 
construed as being involved in political activity -  they would have argued that they weren’t involved in 
political activity but that they were involved in humanitarian activity...we decided that we w ouldjust 
close the proverbial eye. We took a decision not to intervene.. .The decision was taken almost by 
default; we didn’t intervene on the first one and there were a few phone calls and then everybody 
decided well we didn’t intervene in the first one so why start now. The first one had already been in the 
paper and there was nothing we could do about it so why intervene in the second one, or the third one, 
or the fourth one or the tenth one.159
GA A clubs also took part in H-Block protests: Saint Patrick’s GFC placed an 
advertisem ent in the N ew ry Reporter, pledging their support to the hunger strikers and ‘to the 
C am lough to  N ew ry m arch on Sunday 9 N ovem ber 1980.’160 This C am lough to N ew ry m arch 
was attended by ‘several thousand’ at which ‘there w ere a  num ber o f  bands in the long 
procession and banners w ere carried by the various groups participating . ’ 161 D rom intee GFC 
(Armagh) later p laced their own advertisement in  the N ew ry R eporter  fully supporting the 
hunger strikers ‘and the m arches both past and in the fu ture .’ 162 In 29 N ovem ber issue o f  the 
Irish News, seventy-one nam ed clubs (tw enty-three from  A ntrim ,163 seventeen from  D erry 164 
and thirty-one from  T yrone165) declared their support for the hunger s trikers’ dem ands and 
stated that ‘All G A A clubs and m em bers are invited to jo in  us in  the B elfast dem onstration on 
Sunday 30 N ovem ber .’ 166 This advertisement m ay be linked to a previous advertisem ent in the
159 Interview with Peter Quinn, Enniskillen, 21 June 2014.
160 Newry Reporter, 6 November 1980.
161 Newry Reporter, 13 November 1980
162 Newry Reporter, 27 November 1980.
163 An Phiarsaigli CLCG, Ardoyne GAC, Ballycastle GAC, Cargin GAC, Clonard GAC, Davitf s GAC, Dwyers GAC, 
Gael Uladh GAC, Gort na Mona GAC, Lamh Dearg GAC, McDermott's GAC, Mitchel's GAC, Naomh Eanna 
CLCG, O'Connell's GAC, O'Donnell's GAC, O'Donovan Rossa GAC, St Agnes' GAC, St. John's GAC, St. 
Malach/s GAC, St. Gall's GAC, St Paul's GAC, St. Teresa's GAC, Sarsfield's GAC.
164 Ballymaguigan GFC, Bellaghy GAC, Castledawson GFC, Craigbane GFC, Doire Colmcille GAC, Dolans GAC, 
Drum GFC, Drumsurn GAC, Dungiven GAC, Glack GAC, Glenullin GAC, Greenlough GFC, Lsvey GFC, Loup 
GFC, Newbridge GFC, Slaughtneil GAC, Swatragh GAC,
165 Ardboe GFC, Aghyaran GFC, Beragh GFC, Brockagh GFC, Ballygawley GFC, Brackaville GFC, Carrickmore GFC, 
Coalisland GFC, Ciogher GFC, Clonoe GFC, Drumragh GFC, Derrylaughan GFC, Derrytresk GFC, Donaghmore 
GFC, Dungannon GFC, Eglish GFC, Edendork GFC, Eskra GFC, Galbally GFC, Greencastle GFC, Kildress GFC, 
Kilieeshil GFC, Killyclogher GFC, Loughmacrory GFC, Moortown GFC, Moy GFC, Omagh GFC, Pomeroy GFC, 
Stewartstown GFC, Tattyreagh GFC, Urney GFC.
166 Irish News, 29 November 1980.
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Irish N ew s w hich announced that ‘A n urgent m eeting o f  all G A A m em bers who support the 7 
hunger strikers and their 5 basic dem ands will be held in the Lake G len Hotel on Saturday 22 
N ovem ber .’ 167 The Andersonstown News, reporting on this 30 N ovem ber B elfast m arch, 
estim ated that 20,000 people took part in  the m arch, ‘including 3,000 G A A  m em bers’, and, in 
a two-page spread entitled ‘GAA on the M arch’, published num erous photographs o f  GAA 
banners at the m arch .168 A n advertisem ent in  the Fermanagh H erald  for the planned 20 
D ecem ber N ational Sm ash H-Block m arch, in Enniskillen, contained a list o f  tw enty-eight 
G A A clubs 169 who, in  addition to other organisations, had agreed to participate in the m arch 
wearing their club colours.170
The use o f  G A A  grounds for H-Block dem onstrations was also a contentious and highly  
visible sym bolic act throughout the hunger strike. From  the outset, possibly w ith the 1977 
David H ickey incident and the 1978 and 1979 C asem ent Park dem onstrations in m ind, the 
Coiste Bainisti o f  the G A A was adam ant that no grounds could be used for hunger strike 
dem onstrations. The m inutes o f  3 N ovem ber Coiste Bainisti m eeting record that the H -B lock 
Com m ittee had accepted that ‘G.A.A. grounds or prem ises could not be used for p ro tests’, a 
position w hich R ichard O ’Rawe called ‘paradoxical’ and, in reference to the B ritish  m ilitary 
occupation o f  Casem ent Park and Saint Oliver P lunkett Park, noted that the B ritish Arm y ‘feels 
fit to accom m odate them selves in G.A.A. grounds w henever the occasion suits. ’ 171
G A A  grounds were, however, used for H -Block dem onstrations. A t 2 N ovem ber 
N ational Football League m atch betw een Down and Cork, in N ew castle, over one hundred 
protestors entered the pitch at the h a lf  tim e interval ‘despite a County D ow n G A A  board ban 
on an official p ro test ’ . 172 A fter the gam e a rally was held outside the grounds at w hich M aura 
M cCrary, m other o f  a blanket m an, called on the G A A  to support the dem ands o f  the 
prisoners .173 Sim ilarly, at the ha lf tim e interval o f  16 N ovem ber N ational Football League, 
A rm agh v  K erry m atch, in D avitt Park, Lurgan, over 200 protestors entered the pitch, led by 
seven m en dressed in blankets walking in the form ation o f  the letter ‘H ’ . 174 One o f  the
167 Irish News, 22 November 1980.
168 Andersonstown News, 6 December 1980.
169 Bellanaleck, Belcoo, Devenish, Erne Gaels, Derrygonnelly, St. Joseph's, Ederney, Irvinestown, Coa, Tempo, 
Enniskillen Gaels, Maguiresbridge, Llsnaskea, Emmets, Roslea, Newtownbutler, Adrumsee, Kinawley, 
Derrylin, Teemore, St. Patrick's, Swanlinbar, Templeport, Shannon Gaels, Belturbet, Clones, Fintona, Trillick.
170 Fermanagh Herald, 20 December 1980.
171 Undated Letter from Richard O'Rawe to Antrim County Board, H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
172 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 8 November 1980.
173 Irish News, 3 November 1980.
174 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 22 November 1980.
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protestors m ade a speech, prayers were recited in  Irish and ‘w ith a shout o f  “victory to the 
prisoners” the dem onstrators quietly left the fie ld .’17S O n the sam e day, 9,000 protestors 
m arched through Coalisland, Tyrone, ‘to the local G .A .A. p itch ...w h ere  they listened to 
speeches by  Ferm anagh and South Tyrone M .P. M r. Frank M agu ire ...M rs. Bernadette 
M cAliskey, Gerry A dam s...and  the sister o f one o f  the m en on hunger strike, 12-year-old 
A ngela M cK eam ey . ’ 176 A t the 1980 Ulster Senior Club Football Final, betw een Scotstown 
(M onaghan) and Saint John’s (Antrim ),177 held at the A thletic G rounds, Arm agh, on 23 
N ovem ber, ten m en and w om en dressed in blankets entered the p itch  at h a lf  tim e while a 
spokesm an appealed to the 10,000 strong crowd to attend the H -B lock dem onstration taking 
place in A rm agh that evening , 178 w ith the m arch itse lf com m encing from  the ‘GAA grounds 
on the K illylea Road. ’ 179 A t 31 N ovem ber National Football League m atch betw een Ferm anagh 
and Sligo, in Irvinestow n, ‘thirty-four young m en, m ost o f  them  w earing football jerseys o f  
South Ferm anagh G A A  clubs took to the field a t the interval...and stood for several m inutes in 
silence. Tw o m en toured the grounds carrying a  banner bearing the inscription “Sm ash H- 
Blocks” . They then dispersed quietly before the team s had left the dressing rooms for the 
second half. ’ 180
It is im portant to note that the above dem onstrations, apart from  16 N ovem ber 
Coalisland dem onstration, w ere unofficial incursions and w ere not sanctioned by  the relevant 
county boards. The Irish Echo reported that ‘it w ould appear that w hen a local club or county 
board gets a request for use o f  GAA grounds they refer the m atter to Croke Park. Croke Park 
has turned dow n these applications on several occasions recently  and the  organizers o f the H- 
Block protests have responded by forcing their w ay in -  w ithout m uch opposition it m ust be 
confessed . ’ 181 T he D ow n GAA, when explaining their reason fo r no t allow ing a  protest to take 
place w ith in  their grounds, released a statement that, in consultation w ith  the Coiste Bainisti, 
it had been decided that ‘The A ssociation, its property and clubs cannot be used for any purpose 
contrary to the C harter o f  the G A A . ’ 182 It is also evident that the N ational H -B lock Com m ittee 
w ere not in full control o f  every dem onstration held in  their nam e. A t the m eeting betw een
175 Irish Echo, 22 November 1980.
176 Irish News, 17 November 1980.
177 One of the St. John's players. Matt Bradley, had days previously been the target of a sectarian murder bid as 
he trained w ith the Bangor soccer club. Irish News, 14 November 1980.
178 Irish News, 24 November 1980.
179 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 24 November 1980.
180 Irish News, 1 December 1980.
181 Irish Echo, 6 December 1980.
182 Belfast Telegraph, November 1980.
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representatives o f  the GAA and the National H -Block Com m ittee, Bob M urray told the GAA 
that he ‘regretted’ the ‘events in N ew castle’ and explained that the H -B lock Com m ittee in 
D ow n had tried to  defuse the situation and, furtherm ore, that he ‘had sent tw o people to 
N ew castle to stop the dem onstration.’ M urray, however, further explained that he ‘had to 
intercede w ith  a group in Belfast who wished to carry out an anti-G A A  m arch’ and that ‘the 
last thing [the N ational H-Block Committee] w ould w ant w ould be a confrontation w ith the 
G A A . ’ 183
Liam  M ulvihill, who had become Director General o f  the G A A  in M ay 1979, in  reply 
to a letter o f  com plaint about the half-tim e incursion during the U lster Senior Club Football 
final wrote ‘all our counties were given a directive that this should not be condoned. However, 
it is not alw ays easy to  prevent such incursions as I know  from  inform ation received from  
officials in various parts o f  the Six Counties.’ 184 The difficulty in preventing these incursions 
was explained by M aura M cCrory who, when pressed about the 2 N ovem ber N ew castle 
incursion, explained that ‘all the protestors paid the adm ission price ju st like everyone else and 
they went peacefully onto the field through an existing gap in the w ire . ’ 185 The Down Recorder, 
however, reported that the protestors gained adm ission to the ground by  cutting a hole in the 
perim eter w ire fence .186
A ntrim  GAA, on two occasions, cancelled m atches due to be held in C asem ent Park, 
as dem onstrations w ere planned for the A ndersonstow n area o f  Belfast. These m atches were 
cancelled due to the disruption (traffic diversions, parking etc.) the m arches w ould  cause, rather 
than in support o f  the aim  o f  the m arches them selves. A ll 26 O ctober games under the auspices 
o f the A ntrim  county board were cancelled as there was a m ajor rally  p lanned (attended by 
17,000 people) on the eve o f  the hunger strike . 187 Antrim  and D erry w ere scheduled to play 
each other (N ational Football League, Division Tw o) in C asem ent Park on 30 N ovem ber, but 
the A ntrim  coun ty  board applied to the GAA A ctivities C om m ittee for the gam e to be 
postponed as there was a  m ajor H-Block dem onstration scheduled for A ndersonstow n that 
day .188 The A ctivities Com m ittee, having consulted Patrick M cFlynn and Liam  M ulvihill, 
agreed to postpone the m atch until 8 February 1981, stating that ‘A ntrim  w ere concerned at the
183 Unsigned handwritten notes from the undated meeting between the GAA and National H-Block Committee, 
H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
184 Letter from Liam Mulvihill to complainant, H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
185 Irish News, 3 November 1980.
186 Down Recorder, 6 November 1980.
187 Irish News, 2+ October 1980.
188 Antrim County Executive minutes, 22 October 1980 and 24 November 1980.
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problem  that could arise betw een the protest m arch and the fix ture . ’ 189 An 
Phoblacht/Republican New s , however, reported that ‘In a welcom e m ove the G. A.A. cancelled 
a m atch scheduled to take place in Casem ent Park and allow ed m arches to rally  there instead, 
and there were large num bers o f  G.A.A. m em bers actually present at the m arch . ’ 190
The hunger strike did not affect county boards outside o f  U lster in the same m anner as 
those w ithin the province. A  brief analysis o f  a select few county boards show s that the hunger 
strike was either not raised or, when raised, the m atter was referred to Croke Park for guidance. 
The hunger strike is not m entioned in three m onths o f  county board m inutes w ithin the 
Lim erick county board m inute book for the period. The Kerryman  for the period also m akes 
no m ention o f  the K erry  GAA supporting the hunger strike, although Patrick Teahan, President 
o f  the Tralee branch o f  the Irish Transport and General W orkers’ U nion (ITG W U), called on 
the GAA, and other organisations, to jo in  in  the planned w eekly one-hour w ork-stoppages in 
support o f the hunger strikes.191 W hen the M eath Prisoners A ction Com m ittee approached the 
M eath county board to publicly  support the hunger strike, Brian Sm ith, C hairm an o f  the M eath 
county board, stated that while ‘we all deplored w hat was happening up N orth , dow n here he 
would be slow to ask for a proposition until clarification on the [association’s] stand cam e from 
Croke Park. H e felt i f  he asked for a proposition he could insult som eone o f  different political
* } 19 2views.
W hile GA A advertisem ents were placed exclusively in nationalist newspapers, the 
unionist com m unity w ere aware o f  support w ithin the G A A  for the hunger strikes. The Belfast 
Telegraph, w hen reporting that the 2 N ovem ber Dow n dem onstration was not sanctioned by 
the GAA, under the front-page headline ‘GAA in H -B lock Protest S to rm ’ added that ‘various 
clubs have continued to insert advertisements in new spapers pledging support fo r the hunger 
strikers. In today’s Irish News there were three notices from Gaelic clubs in Antrim, 
Londonderry and T yrone . ’ 193 Peter Robinson, E ast B elfast M P and deputy  leader o f  the 
Dem ocratic U nionist Party (DUP), m et with H um phrey A tkins on 24 N ovem ber to discuss the 
disruption caused by H -Block protests. At this m eeting R obinson expressed ‘the outrage felt 
by the law  abiding com m unity in Northern Ire land’ and, in a reference to the GA A, insisted 
that, in v iew  o f  the ‘fact that resolutions have com e from  that organisation and advertisem ents
1SS Irish Press, 28 November 1980.
190 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 6 December 1980.
191 The Kerryman, 28 November 1980.
192 Meath County Board minutes, 3 November 1980, Meath County Board Minute Book 1978-1982.
193 Belfast Telegraph, November 1980.
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in support o f  a political status for these prisoners’, A tkins ‘m ust stop giving any further grants 
to that organisation . ’ 194 Robinson also raised G A A club level support for the hunger strikers in 
the House o f  Com m ons when he stated that it was a ‘sad and sorry spectacle’ to see G A A flags 
and banners ‘in the forefront o f  the protest being carried out on behalf o f  the m urderers and 
gunm en in the M aze prison’. Robinson also referred to  the fact that ‘advertisem ents are placed 
alm ost every day by that same so-called sporting organisation in support o f  w hat som e term  as 
the brave m en in  the M aze prison .’ 195
There w as also opposition from  within the GAA itse lf to the various form s o f  support 
som e G A A clubs were giving to the hunger strikers. A  ‘lifelong supporter o f  the G .A .A .’ w rote 
to the Irish News criticising the ‘m ess [the GAA] has got itse lf into over the H -B lock issu e .’ 
The writer, noting that m any clubs had placed advertisem ents o f  support, on  hum anitarian  
grounds, fo r the hunger strikers in the press asked ‘Since w hen did the G A A becom e the 
spokesm an for hum anitarian issues?’ H ighlighting that G A A  m em bers w ere also affected by 
‘unem ploym ent, poverty and low w ages’, the w riter asked the further question ‘i f  clubs pursue 
the hum anitarian aspect then we should have statem ents on all o f  the above pressing social 
issues. W here will the time be for running the athletic end o f  the c lub?’ R eferring to the 
postponem ent o f  the A ntrim  v Derry National Football League fixture, the letter-w riter 
com m ented that ‘1 am sure the counties and Central Council w ere acting w ith  the best o f  
m otives, how ever the longer they postpone taking a stance the  m ore intricate and inso lvable 
the problem  becom es’ and called on the Central Council to issue a ‘directive on how  clubs 
m ight extricate them selves from the present dilem m a . ’ 196
As the  hunger strike progressed, the U lster Council, conscious o f  the pressures being 
applied to U lster clubs, and that some o f  its clubs w ere taking a  stance that diverged from  the 
official position  o f  the GAA, acted to prevent a sp lit w ithin the  province. A t their 15 N ovem ber 
m eeting, the Council requested that all U lster G A A  clubs send pre-prepared telegram s to  both 
the Irish and B ritish  governm ents calling for im m ediate action  to end the hunger strike. T he 
U lster Council directed county com m ittees to ensure that the clubs ‘carry out the suggestions 
in a  dignified and non-provocative w ay’ and supplied the w ording o f  both telegram s: the 
telegram  to  the B ritish Prime M inister called on  the B ritish governm ent, on hum anitarian
194 Irish Press, 25 November 1980.
195 pet er Robinson speaking in the House of Commons, 10 December 1980. Cronin, Duncan and Rouse, The 
GAA: A People's History, p. 170.
196 Letter from 'GAA Fan, Newry' in the Irish News, 4 December 1980.
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grounds, to ‘create circum stances which will bring to an end the tragic H -B lock hunger strike’, 
while the telegram  to Charles Haughey, A n Taoiseach, called on  the Irish governm ent to ‘use 
all m eans at its disposal to pressurise the British Governm ent, on hum anitarian  grounds, to 
create circum stances w hich will bring to an end the tragic H -B lock hunger strike. ’ 197 The U lster 
Council also requested that an emergency m eeting betw een the nine county chairm en o f U lster 
and A n Coiste Bainisti be held ‘to decide on a definite and clearly defined approach to the ever- 
worsening situation in the Province.’
On 19 N ovem ber, a G A A delegation consisting o f  Patrick M cFlynn, Liam  M ulvihill, 
Con M urphy, Peter H arte and Crossm aglen Rangers officials G ene Larkin, Jim  Hanratt and 
Gene D uffy  m et w ith Brian Lenihan, M inister for Foreign A ffairs, in  Leinster H ouse to discuss 
the ongoing B ritish m ilitary occupation o f  St. O liver P lunkett Park, Crossm aglen. A s  the 
m eeting concluded, M cFlynn ‘referred to the H -Block hunger strike and said that the GAA did 
not support subversives and recognised the delicate situation.’ M cFlynn stated that the ‘nature 
o f  the GAA was such that it was in touch w ith local peop le’ and that ‘B oth  sides o f  the 
com m unity are under pressure and m ost people are very w orried .’ M cFlynn asked if  there was 
anything that the governm ent could do to help alleviate the problem , to w hich Lenihan replied 
that the Irish governm ent had put pressure on the British to find a ‘prison  clothes form ula’ but 
that this had not w orked .198
As a result o f  M cFlynn attending an U lster Council m eeting and being ‘lam basted’ by 
the Council and accused o f  ‘sitting on the fence [and] doing noth ing ’ , 199 the nine U lster 
chairm en w ere invited to m eet the Coiste Bainisti in Croke Park  on 22 N ovem ber 1980. At this 
special m eeting eight o f  the nine U lster County Chairm an (the D onegal Chairm an did not 
attend) relayed to the Coiste Bainisti the situation w ithin their respective county. The Cavan 
and M onaghan C hairm en both indicated that they  felt rem oved from  the situation w ith Philip 
Brady, Cavan C hairm an, stating that ‘people [are] totally unaw are o f  the situation existing in 
the Six C ounties.’ D erry, Ferm anagh, Tyrone and A rm agh all expressed dissatisfaction w ith  
strength o f  8 N ovem ber Coiste Bainisti statem ent, w ith feelings ranging from  ‘felt the 
statem ent could have been  a wee bit stronger’ (Ferm anagh) to ‘to ta lly  dissatisfied w ith the 
statem ent from  M anagem ent C om m ittee’ (Tyrone). J. W illiam son, C hairm an o f  the D ow n
197 Letter from Michael Feeney, Secretary of the Ulster Council to GAA Headquarters, 16 November 
1980, H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
198 Minutes of the meeting between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and GAA delegation, 19 November 1980. 
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199 MacFlynn, Leading Through the Troubles, p. 11.
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county board, stressed that clubs were coming under ‘undue pressure from  certain sources’ and 
w arned that ‘there is a danger o f  the Association losing control’ and a ‘grave danger o f  a split 
w ithin clubs . ,200 In contrast, however, John O ’R eilly , Chairm an o f  the A rm agh county board, 
reported that there w as ‘good unity in the clubs and the H -B lock Com m ittee see them  as 
friends ’ .201 John Tracey (Sean O ’Treasaigh), C hairm an o f  the Tyrone county board, informed 
the m eeting that there was a  ‘strong feeling that the G A A  itself should organise a  dem onstration 
o f  support fo rth e  prisoners’ and expressed dissatisfaction w ith the directions on use o f  grounds, 
stating that ‘grounds in Coalisland [were] used because they felt it was the responsible thing to 
do . ’ 202 This stance w as backed by Hugh M cPoland (Aodh M ac Poilini), Chairm an o f  the 
Antrim  county board, who ‘suggested either an U lster dem onstration or county 
dem onstration...[he] felt that at least grounds should  be m ade available for open air m asses to 
show the people that w e are concerned about (a) the H-Block (b) the hunger strikers (c) our 
own com m unity . ’203
In response to this meeting, the Coiste Bainisti agreed to  draft and release a new  
statem ent w hich read
Because o f the Gaelic Athletic Association’s concern, on humanitarian grounds, for the Long Kesh 
prisoners and their relatives and the tragic consequences that could arise if  the hunger strikers situation 
is not speedily resolved, a meeting of representatives of the Management Committee and Chairmen of 
the Ulster counties was held in Croke Park on Saturday last.
The Association calls on the British Government to take immediate steps to afford normal decent 
standards and humane treatment to the prisoners, to relieve further distress for their relatives and, in the 
interest o f  peace, bring the whole sad situation to an end.
It was acknowledged at the meeting that any genuine peaceful efforts to resolve the situation and bring 
the continuing spiral o f violence to an end is worthy o f  the support o f all G.A.A. units.204
W hen view ed against the previous 8 N ovem ber statem ent, the 4 D ecem ber statem ent appears 
m ore forthright in  its assertions. Instead o f  the irresolute request that ‘every effort should be 
m ade to find a  so lu tion’ the GAA directly called on the B ritish governm ent to  ‘afford norm al
200 Handwritten notes from the meeting between the Ulster Chairmen and An Coiste Bainisti, 22 November 
1980, H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
201 Handwritten notes from the meeting between the Ulster Chairmen and An Coiste Bainisti, 22 November 
1980, H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
202 Handwritten notes from the meeting between the Ulster Chairmen and An Coiste Bainisti, 22 November 
1980, H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
203 Handwritten notes from the meeting between the Ulster Chairmen and An Coiste Bainisti, 22 November 
1980, H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
204 GAA Press Release, 4 December 1980, H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
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decent standards and hum ane treatm ent to the prisoners.’ The last line o f  the statem ent also 
opened up the possib ility  o f  G A A clubs officially taking part in  dem onstrations, so long as they 
were ‘genuinely peacefu l’. The Antrim  county board issued a press release in  which it 
expressed ‘total agreem ent’ w ith the 4 D ecem ber statem ent, adding that ‘W e confirm  our 
support fo r the principles em bodied in the 5 demands o f  the prisoners on hunger strike and call 
on the British G overnm ent and N orthern Ireland Office to im m ediately introduce the necessary 
reform s . ’ 205 Sim ilarly, the Tyrone county board, w hich had been the m ost critical o f 8 
N ovem ber statem ent, released their own statem ent expressing ‘total agreem ent w ith the 
sentim ents’ contained w ithin 4 Decem ber statement, adding that the county board  considered 
the hunger strike as ‘above party politics and can therefore be supported by all our m em bers’ 
and recom m ending that all Tyrone clubs ‘support those w ho are w orking in a peaceful and 
dignified w ay  to win decent standards o f  treatm ent for our fellow countrym en and w om en in 
Long K esh and in A rm agh . ’ 206
W hile the republican m ovem ent w elcom ed the G A A  statem ent, in particular the Tyrone 
and Antrim  statem ents ,207 the apparent support for the prisoners w as criticised by sections o f  
the m edia. On 5 Decem ber, the G A A statement appeared on the front pages o f  the Irish Times 
a n d /m /r  Independent, both o f  which interpreted the statem ent as G A A  support for the demands 
o f the hunger strikers. The Irish Independent was particularly  negative in its reporting o f  the 
statement. It gave prom inence to the position o f  John O ’Grady (described by the new spaper as 
‘a m em ber o f  the hardcore group within the G .A.A. totally opposed to the Association 
becom ing involved in the H-Block issue’) who accused the G A A  o f  succum bing to pressure 
from  subversive groups. O ’Grady called the release o f  the statem ent ‘sham eful’ and accused 
the G A A  o f  releasing  the statem ent without having the m andate o f  the association .208 Patrick 
M cFlynn, in the  sam e article, insisted that the association was no t responding to threats or 
pressure but that he had travelled extensively throughout the country and ‘knew  the  mood in 
the various counties.’ M cFlynn added that he ‘was convinced that there was nothing in the 
statem ent as framed that would lead to any outcry from the county boards . ’ 209 The Irish 
Independent, for their ow n part, claimed that the statem ent was under ‘close scrutiny by the 
rank-and-file Gardai w ho have had a running battle w ith the  G A A over its am biguous attitude
205 Antrim County Board Press Release, H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
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to the Provos and the failure to condem n outright the m urders o f  three G ard a f, and added that 
‘a real test for M r M cFlynn and the Association and the A ssociation O fficers will com e on 
Saturday w hen the Central Council m eets at Croke P ark . ’210
The Central Council, at their 6 D ecem ber m eeting - their first m eeting since the 1980 
hunger strike began  - discussed the ‘recent Garda allegations and H -Block controversy’ and 
congratulated the  Coiste Bainisti on their handling o f  both affairs.211 Turning their attention to 
m edia coverage o f  the affairs, Father Leo O M orachain (Leo M orahan), M ayo county board 
representative, assured the m eeting that he had been com pletely m isrepresented by  the Irish 
Independent, w ho had reported that he feared the 4 D ecem ber Coiste Bainisti statem ent could 
be ‘m isconstrued by certain people who would use it to their advantage’, and that he had tried, 
w ithout success, to  get the Irish Independent to issue a clarification .212 Donal O Faolain urged 
caution w hen dealing w ith  the m edia, stating that the ‘m edia alw ays go to the people w ho are 
un-representative. ’
W hen the hunger strike ended, on 18 D ecem ber, the N ational H -B lock Com m ittee 
issued a press release ‘saluting the thousands o f  people who flocked to the banner o f  the hunger 
strikers’, adding that the ‘strength o f  a roused people w as dem onstrated on the streets, in offices 
and on factory floors .’ 213 In retrospect, the 1980 hunger strike, in m any ways, is considered a 
‘trial ru n ’ for the 1981 hunger strike -  the republican prisoners learned from  the m istakes o f  
the 1980 strike, in particular the w eakness o f  a  m ass hunger strike, and applied these lessons 
to the 1981 hunger strike. The GAA also learned a num ber o f  lessons during the 1980 strike, 
in particular that its broadly  nationalist, but strictly non-political, stance was w holly inadequate 
and unenforceable in hunger strike Northern Ireland. From  the outbreak o f  the Troubles, the 
GAA, at Central Council and U lster Provincial levels, fought hard to keep the association 
independent o f  the day-to-day politics o f  N orthern Ireland, bu t an event as cataclysm ic as a 
hunger strike, w ith three o f  the seven hunger strikers m em bers o f  the GAA, saw  G A A m em bers 
and clubs openly  challenge, and change, the official position  o f  the association. In a 13 
D ecem ber 1980 interview  with An Phoblacht/Republican N ew s, on the m obilisation o f  11- 
Block support, G erry A dam s, vice-president o f  Sinn Fein, suggested that the ‘five m ain bod ies’ 
(the Catholic church, the GAA, Irish Congress o f  Trade Unions, the Social D em ocratic and
210 Irish Independent, 5 December 1980.
211 Central Council minutes, 6 December 1980, CCMB 1980, p. 245.
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Labour Party (SDLP) and Fianna Fail) supported the prisoners dem ands but could not, for their 
ow n reasons, com e out and publicly state this. A dam s, however, com m ented that
The movement o f ordinary people, especially in the Six Counties, has pushed the Catholic church, the 
G.A.A. and public representatives to take up the gauntlet to some extent, and the manner in which the 
support has narrowed into support for the prisoners five demands as a package, and not just in a wishy- 
washy way {‘we sympathise with the prisoners’) has been particularly significant.214
Flowever, on occasions, the views o f the ‘ordinary’ m em bers o f  the GAA were 
m isrepresented as the official position o f  the association. A t the 6 D ecem ber H -Block m arch 
in Dublin, Joe K eohane ,215 Kerry GAA, told the crow d that ‘the ideals and aspirations o f  the 
G A A are synonym ous w ith our national ideals — nam ely a free, G aelic united Ireland.’ Keohane 
further listed ‘a num ber o f  players and GAA figures who had asked him  to speak on their behalf 
also, including such household names as Jim m y K eaveney o f  D ublin and M ikey Sheehy o f 
K erry .’ 216 W hile An Phoblacht/Republican News m ade it clear that K eohane was speaking in 
a  personal capacity, o ther newspapers presented his speech as the official position o f  the 
association. The Sunday Independent, on its front page story, and under the headline ‘Gardai 
stoned by  H -B lock M archers’, reported that ‘speaking on beha lf o f  the G .A.A. M r Joe Keohane 
called on the  B ritish Governm ent to abandon their stand on the issue . ’ 217
VI.
T he m onths betw een the two hunger strikes, D ecem ber 1980 to M arch 1981, is 
traditionally the period during w hich GAA county boards and provincial councils hold their 
annual conventions, at w hich the year gone by is review ed, m otions are subm itted and debated, 
and agendas set for the forthcom ing year. An exam ination o f  county and provincial secretary’s 
reports subm itted to their respective conventions, the m otions subm itted to these conventions, 
and chairm en’s addresses give a good understanding o f  the feeling o f  the G A A  throughout 
Ireland at this particular tim e. Before the first county  convention w as held, Tom  W oulfe w rote
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a lengthy article, entitled ‘Garda Row: W hat the GAA Should D o ’, in the 14 N ovem ber 1980 
edition o f the Irish Press. In this article, W oulfe explained the significance o f  the 1979 change 
to R ule 7 and stated that ‘the seeds o f  the problem  confronting the G. A. A. today w ere nurtured 
by the 1979 diversion. Here, surely, one w itnessed the em ergence o f  a po litically  orientated 
G.A. A. with the em phasis on extrem ism .’ W oulfe, recalling the row  betw een the G A A and the 
GRA, stated that while the G A A ’s ‘unequivocal and repeated’ condem nations o f  violence were 
welcom e, ‘som ething m ore substantial and sustained’ w as required. W oulfe stated that he 
would like to see ‘m otions condem ning violence on the agenda o f  every county convention’, 
w ith the m atter then raised at the Annual Congress.218
A t the D ublin county convention, held on 4 January 1981, the Civil Service m otion 
‘W hereas the  A ssociation com m its itse lf to support the national aim  o f  political unity by 
peaceful m eans, it em phatically rejects and unequivocally condem ns violence to support that 
a im ’ was defeated by  100 votes to 98. Following the vote, W oulfe told RTE radio that form er 
GAA presidents, Pat Fanning and Con M urphy, had, through the introduction o f  the 1979 non- 
party-politics rule, allow ed the association ‘to drift into politics and [led] it into sym pathising 
w ith the m en o f  v io lence.’ Fanning replied that the com m ent w as ‘so silly it does not warrant 
com m ent’, w hile M urphy said he was ‘deeply offended by such m alicious statem ents .’ 219 Jack 
M arrinan, secretary o f the GRA, also criticised the defeat o f  the m otion, inform ing the Irish 
Independent that he had expected the D ublin m otion to be passed at the D ublin convention, 
and subsequently  forw arded to  the G A A Annual Congress, at w hich the association could 
‘copper-fasten’ its opposition to violence .220 The republican m ovem ent, unsurprisingly, 
w elcom ed the D ublin  vote stating that ‘attempts by anti-nationalists in the G A A to use the 
association against the freedom  struggle in the N orth, received a severe rebuff...Such 
nationalist expressions in  D ublin would certainly indicate that any o ther such  m otions around 
the country stand no chance whatsoever. The gut reaction o f  the G A A  m em bers continues to 
be sound . ’221
Throughout the rem aining counties o f  Leinster, C onnacht and M unster, the issue o f  the 
G A A ’s attitude tow ards republican violence was raised at the K ilkenny ,222 K ildare ,223
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W exford ,224 M ayo ,225 G alw ay ,226 Leitrim ,227 R oscom m on ,228 S ligo ,229 Cork and Lim erick230 
county conventions. A t each o f  these conventions, it was the issue o f  republican violence that 
was raised w ith only the Cork county board directly referring to the H -Blocks. The Cork 
secretary, Frank M urphy, in his report to the county convention, stated that m otions relating to 
prison conditions that had appeared on Annual Congress agendas had ‘carefully and 
unequivocally stated that this concern has been based on hum anitarian  grounds solely. The 
m ajor religious leaders in  this country have expressed sim ilar concern. W here lies the 
difference? ’231
W ith in  Ulster, the related issues o f  the H -Blocks and the G A A ’s attitude to republican 
violence w ere raised at only three county conventions; D onegal, Ferm anagh and Arm agh. 
W hile the H-Blocks or republican violence was not m entioned in the D onegal secretary’s 
report, nor w ere there any related m otions on the agenda, the county  chairm an, M ichael 
Gillespie, told the convention that the ‘official position o f  the D onegal organisation was that 
they were totally  against violence, no m atter by w hom  or against w hom  it is perpetrated .’ 232 A  
D errylin sponsored m otion appeared on the agenda for the Ferm anagh county convention 
calling on G A A m em bers to boycott the Irish Independent ‘in v iew  o f  that new spaper’s recent 
policy o f  bringing the Association into disrepute by  attem pting to link it w ith violent and 
subversive activ ity ’ .233 A t the convention itself, w hile there ‘was support for the principle o f  a 
boycott, it w as...felt that such a boycott would be unw orkable’ w ith  the D errylin  representative, 
M artin M cB rien, agreeing to allow the m otion to  be am ended at a later date ‘to take account o f  
w hat was felt to be a general hostile attitude by sections o f  the daily  press tow ards the 
A ssociation . ’234 At the Arm agh county convention, held on 21 D ecem ber 1980, tw o m otions 
calling for the convention to ‘express concern at the p light o f  the prisoners in H -B lock’ and 
that the A rm agh county board should ‘fully support the dem ands o f  the hunger strikers and 
publicly advertise their support’ appeared on the agenda, bu t these m otions w ere subm itted, by 
Clan Eireann and Saint Killians respectively, before the hunger strike ended on 18 D ecem ber
224 Irish Independent, 26 January 1981.
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1980. The A rm agh secretary, Gearoid O Fagain, d id  not refer to the m atter in  his report.235 Pat 
O ’N eill, secretary o f  the South Antrim  Divisional B oard, referred directly to  G A A involvement 
in  the H -Blocks crisis in his annual report to  the South Antrim Convention, held on 14 
D ecem ber 1980. O ’Neill asked ‘W hat are we afraid of? W e have given leadership to the G.A.A. 
in m any areas before. W e owe it to the large num ber o f  G.A.A. personnel on the blanket to be 
seen to support their struggle.’ W hile O ’Neill observed that ‘M uch w ork  has been done by 
individual clubs in the South Antrim  area’ he argued that ‘as a county w e could, and should, 
be doing m ore ’ .236 D espite this, the issue w as not raised in the A ntrim  secretary’s (A1 
M cM urray) report nor at the Antrim  county convention, held on 25 January  1981.237
In his secretary’s report to the U lster Convention, M ichael Feeney (M icheál O 
Feinneadha) stated that the U lster Council, throughout the latter h a lf  o f 1980, had to suspend 
‘norm al ac tiv ities’ and adopt ‘a defensive role to  w ard-off unsubstantiated and unjustifiable 
attacks both from  publicity  seeking obscure “officials” w ithin the G .A .A . and from  others 
outside who for their ow n political or other reasons feel that the A ssociation, because o f its 
Gaelic traditions, and com m itm ent to a Gaelic Ireland, should be v ilified  on every occasion 
possib le.’ Feeney further stated that, despite being subjected to ‘physical, psychological and 
political violence over the  years’, the GAA in U lster has ‘consistently counselled calm ness and 
m oderation.’ Feeney, noting that the U lster G A A  ‘condem ned violence from  every source’ 
argued that the ‘m indless and totally unjustified a llegations’ that the G A A  supported republican 
violence ‘place at risk the lives o f  m any o f  our m em bers . ’ 238 A t the provincial convention itself, 
held on 1 M arch 1981, the Arm agh m otion (the only violence / H -B lock related  m otion on the 
agenda) ‘T hat this Convention express concern at the plight o f  the prisoners in H -B lock and 
fully supports their dem ands on hum anitarian g rounds’ was passed.
As can be seen, the related issues o f  the H -B locks and the G A A ’s attitude to republican 
violence w ere only raised  by fourteen county boards and tw o provincial councils. Tellingly, 
however, conditions w ith in  the H-Blocks were on ly  raised by  two county  boards (Cork and 
Arm agh) and one p rovincial council -  the U lster Council. O f the county boards and provincial 
councils tha t raised the tw o matters, the vast m ajority  w ere m ore concerned w ith publicly  
clarifying that the GAA, w hilst nationalist in outlook, condem ned republican violence. A t
235 Secretary's Report to the 1980 Armagh County Convention, Newry, 21 December 1980.
236 Irish News, 11 December 1980.
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national level, m em bers o f  the two m anagement com m ittees were m ore concerned w ith the 
day-to-day running o f association, with the H-Blocks only raised on a small num ber o f  
occasions. Betw een 1976 and 1980 (inclusive) the Coiste Bainisti o f  the G A A m et on 70 
occasions, w hile the Central Council m et on 23 occasions. Throughout this entire period the 
H-Blocks w ere only discussed at seven meetings w hile the w ider issue o f  republican violence 
was only discussed at three meetings.
The m urder o f  the three Gardai in 1980, and the resultant dispute that arose betw een 
the G A A and the GRA, brought the issue o f  the G A A ’s attitude to republican violence to the 
fore and overshadow ed any concerns that association units and m em bers had  for the prisoners 
in the H -Blocks. W hile the 1980 hunger strike saw the m obilisation o f  som e G A A units at local 
levels in  N orthern Ireland, there was very lim ited overt support for the hunger strikers from  
GAA units in the Republic o f  Ireland. As shall be  discussed fully in later chapters, the H-Blocks 
crisis m arked the first regional crisis the GAA faced, and showed for the first tim e how  the 
association w as divided by the border. Crucially, R ule 7 had been am ended in M arch 1979 to  
allow all G A A units and representatives to participate in political m atters, so long as these 
m atters w ere not party-political: this however, was to have serious ram ifications for the GAA 
during the 1981 hunger strike, w hen the National H -B lock Com m ittee decided to stand 
candidates in elections in both N orthern Ireland and the Republic o f  Ireland.
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Chapter Three: 1981
The 1981 hunger strike began on 1 M arch and lasted until 3 O ctober w hen the republican 
prisoners, conscious that their fam ilies would intervene to save their lives, ended the protest. 
During th is period  a total o f twenty-three republican prisoners1 em barked on a hunger strike. 
There were approxim ately 420 protesting republican prisoners in the H -B locks at the beginning 
o f  this period ,2 104 o f  whom  were m em bers o f  the G A A .3 T he protesting prisoners ended the 
‘no w ash’ and ‘d irty ’ protests on 2 M arch, as they wanted to focus the w orld ’s attention on the 
hunger strike. T en  hunger strikers died betw een 5 M ay and 20 A ugust -  Bobby Sands (5 M ay), 
Francis H ughes (12 M ay), Raym ond M cCreesh (21 M ay), Patsy O ’H ara (21 M ay), Joe 
M cDonnell (8 July), M artin Hurson (13 July), K evin Lynch (1 A ugust), K ieran D oherty (2 
August), Thom as M cElw ee (8 A ugust) and M ichael Devine (20 A ugust). A s shall be discussed, 
five o f the  m en who died on hunger strike were, at one tim e, G A A  m em bers -  M cCreesh 
(C am ckcruppen  GAA), M cDonnell (St. Teresa’s GFC), H urson (G albally Pearses), Lynch (St. 
Patrick’s H urling Club) and Doherty (St. T eresa’s GFC). Tw o o f  these five, Lynch and 
D oherty, w ere very  active m em bers o f  the GAA.
T his chapter will address how the GAA reacted to the 1981 hunger strike, and how  the 
hunger strike affected the GAA. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section will 
detail the events that took place w ithin the H -Blocks during the period O ctober 1980 -  M arch 
1981, w hich led  to the com m encem ent o f  the hunger strike. The actions o f  the N ational H- 
Block C om m ittee and Sinn Fein during this period will be briefly  discussed, as w ill the lim ited 
support that som e G A A clubs gave to the prisoners during the period. The second section will 
detail how  the G A A  reacted to the early stage o f  the hunger strike, 1 M arch -  29 M ay. This 
section will p rov ide  further detail on those on hunger strike w ho w ere G A A  m em bers and 
question how  the various GAA units, clubs and county  boards in N orthern  Ireland in particular, 
reacted to the com m encem ent o f  the hunger strike. This section will further ask how the G A A 
reacted to th e  deaths o f  the first four hunger strikers, w ho died during this period, w ith the 
resultant row  betw een the GAA and the GRA explored in the context o f  the G A A ’s overall
1 Bobby Sands, Francis Hughes, Raymond McCreesh, Patsy O'Hara, Joe McDonnell, Brendan McLoughlln, 
Martin Hurson, Kevin Lynch, Kieran Doherty, Thomas McElwee, Paddy Quinn, Michael Devine, Laurence 
McKeown, Patrick McGeown, Pat Devlin, Liam McCloskey, Patrick Sheehan, Jackie McMullan, Bernard Fox, 
Hugh Carville, John Pickering, Gerard Hodgkins, James Devine.
2 Ulster Herald, 8 August 1981.
3 Irish Press, 30 July 1981.
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attitude to republican violence. This section w ill also detail the involvem ent o f  som e GAA 
m em bers and clubs in the election campaign of B obby Sands, and question i f  such involvem ent 
was in breach o f  the G A A ’s ‘non-party-political ru le ’. The third section o f  this chapter will 
detail the actions o f  the GA A during the latter stage o f  the hunger strike, 29 M ay -  3 October. 
The reaction o f the G A A  during this period will be explored in the context o f  a directive that 
was issued to GAA county boards by Liam M ulvihill, in response to the 29 M ay announcem ent 
that the N ational H -Block Com m ittee were entering candidates in the June 1981 general 
election in the Republic o f  Ireland. This directive was interpreted by m any as a total ban on 
GAA support for the hunger strikers. This section will focus on the debate that took place 
w ithin the GAA as to  the appropriate level o f  support the association could lend to the 
prisoners, by com paring and contrasting M ulvihill’s directive with correspondence from  ten 
Tyrone clubs who sought m ore GAA support for the prisoners. This section w ill also explore 
how the G A A  reacted to the deaths o f the final six hunger strikers, and the association’s 
reaction to the conclusion o f  the hunger strike itself. The final section o f  this chapter will 
analyse the proceedings o f the county and provincial conventions, and the 1982 Annual 
Congress, to ascertain  i f  the hunger strike affected the association as a  w hole or i f  its effects 
were felt b y  individual units o f  the association.
I.
This section w ill focus on the period betw een the ending o f  the 1980 hunger strike, 18 
D ecem ber 1980, and the  start o f  the 1981 hunger strike, 1 M arch 1981. T his section addresses 
what happened w ithin the H-Blocks that led the republican prisoners to decide to em bark upon 
another hunger strike, asks how  Sinn Fein and the N ational H -Block C om m ittee reacted to 
events taking place w ith in  the H-Blocks, and, finally, it explores the reaction o f  the G A A  to 
the build-up to  the 1981 hunger strike.
The period  betw een the end o f the first hunger strike and the beginning o f  the second 
hunger strike has been term ed, by  Brian Cam pbell in N or M eekly Serve my Time, The H B lock  
Struggle 1976-1981 , as one o f  ‘Confusion, Frustration, D eterm ination’. In the im m ediate 
afterm ath o f  the first hunger strike there was som e optim ism  am ongst the prisoners that a 
settlem ent could be reached to end the prison protests. W ithin  a short space o f  tim e, however, 
the republican prisoners realised that the negotiations betw een the p risoners’ leadership and 
the prison adm inistration were not going to result in the prisoners receiving their ‘five 
dem ands’. Throughout January 1981 a ‘step-by-step’ process w as attem pted to  end the ‘d irty ’
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and ‘no-w ash’ protests. This ‘step-by-step’ process began w hen six ty  republican prisoners were 
transferred to clean and furnished cells, on the understanding that the prisoners w ould  not dirty  
their cells. On 22 January the republican prisoners released a statem ent that they had decided 
to ‘pilot a schem e’ whereby twenty prisoners, who were in clean and furnished cells, would 
wash and shave, w ith  the expectation that they w ould then be given their ow n clothes and 
classed as ‘non-protesting prisoners.’ 4
A ccording to Jaz M cCann, however, w hen the tw enty  prisoners w ashed, shaved, cut 
their hair and prepared for work the ‘reception from  the governor w as not w hat was expected. 
H e said that he  w ould decide w hat type o f  work they w ould do, and that i f  they did not conform  
to prison rules, they w ould be m oved into the work Blocks. H e refused to issue them  with then- 
personal clothing until they fully conform ed.’ This, according to M cCann, was the end o f  
diplom acy -  the prisoners were ordered to smash their cells, and they did so ‘w ith a 
vengeance .’ 5 H ennessey, however, has shown that the situation was som ew hat m ore 
com plicated, insofar as the British governm ent had to  consider the p risoners’ request for their 
own clothes in the context o f  the governm ent’s stated policy o f  there being no special regim e 
for any prisoners, w hile the request was also m ade against the backdrop o f  IRA  killings o f  Ivan 
Toom bs, C hristopher Shenton and N orm an and Jam es S tronge .6 Bik M cFarlane stated that the 
refusal to issue the prisoners w ith their own clothes ended the period o f  confusion: the 
republican prisoners knew that a new hunger strike was the ‘only course’ to take .7 A  jo in t 
statem ent from  the H -Block and A rm agh republican prisoners w as released on 5 February 
announcing that a new hunger strike w ould begin, in both prisons, on 1 M arch -  the fifth 
anniversary o f  the w ithdraw al o f  political status from param ilitary  prisoners.
O utside the prison, the National H-Block C om m ittee and Sinn Fein spent the period 
im m ediately after the ending o f  the first hunger strike preparing the public for the possib ility  
o f  another hunger strike. Both organisations sought to keep public  attention focused on the 
situation w ithin the H-Blocks. The National H -Biock C om m ittee held a conference on 25 
January 1981, at w hich Piaras O Duill, in his chairm an’s address, h ighlighted m any o f  the 
previous cam paign’s strengths but acknowledged that the ‘cam paign needed to broaden its base 
and that it had yet to gain the support o f  the “higher echelons [o f the political parties], especially
4 Irish News, 23 January 1981.
5 Campbell, Nor Meekly Serve M y Time, pp. 136-137.
6 Hennessey, Hunger Strike, pp. 125-59.
7 Campbell, Nor Meekly Serve M y Time, p. 139.
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in the south .’” 8 A t this conference the National H -Block C om m ittee agreed that more 
conferences and m arches w ould be organised and ‘activists w ere asked to put pressure on those 
who called on  the prisoners to end their hunger strike to now  publicly  call on Britain to honour 
the [supposed 1980] agreem ent or to publicly state their support for the prisoners’ 5 ju s t and 
reasonable dem ands .’ 9 Sinn Fein, having been ‘tactically, strategically, physically and m orally 
opposed to  the  hunger strike ’ , 10 held their own internal party  conference on 15 February 1981, 
at w hich the  party pledged full support to the H -B lock prisoners, agreed to fully co-operate 
w ith the N ational H -B lock Com m ittee and to pursue the strategy o f  lobbying ‘local governm ent 
representatives throughout Ireland...trade unionists, cultural and sporting bodies, students, 
youth and w om en’s g roups . ’ 11
During the period between the tw o hunger strikes, the Coiste B ainisti o f  the GAA m et 
on one occasion only, 31 January 1981, and the issue o f  the H -B locks w as not raised at this 
m eeting .12 A t a local level, however, the build-up to  the 1981 hunger strike affected clubs in 
the sam e m anner (although nowhere near the sam e extent) as the 1980 hunger strike. A t the 
N ational Football League game between Antrim  and Derry, in Corrigan Park, Belfast on 8 
February, representatives o f various Belfast GA A clubs, w earing their club jerseys, took part 
in a ha lf tim e dem onstration, organised by ‘Gaels A gainst H -B lock/A rm agh’, which, according 
to An Phoblacht/Republican News, was ‘warm ly cheered’ by the ‘several-hundred-strong 
crow d . ’ 13 A t the 16 February Antrim  county board m eeting, Pat O ’N eill, South Antrim  
delegate, suggested that the county board should ‘re-iterate the previous sentim ent expressed 
reference [sic] H -Block and the hunger strikers’ bu t the county chairm an, H ugh M e Poland, 
deferred the m atter to  a future m eeting . 14 W hile advertisem ents in support o f  the protesting 
prisoners re-appeared in the Irish News from m id-January 1981 onw ards, in the tw o m onths 
leading up to the second hunger strike only one G A A  club, A rd  Eoin (Belfast) placed such an 
advertisem ent. 15
W hile the 1981 hunger strike was w idely expected, the build  up to the hunger strike 
w as not m arked w ith the same level o f  protest activity  as the periods during w hich the tw o
8 Ross, Smashing H-Block,p. 112.
9 Ross, Smashing H-Block, p. 113.
10 O'Malley, Biting a t the Grave, p. 72.
11 Irish Press, 16 February 1981.
12 Coiste Bainisti meeting minutes, 31 January 1981, CCMB 1981 (Part 1), pp. 3-15.
13 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 14 February 1981.
14 Antrim County Board minutes, 16 February 1981.
15 Irish News, 26 February 1981.
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hunger strikes w ere ongoing. Cam pbell wrote that at the outset o f  the 1981 hunger strike, 
‘public support proved difficult to harness... [as].. .m any w ere exhausted after the strain o f  the 
first hunger strike and disillusioned at its inconclusive ending .516 This was particularly  true for 
the GAA. W hile there w ere some tangible signs o f  support for the prisoners from  some GAA 
clubs, it w as not until the hunger strike itself began that the issue affected the G A A in a 
m eaningful manner.
II.
This section w ill focus on how the GAA, at all levels, responded to early  stage o f  the 
1981 hunger strike, betw een 1 M arch, the starting date o f  the hunger strike, and 29 M ay, w hen 
the N ational H -Block Com m ittee announced that nine prisoners w ere contesting the 11 June 
general election in the Republic o f Ireland. This decision by  the N ational H -Block Committee, 
w hich w as interpreted by  som e as a party-political act, had serious ram ifications for the G A A ’s 
response to the hunger strike. During the period 1 M arch -  29 M ay, four hunger strikers died 
in relatively quick succession - Bobby Sands (5 M ay), Frances H ughes (12 M ay), Raym ond 
M cCreesh (21 M ay) and Patsy O ’H ara (21 M ay). Furtherm ore, on 10 A pril B obby Sands was 
elected as the M P for Ferm anagh/South Tyrone. This section will ask how  m any hunger strikers 
were m em bers o f  the GAA; it will assess how  the G A A reacted to the outbreak and early stages 
o f  the hunger strike; it will outline the reaction o f  the G A A to the deaths o f  the four hunger 
strikers; it will discuss the row  that tem porarily reignited betw een the G A A  and the G RA  and, 
finally, it w ill explore the G A A ’s reaction to and involvem ent in  the by-election cam paign o f  
Bobby Sands in Ferm anagh/South Tyrone.
Sim ilar to the 1980 hunger strike, the aim  o f  the 1981 hunger strike was to focus 
attention on the cause o f  the prisoners in the H -Blocks and generate national and international 
support for the prisoners’ ‘five dem ands5. 17 T he prisoners ‘launched into a  m assive letter- 
writing cam paign trying to exert even more pressure on T hatcher’s governm ent to adopt a 
flexible approach and resolve the crisis. ’ 18 Again, the republican m ovem ent contacted various 
social, cultural and labour organisations, requesting that these organisations publicly  declare 
their support for the hunger strikers. As the hunger strike began, An Phoblacht/Republican
16 Campbell, Nor Meekly Serve M y Time, p. 146.
17 The five demands of the republican prisoners can be summarised as 1) the right not to wear a prison 
uniform, 2) the right not to do prison work, 3} the right of free association with other prisoners and to 
organise educational and recreational pursuits, 4) the right to one visit, one letter and one parcel per week 
and 5) full restoration of remission lost through protest.
18 Campbell, Nor Meekly Serve M y Time, p. 152.
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News, in a direct criticism  o f  the SDLP and Fianna Fail, stated tha t ‘a public expression o f  
concern is w orth m ore than a thousand private p leas/ 19
The G A A  was one o f  the organisations that the republican m ovem ent contacted, 
requesting that it publicly declare its support for the prisoners’ dem ands. This happened at local 
and national level. Seven republican prisoners from  T yrone20 issued a ‘Plea to G.A.A. C lubs’, 
w hich was published in the Fermanagh News and the Dungannon O bserver  on 28 M arch, in 
w hich the prisoners stated that they needed ‘the help o f  G .A.A. clubs to save the lives’ o f  the 
hunger strikers and that it was ‘crucial that G.A.A. m em bers fully support the m arches and 
protest now , and in the com ing days and weeks.’ The prisoners argued that the help o f  the GAA 
could ‘save the  life o f  a hunger striker’ but warned that ‘by com placency you could do the 
opposite. ’ The prisoners suggested that all GAA clubs should ‘hold em ergency m eetings now  
and ...in struc t all players and supporters to rally behind the H -B lock dem ands.’ The prisoners 
also asked the clubs to ‘put pressure on their respective county boards to speak out in a m ore 
forth-right m anner than before.’ A t county board level, the A rm agh21 and K ilkenny22 county 
boards w ere am ongst those that received correspondence from  the prisoners. A t national level, 
republican prisoner, Lorcan M ac Eoin (Laurence M cK eow n), w rote a letter, entirely in Irish, 
to the GA A, urging the association to ‘m ake an effort to help [Bobby Sands] survive, speak out 
publicly and Loudly. ’23 The protesting female republican prisoners in  A rm agh Jail also wrote a 
letter to  the leadership o f  the GAA in which they thanked the association for its ‘past efforts 
and achievem ents during the last hunger strike’ and asked the association to ‘renew  and greatly 
intensify all past efforts . ’24
W hen the  republican m ovem ent and the N ational H -B lock Com m ittee approached the 
GAA, both groups highlighted that m any o f  those im prisoned in the H -Blocks, including those 
participating in  the hunger strike, were members o f  the GAA. B y highlighting that m em bers o f  
the G A A  w ere im prisoned in the H-BIocks, both groups w ere attem pting to persuade the G A A  
to publicly  support the prisoners’ plight. The protesting fem ale prisoners in A rm agh Jail w rote 
that ‘m any o f the young m en and wom en suffering in B rita in ’s hell holes were once deeply 
involved and attached to  the Gaelic Association [sic] and w ould be so today bu t for the w ar
19 An PhoblocM/Republican News, 14 March 1981.
20 Pat Mullan, Peter Kane, M att Devlin, Aidan Slane, Ciaran O'Donnell, Joe McNulty and Denis Cummings.
21 Armagh county board minutes, 13 April 1981, Armagh County Board Minute Book, 1978-1988.
22 Kilkenny Pec pie, 12 June 1981.
23 Letter from Lorcan Mac Eoin to the GAA, 4 April 1981. H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
24 Undated letter from the 'Protesting Prisoners in Armagh Jail' to  the GAA. Northern Ireland Political 
Collection, Linen Hall Library.
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situation in our country . ’ 25 A t the G A A ’s 1981 A nnual Congress, held on 28/29 M arch, H- 
B lock activists picketed delegates attending the congress, displayed a large banner across the 
hotel entrance and handed out lists o f  GAA m em bers im prisoned in the H -B locks .26
From  the sources available, it can be ascertained that nine o f  the tw enty-three m en who 
participated, m the hunger strike were members o f  the GAA, at club and coun ty  level, w hile 
fourteen m en who participated in the hunger strike had no connection w ith the GAA. The m ain 
source o f  biographical inform ation on those who took part in  the 1981 hunger strike are the 
‘Portrait o f  a H unger S triker’ features that were published in An Phoblacht/Republican N ew s , 
during the course o f  the strike. Unfortunately, how ever, a ‘Portrait’ does not exist for each o f  
the tw enty-three men. A s the republican m ovem ent was actively prom oting the fact that m any 
o f  the prisoners w ere m em bers o f  the GAA, it is highly unlikely that any G A A  m em bership 
w ould have been om itted from these ‘Portraits’. It is, however, possible that the hunger strikers 
GAA activities w ere exaggerated by the newspaper, in  an attem pt pressurise the G A A to 
publicly support the hunger strikes. From  the various sources, it can be ascertained that K evin 
Lynch (Saint Patrick’s GAA, D erry),27 Raymond M cCreesh (C arrickcruppen GFC, A rm agh), 
K ieran D oherty (St. T heresa’s GAC and Antrim M inor Football Team ), M att D evlin  (A rdboe 
GFC, Tyrone), Pat Sheehan (S t  G all’s GAC, Antrim ), Paddy Quinn (W hitecross, A rm agh) and 
Gerry (Hugh) C arville (Greencastle GFC and Dow n M inor Football Team )28 w ere m em bers o f  
the GAA. W hile the vast m ajority o f  the literature from  the tim e o f  the hunger strike does not 
m ention if  Joe M cD onnell and M artin Hurson w ere m em bers o f  the GAA, later literature, and 
com m em orative events, indicate that the two m en were, in fact, m em bers o f  the association -  
M cDonnell belonged to  St T eresa’s (Belfast)29 and H urson played w ith  G albally Pearses 
(Tyrone).30 From  all o f  the available sources, and interview s carried out for this research, it 
seems certain  that the rem aining fourteen hunger strikers w ere not m em bers o f  the GAA.
25 Undated letter from the 'Protesting Prisoners in Armagh Jail' to the GAA. Northern Ireland Political 
Collection, Linen Hall Library.
26 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 4 April 1981.
11 Aidan Hegarty, Kevin Lynch and the Irish Hunger Strike (Camlane Press, 2006), pp. 75-79.
28 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 16 May 1981,4 July 1981, 1 August 1981, 29 August 1981, 5 September 
1981 & 12 September 1981.
29 While the 27 June 1981 edition of An Phoblacht/Republican News stated that Joe McDonnell's 'great love 
and ability was sport. He was a good gaelic football player7, the biography does not mention if McDonnell 
belonged to  a GAA club. Throughout the hunger strike no GAA club, including St Teresa's GFC, published an 
advertisement of support for Joe McDonnell, but, in 1998, St. Teresa's GFC named their pitch 'Me Donnell /  
Doherty Park' in honour of their two former members, Joe McDonnell and Kieran Doherty
“ There is no mention of Martin Hurson being a member o f the GAA in the 'Portrait of a Hunger Striker7 
focusing on Hurson, published in An Phoblacht/Republican News on 11 July 1981, and no GAA club placed 
an advertisement in support of him throughout his hunger strike. At his funeral, however, Sean Lynch, in
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During the period 1 M arch and 29 M ay G A A  units, clubs and county boards in 
particular, reacted to the com m encem ent and progress o f  the hunger strike in  a  num ber o f  ways. 
GA A clubs placed notices o f  support for the prisoners in  the Irish N ew s , several G A A clubs 
took an active ro le in H -Block m arches and dem onstrations, w ith  som e o f  these H -Block 
dem onstrations taking place on GAA grounds, w hile  a lim ited num ber o f  clubs w ithdrew  from  
their respective com petitions.
As w ith the 1980 hunger strike, some GAA clubs placed notices o f  concern  and support 
for the H -Block prisoners in the nationalist press, although during th is period the notices were 
predom inantly confined to the Irish News. W hile the advertisem ents w ere sim ilar in nature, 
three distinct them es can be discerned. Some clubs p laced advertisem ents in  the new spaper 
specifically m entioning a prisoner from the club’s locality ;31 other clubs p laced  notices in the 
new spaper calling for a  solution to be found on hum anitarian grounds ;32 w hile other clubs 
placed notices declaring their full support for the prisoners and their dem ands for political 
status.33
A t the 12 M arch N ational H -Block C om m ittee conference, B ernadette M cA liskey 
outlined that the strategy to be pursued by the com m ittee included a  series o f  street 
dem onstrations, w ith an ‘Industrial Day o f  A ction’ planned for 15 April and a national rally in 
Dublin on 18 A pril .34 The National H -Block Com m ittee, according to Patrick M cFlynn, G A A  
president during the period 1979-1982, recognised that the G A A w as a ‘ready organised group 
in  the parish’ and that convincing the GAA clubs to take part in the H -B lock m arches w ould 
be a ‘great fillip ’ to the H -Block C om m ittee’s efforts to m obilise a  popular street cam paign .35 
O n at least one occasion a H -Block m arch was tim ed so as not to clash w ith  local G A A
delivering the oration, called Hurson 'a young man who played Gaelic football for the local GAA club in 
Gal bally.'30 An Phoblacht/Repubiican News, 13 July 2013. [Article published on 32nd anniversary of Hurson's 
death.]
31 Shamrocks GAC (Derry) placed an advertisement of support fo r Mickey McVey; Bellaghy GAC (Derry) 
supported Francis Hughes, while St. Teresa's GAA (Antrim) expressed support for Kieran Doherty. Irish News, 
14 March 1981, 25 March 1981 & 22 April 1981.
32 Forkhill Peadar 0  Doirnin Club (Armagh), St. Malachy's GFC (Derry), Erin's Owen GAC (Derry), Eire Og GAC 
(Armagh), Ballinascreen GAA (Derry), Michael Davitt GAC and Ruairi OG GAC (Antrim). Irish News, 28 April 
1981, 30 April 1981,1 May 1981, 6 May 1981, 7 May 1981 & 12 May 1981.
33 Sean O'Leary GAC (Derry), Cardinal O'Donnells GAC (Antrim), Erin's Own GAC (Antrim), Kickhams GAC 
(Antrim), Ardoyne GAA (Antrim), Crossmaglen Rangers GFC (Armagh), O'Donnells GAC (Antrim), St. Paul's 
GFC (Armagh) and Slaughtneil GAC (Derry). Irish News, 8 April 1981,14 April 1981,15 April 1981,15 April 
1981, 16 April 1981, 24 April 1981, 25 April 1981 &25 April 1981.
34 Irish News, 13 March 1981.
35 Interview with Patrick MacFlynn, 20 August 2009, GAA Oral History Project.
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fixtures,36 w hile local H-Block committees, including the D ungannon37 and Om agh38 
com m ittees, appealed to GAA clubs to attend the H -Block dem onstrations w ith their G A A 
banners. There was, however, some opposition to these m arches from  w ithin the nationalist 
com m unity and from  w ithin the GAA itself. The Bishop o f  D erry, Edw ard Daly, publicly  called 
on people not to jo in  dem onstrations ‘unless the group seeking that support publicly rejects 
m urder and v io lence ’ ,39 while Patrick M cFlynn later explained that the parents o f  teenagers 
involved in the G A A did not want the GAA partaking in H -B lock m arches as they feared these 
teenagers w ould ‘then become actively involved in the troubles that were going on . ’40
T here is, however, evidence that GAA clubs took an official part in the H-Block 
m arches held  betw een 1 M arch and 29 May. Som e clubs inserted  notices in the Irish News 
calling on GAA m em bers and supporters to attend the m arches in their areas, w hile G A A  club 
banners w ere ‘p rom inent’ at the m arches, in particular the 26 April m arch from  the D unville 
Park (B elfast).41 On the other hand, the presence o f  GAA club banners at these m arches was 
not always sanctioned by the respective clubs. The Executive Com m ittee o f  the St. G all’s 
(Belfast) GAA club, who had at least two club m em bers participating  in the H -Block protests 
(Pat Sheehan and M ichael Culbert), refused perm ission for their club banner to be carried at 
these m arches. Som e m em bers o f  the club sim ply created a  new  club banner, and this was 
carried at H -Block m arches w ithout the perm ission o f  the club com m ittee .42 In addition to G A A 
clubs participating in H-Block demonstrations, several H -B lock dem onstrations took place on 
GA A pitches throughout Ireland - these m arches usually  occurred during the half-tim e interval 
o f  a m atch and w ere, predom inantly, unofficial incursions that did not have the approval o f  the 
G A A at local or national level. Incursions onto G A A  pitches took  p lace at Croke Park, where 
scuffles broke out betw een the protestors and the G ardai,43 H yde Park44 and C lones,45 where, 
on both occasions, union jacks were burned on the pitches. T here w ere also protests at several 
club m atches. A n ‘unofficial’ H -Block protest at the 15 M arch football m atch betw een the 
Derry clubs L issan and Pearses, where the words ‘H -B lock’ w ere spelled out w ith saw dust on
36 The start of the 22 March march in Galladuff, South Derry, was delayed until 5.30pm so as not to clash with 
the local GAA fixtures. Irish News, 21 March 1981.
37 Dungannon Observer, 14 March 1981.
38 Ulster Herald, 25 April 1981.
39 Armagh-Down Observer, 7 March 1981.
40 Interview with Patrick MacFlynn, 20 August 2009, GAA Oral History Project.
41 An Phoblocht/Republican News, 2 May 1981.
42 Interview with Michael Culbert, Belfast, 24 April 2014.
43 Irish Press, 6 April 1981.
44 An Phoblocht/Republican News, 2 May 1981.
45 An Phoblocht/Republican News, 2 May 1981.
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the side-line o f  the Lisnagelvin playing p itch ,46 resulted in a fracas betw een som e o f  the G A A 
players and the local DUP councillor, John Henry. In the afterm ath o f this game, the (then- 
legal) UD A said they w ould be com piling a dossier on the GA A to present to H um phrey Atkins, 
in an attem pt to get all financial aid to the GAA stopped, while the U FF in D erry issued a 
statem ent that it now  regarded all GAA personnel as ‘legitim ate targe ts ’ .47
Betw een 5 M ay and 21 May, four hunger strikers died in relatively  quick succession -  
Bobby Sands (5 M ay), Frances Hughes (12 M ay), Raym ond M cC reesh (21 M ay) and Patsy 
O ’H ara (21 M ay). Follow ing the death o f  Sands, the Central Council o f  the G A A  released a 
statem ent in  which it offered the sym pathies o f the G A A  to the fam ily o f  Sands and appealed 
to ‘those responsible to afford norm al decent standards and hum ane treatm ent to the 
prisoners. ’48 The Central Council did not release a further statem ent follow ing the deaths o f  
Hughes, M cC reesh or O ’Hara. As shall be discussed, m essages o f  sym pathy persisted beyond 
the death o f  Sands at a m ore local level. Other units o f the G A A  that offered their sym pathies 
to the four dead hunger strikers include the M unster Council49 and the D erry ,50 A rm agh ,51 
Sligo52 and M eath county  boards.53 Several GAA clubs from  w ithin N orthern Ireland ,54 and 
som e A m erican clubs ,55 inserted sym pathy notices in the Irish N ew s.56
A num ber o f  county and divisional boards, predom inantly  in U lster, cancelled G A A 
activities w ithin their respective jurisdictions follow ing the deaths o f  the first four hunger 
strikers. T he m ajority  o f  Gaelic games w ithin Ulster, however, w ere carried out as scheduled. 
The South A ntrim  com m ittee (which represented tw enty-six clubs from  the B elfast area), the
48 The playing o f Gaelic games on the Derry council owned Lisnagelvin playing pitch, located in the Waterside 
area of the city, had been controversial, with local residents objecting to Gaelic games on the pitch. The 15 
March match had not been sanctioned by the Derry City Council and, as maintenance work had not been 
carried out on the pitch due to loyalist threats to the council workmen, GAA officials erected their own 
posts and lined out the pitch using sawdust.
47 Derry Journal, 20 March 1981.
48 Central Council minutes, 8 May 1981, CCMB 1981 (Part 2), pp. 36-37.
49 Munster Council minutes, 7 May 1981 & 28 May 1981, Munster Council Minute Book 1981, pp. 50 & 60.
50 Irish News, L5 May 1981.
51 Armagh County Board minutes, 29 May 1981.
52 Sligo County Board minutes, 6 May 1981, Sligo County Board Minute Book 1977-1985.
53 Meath County Board minutes, 11 May 1981 & 25 May 1981, Meath County Board Minute Book 1978-1982.
54 Twinbrook GAA (Belfast), St Patrick's GFC (Fermanagh), Dromintee GFC (Armagh), Roger Casement GAC 
(Antrim), Annaghamore GFC (Armagh).
55 Sean McDermott's GFC (San Francisco), Shannon Rangers Hurling and Football Clubs (San Francisco), San 
Francisco Gaels Hurling and Football Clubs, Los Angeles Wild Geese.
56 Irish News, 6 May 1981, 8 May 1981, 9 May 1981, 22 May 1981, 23 May 1981 & 30 May 1981.
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Antrim , A rm agh ,57 D erry ,58 Tyrone ,59 Ferm anagh60 and N ew  Y ork61 county boards all 
cancelled fixtures, to  varying degrees. N ot all G A A supporters, even in Belfast, appreciated the 
cancelling o f  games. Follow ing the death o f  Sands, the Andersonstown News GAA 
correspondent, who w rote under the name ‘Joe C asem ent’, com plained that ‘Antrim  GAA 
cam e to a standstill’ over the weekend o f  9/10 M ay and argued that as Sands was buried on 
Thursday, 7 M ay, the Antrim  GAA, ‘having paid their due respects ...shou ld  have got back to 
their No. 1 priority, that is playing Gaelic gam es.’ ‘C asem ent’ further argued that the ‘G.A.A. 
who were, and still are, Ireland’s bulwark against A nglicization should not be intim idated by 
anyone’ and he appealed to the ‘Antrim  clubs and officials to get their priorities in the proper 
order, as they did during the m idweek, but should never have shut shop over the w eekend .62
Som e U lster clubs w ithdrew from GA A com petitions in protest at the deaths o f  the 
hunger strikers. Two Tyrone clubs, Clonoe O ’Rahillys G FC and D errytresk Fir na Chnoic 
GFC, p laced a  jo in t advertisem ent in the Irish N ew s , on 23 M ay, stating that, due to the 
deteriorating political situation, both clubs were w ithdraw ing from  G A A  activities ‘pending a 
hum ane and ju st solution in the H -Block/A rm agh Prison d ispute . ’63 The league tables for the 
Tyrone football com petitions, in the Ulster Herald, show that D errytresk did not participate in 
any o f  their scheduled Division 3 league games throughout the entire course o f  the hunger 
strike, but that Clonoe O ’Rahillys resum ed playing their D ivision 2 m atches in late June .64 
Similarly, the D erry club, Em m ets GAC Slaughtneil, p laced an advertisem ent in the Irish News, 
on 26 M ay, in w hich the club announced that ‘for the duration o f  the present H unger Strike we 
will not take part in any sporting com petitions.’ 65 C rossm aglen Rangers G FC (Armagh), w hose 
pitch w as occupied by  the  British Army, decided, however, to continue playing their gam es as 
an act o f  defiance. G ene Duffy, a long-serving official w ith the club, recalled that the 
Crossm aglen club cam e under pressure from  people in A rm agh to cancel gam es, but that, while 
club m em bers were all ‘very very supportive o f  the hunger s trikers’, they felt that ‘it w ould be 
a w rong m ove for the A ssociation to stop playing games and w e fought very sternly to...keep
57 Irish News, 6 May 1981 & 13 May 1981.
58 Irish News, 23 May 1981.
59 Irish News, 13 May 1981 & 23 May 1981.
60 Fermanagh Herald, 9 May 1981.
61 Darby, Gaelic Games, Nationalism and the Irish Diaspora in the United States, p. 190.
62 Andersonstown News, 16 May 1981.
63 Irish News, 23 May 1981.
64 Ulster Herald, 27 June 1981.
65 Irish News, 26 May 1981.
8 8
our gam es going...in defiance o f  w hat the British [Army] w anted because the B ritish [Army] 
w anted the gam es stopped...that w ould suit them .66
Tributes to the four dead hunger strikers w ere also expressed at G A A  m atches 
throughout Ireland. The staging o f  a m inute’s silence at Pairc Ui Chaoim h, Cork, proved to be 
the m ost controversial m ark o f  respect and tem porarily reignited the dispute betw een the G A A 
and the GRA. Before the com m encem ent o f the A ll-Ireland club football sem i-final, betw een 
Saint F inbarrs (Cork) and Scotstown (M onaghan), held in Pairc Ui C haoim h on 24 M ay, the 
Cork county  board secretary, Frank M urphy, according the Irish P ress , ‘asked over the 
loudspeaker for a m inu te’s silence for two GAA. m en accidently electrocuted at a  p itch  in 
Ballinora. M r M urphy linked their names in the silent tribute w ith those o f  the “th e  four 
Irishm en who had died tragically in the H-Blocks hunger strike .’” 67 Senator Professor John  A. 
M urphy68 lodged a com plaint with the Cork county board im m ediately after the m inu te’s 
silence, stating that he ‘d idn’t come to m atches to have the Provos sym pathy sentim ents 
im posed on [him ] ’69 and he accused the GAA o f  ‘m eddling in  sectarian po litics . ’ 70 Frank 
M urphy denied John A. M urphy’s accusation and replied, through the Cork Examiner, that if  
Professor M urphy ‘had listened to the full text o f  his [Frank M urphy’s] m essages o f  sym pathy, 
he could not accuse anyone o f  sectarian politics.’ The Cork Examiner carried the full tex t o f  
the m essage read out by  Frank M urphy before the m atch that included the line ‘W e also 
rem em ber all our fellow  countrym en who have died recently in the N orthern  Ireland troubles, 
and especially  the four young m en who tragically died on hunger strike in  the H -B locks .’ 71 
Frank M urphy’s statem ent ended the dispute betw een the Cork county board  and Senator 
M urphy, although Senator M urphy later, at a press conference announcing his determ ination
66 Interview with Eugene (Gene) Duffy, 22 July 2010, GAA Oral History Project.
67 Denis O'Mahony and Denis O'Hara died, and five others were injured, on 24 May 1981, when the metal 
goalpost they were moving, at the Ballinora GAA grounds (Cork), came in contact with an overhead ESB 
power line. Irish Press, 25 May 1981 & 26 May 1981.
68 Senator John A. Murphy was born in Macroom, Cork in 1927. In 1971 he was appointed Professor of Irish 
History in University College Cork (UCC), a position he held until his early retirement in 1990. During the 
periods 1977-1982 and 1987-1992, Murphy represented the National University o f Ireland constituency in 
Seanad iireann. Murphy also had a regular column with the Sunday Independent. Murphy was a consistent, 
and vocal, critic of Sinn Fein and the IRA, and also the H-Block campaigners -  in a 27 July 1981 address to 
the Cork Rotary Club, Murphy accused the H-Block Committee of being increasingly indistinguishable from 
the Provisional, whose aim was to destabilise the Republic and threaten its institutions. Irish Independent, 
28 July 1981.
69 Cork Examiner, 26 May 1981.
70 Cork Examiner, 25 May 1981.
71 Cork Examiner, 26 May 1981.
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to retain  his seat in the 1981 Seanad elections, called on the GAA to be ‘resolutely anti-physical 
force...even i f  this m eant cutting o ff clubs which supported the H -B lock cam paign . ’ 72
On 1 June, an article appeared in the Irish Independent in w hich Jack M aninan, 
secretary o f  the GRA, raised the possibility that ‘Garda m em bers o f  the GAA m ay be asked to 
quit the organisation because o f  its “tacit” support for the m en o f  v io lence’ and that the ‘Garda 
Com m issioners m ay be asked not to attend this year’s A ll-Ireland finals because o f  the GAA 
[sic] attitude to  violence. ’ M arrinan explained that he had received a num ber o f  com plaints 
from  G ardai, who, M arrinan said, felt they had been ‘conned at the recent A ll-Ireland club 
football final [sic]...into standing in silent tribute to the Long K esh hunger strikers.’ These 
Gardai, according to M arrinan, were ‘very em barrassed’ as they had ‘got up thinking they were 
standing in tribute to two m em bers o f  the GAA accidently e lectrocuted ... only to find ... Frank 
M urphy .. .adding the hunger strikers to the tribu te.’ M arrinan stated that the G R A  had to take 
‘some s tand ’ against an issue that ‘w on’t go aw ay’, and explained that the G RA  ‘had received 
certain undertakings from  the national officials [of the GAA] last O ctober and felt they w ould 
disassociate them selves fully from the m en o f  violence. B ut the sort o f  “clear substantial 
reaction” that the issue requires had not been forthcom ing.’ M arrinan acknow ledged that a 
num ber o f  county boards had ‘tried’ to pass m otions condem ning violence, but claim ed that 
this was ‘d iscouraged’ by officials in Croke Park, w hose attitude ‘left m any outside observers 
in little doubt that there was a  strong body o f  support in the G A A for the Provisional IR A . ’ 73
The contents o f  M arrinan’s statement indicate that the row  over the Pairc U i Chaoim h 
m inute’s silence w as sym ptom atic o f  a larger concern the G R A  held about the GAA. A t the 
G A A ’s 1981 A nnual Congress, held on 28/29 M arch, Patrick M cFlynn, G A A  president, told 
delegates that they had ‘an  opportunity o f  giving your clear and em phatic answ er to  those who 
are attem pting to  m isrepresent the view s o f  the A ssociation . ’ 74 There w ere tw o violence-related 
m otions on the  agenda for this A nnual Congress - a Lim erick m otion called for the G A A to 
condem n ‘all form s o f  unlaw ful violence against personal property  by  any person or 
organisation, o r w hatever “cause” w hatsoever’, and a jo in t S ligo/R oscom m on/Ferm anagh75 
m otion that ‘the G A A  as a 32-county organisation supports the ideal o f  N ational U nity by
71 Irish Press, 4 July 1981.
73 Irish Independent, 1 June 1981.
74 1981 Annual Congress minutes, CCMB 1981 (Part 1), p. 224.
75 The Fermanagh delegate subsequently told congress that his county did not sponsor this motion but that 
they had put-forward a motion {which did not appear on the agenda) deploring the attitude of the media 
in misrepresenting the GAA's attitude to violence.
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peaceful m eans, but categorically condemns violence to achieve this objective.’ These two 
m otions, however, were not put to the congress for acceptance or rejection but, instead, on the 
proposal o f  C on M urphy, ‘the policy o f  the Association w ith regard to violence as announced 
by A n tU achtaran on several occasions during the past year’ w as re-affirm ed .76
During the debate on w hether to vote on the m otions or re-affirm  the policy  o f  the 
association, G ene Larkin (Armagh) stated that he objected to ‘w hat the m otions do not say’ 
while Tom m y M ellon (Derry) argued that the m otions ‘w ere dealing w ith the sym ptom s rather 
than the cause.’ The decision not to m ove the m otions, accepted by  an overw helm ing m ajority, 
led to the Roscom m on delegate, Eam onn Bolger, leaving the congress in pro test.77 The debate 
surrounding the tw o violence-related m otions highlighted a real difference o f  opinion betw een 
delegates from  N orthern Ireland and the Republic o f  Ireland -  the Irish Independent noted that 
‘at one point an open split between N orthern delegates and some o f  the delegation backing the 
m otion on violence was only avoided by the intervention o f  president M r. M cFlynn and form er 
president M r. M urphy .’ 78 Similarly, the Roscom m on m otion, discussed later in the congress, 
‘That the G .A.A. should not in future issue any statem ent on political m atters not directly 
affecting the G .A .A .’ was also w ithdrawn with Patrick O ’N eill (A ntrim ) stating that ‘it w ould 
appear that certain o f  their problem s in the North w ere an em barrassm ent to o ther peop le’, and 
that ‘there w ere things in the N orth that affected ...G .A .A . m en and w om en in the N orth that 
would not affect G .A.A. m en and w om en in the South .79
Follow ing the 1981 A nnual Congress, the Irish Independent and the Belfast Telegraph 
both predicted  that the proceedings o f  the congress w ould lead to a rift betw een the G A A  and 
the A n G arda Siochana. The Belfast Telegraph explained that the ‘fa ilu re .. .to pass resolutions 
condem ning unequivocally  the use o f  violence for political ends has caused deep resentm ent 
in the ranks o f  the G ardai’ ,80 while the Irish Independent, on its front page and under the 
headline ‘G arda fury as GAA rejects violence m otion’, reported that ‘there is now  the 
possib ility  o f the close historic links betw een the Gardai and the association being severed with 
the m en threatening to w ithdraw  from  participation in G A A activ ities.’ M arrinan to ld  the Irish 
Independent that the G A A ‘cannot com prom ise on v io lence’ and that ‘as the G A A  rules now  
stand it seem s that the GAA can, in its own w ords “unequivocally  support the struggle for
76 1981 Annual Congress minutes, CCMB 1981 (Part 1), p. 245.
77 Irish Press, 30 March 1981.
78 Irish Independent, 30 March 1981.
79 1981 Annual Congress minutes, CCMB 1981 (Part 1), p. 247.
80 Belfast Telegraph, 30 March 1981.
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national liberation’” . The Irish Independent predicted that ‘the rift betw een the Gardai and the 
association is certain to lead to a breakaway of som e kind and heighten the bitterness between 
them  follow ing the shooting o f  three gardai in counties Roscom m on and W exford . ’ 81
Follow ing Jack  M arrinan’s 1 June statement, on 3 June the Cork county board released 
a lengthy statem ent, approved by M cFlynn, refuting the allegations m ade by M arrinan. The 
statem ent called M arrinan’s allegation that Gardai had been ‘conned’ as ‘false and m isleading’ 
and explained that ‘no m em ber o f  the Garda force was em ployed on official duty w ithin the 
stadium  on the occasion in  question’ and, m ore im portantly, that the ‘carefully prepared and 
authorised announcem ent...w as concluded three m inutes prior to the referee signalling the 
com m encem ent o f  the m inute’s silence. No one should have been in any doubt about the full 
contents o f  the announcem ent. N o one was “conned” ’. The statem ent re-iterated that the GAA, 
at national level, had been expressing its concern for the H -Block prisoners on hum anitarian 
grounds, and that the C ork county board had ‘consistently supported and adhered strictly to the 
A ssociation’s policies in these m atters.’ The statem ent also com m ented that m any county 
boards had, through their own conventions, outlined the association’s rejection o f  violence, and 
that ‘as the local new spapers gave prom inence to these rem arks it is strange that they were not 
“reported” to M r. M arrinan [who] appears to receive only reports that are m isleading, taken 
out o f context and grossly unfair to this B oard.’ The statem ent concluded by noting that an 
‘outstanding level o f  support, co-operation, and goodwill has alw ays existed  betw een the Cork 
County Board and the G arda Siochana’ and that it would be ‘m ost regrettable i f  illfounded and 
unw arranted rem arks by Mr. M arrinan would hinder this relationship or be the cause o f  
dissension’, before w arning that the ‘Association will not be deflected from  its responsible 
N ational attitude by m isrepresentation or by threat. ’82
This statem ent appeared in  the national and provincial press the follow ing day, 4 June, 
with the Cork Exam iner reprinting the statem ent in full on its front page. The Irish Independent, 
on its ow n front page, reported that the Cork county board had ‘launched a personal attack on 
Garda rank-and-file c h ie f Jack M arrinan’ and that the ‘ongoing ro w ’ betw een the GAA and the 
GRA had now  escalated .83 The Irish Times also reported on the statem ent, under the headline 
‘M arrinan attacked by G .A .A .’ 84 This, however, seem ed to end the d ispute betw een the two
81 Irish Independent, 30 March 1981.
82 Statement issued by the Cork County Board, 3 June 1981. H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
83 Irish Independent, 4 June 1981.
84 Irish Times, 4 June 1981.
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bodies -  there is no further m ention o f  the dispute in any o f  the national newspapers. A t the 
July Coiste Bainisti m eeting, the first m eeting after M arrinan’s accusation, a letter was received 
from the GRA ‘explaining that the A ssociation Secretary had been m isquoted by the 
new spapers in com m ents m ade about the GAA . ’ 85
W hen Frank M aguire, the Independent nationalist M P for Ferm anagh/South Tyrone, 
died suddenly on 5 M arch ,86 the National H-Block Com m ittee decided that Bobby Sands w ould 
stand as an ‘Anti H-Block/A rm agh political prisoner’ candidate in the resultant by-election. On 
10 April, Sands was elected the M P for Ferm anagh/South Tyrone, having received 30,492 
votes as opposed to Harry W est’s (Ulster Unionist Party) 29,046 votes. The supposed purpose 
o f  Sands’ candidacy w as ‘not about securing an entry into electoral politics; it was about the 
possibility  o f  gaining publicity  and building the [H-Block] cam paign . ’ 87 N either the H-Block 
Com m ittee88 nor Sinn Fein89 considered the Ferm anagh/South Tyrone by-election as a ‘normal 
political election’ in that its objective was not about w inning a seat for a political party, but 
instead it was an opportunity to try  and save the life o f  B obby Sands. There is no doubt, 
however, that the republican political strategists w ould have been aw are o f  the w ider 
im plications o f  electoral success in the by-election. A ccording to H ennessey, ‘Sands’ victory 
produced a jub ilan t response from his cam paigners, w ho em phasised its w ider political 
im plications for the British presence in Ireland ’ .90
Throughout Sands’ election campaign - betw een 26 M arch and 9 A pril - GAA 
personnel cam paigned on behalf o f  Sands; som e G A A  grounds w ere used for electioneering 
purposes and some U lster clubs expressed their support for Sands’ candidacy by placing 
advertisem ents in nationalist newspapers. The advertisem ent in the Irish News for the 8 A pril 
‘M assive E ve o f  Poll R ally ’, in Tyrone, listed Joe K eohane as one o f  the m ain speakers and 
described him  as a ‘form er All Ireland G A A Star (8 A ll-Ireland m edals).’91 An 
Phoblacht/Republican N ew s  reported that ‘In Ferm anagh/South Tyrone last Sunday [5 April],
85 Coiste Bainisti minutes, 17 July 1981, CCMB 1981 (Part 2), p, 143.
86 Frank Maguire was a playing member of the Lisnaskea Emmets (Fermanagh) GAA club. Maguire also played 
for the Fermanagh senior football team for a number o f years. Lisnaskea cancelled their senior and junior 
league matches as a mark of respect when Maguire died. (Fermanagh News, 7 March 1981). The entire 
executive of the Ulster G.A.A. and the former Ulster secretary, Malachy Mahon, and the Fermanagh GAA 
secretary and chairman attended Maguire's funeral. (Fermanagh Herald, 14 March 1981).
87 Ross, Smashing H-Block, p. 118.
88 Interview with Jim Gibney, Belfast, 4 October 2014.
89 Interview with Danny Morrison, Belfast, 22 October 2014.
90 Hennessey, Hunger Strike, p. 171.
91 Irish News, 8 April 1981.
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the election cam paign o f  Bobby Sands was in full swing w ith ... after-m atch m eetings at m any 
gaelic football grounds in  the area’, and also that ‘speakers addressed crow ds attending a gaelic 
football tournam ent in Augher, County Tyrone .’ 92
Five Tyrone clubs93 placed a jo in t advertisem ent in 7 A pril Irish News p ledging their 
support to Sands in the by-election and urging ‘all their supporters to cast their vote for h im .’ 94 
This Irish News advertisem ent w as used, and reproduced, by  Sean K ilfeather in the Irish Times 
as an exam ple o f  w hat K ilfeather called ‘a blatant breach o f  Rule 7 o f  the G A A w hich describes 
the association as “non party-political.’”  K ilfeather argued that w hile ‘som e people skilled in 
am bivalent pedantry m ay argue that Bobby Sands is not a m em ber o f  any political party ...he is 
taking part in a  contest against a m em ber o f a political party  for a seat in a party  political system  
in a situation from  which other party political people w ithdrew .’ K ilfeather expressed his 
opinion that the  ‘air around Croke Park these days is filled with flapping o f  the w ings o f  the 
pigeons com ing hom e to roost’ and, having rem inded readers about his open letter to the GAA 
president in 1979, asked ‘W ill the GAA allow this state o f  affairs to continue or w ill it stop 
now ...The Tyrone Five have taken a serious step. The next m ove is up to  Croke P ark .’ 95 Tw o 
m ore T yrone clubs, St. C olm cilles96 and Greencastle St. Patrick’s G F C ,97 p laced separate 
advertisem ents in the Irish News and Ulster H erald, urging people to vote for Sands. Peter 
Quinn explained that the U lster Council and the U lster county boards, w hilst recognising that 
clubs that inserted these notices o f  support for Sands had crossed the line from  ‘hum anitarian 
to po litical’, d id  not intervene, bu t instead ‘turned the proverbial ey e ’. Q uinn further explained 
that ‘the considered view , which was never recorded, was it was none o f  our business .98
D uring the early  stage o f  the hunger strike, 1 M arch -  29 M ay, the N ational H -Block 
Com m ittee, Sinn Fein and the H-Block prisoners approached the G A A , at all levels, in an 
attem pt to persuade the association to come out in full public  support o f  the hunger strike. As 
discussed, how ever, support for the hunger strike w as confined, predom inantly , to som e 
Ulster clubs and county boards, who acted in an independent and varied m anner. A t the 
outset o f  the hunger strike, neither the Central nor U lster councils issued any guidelines as to
92 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 11 April 1981.
93 Brackagh Emmets GFC, Derrytresk GFC, Clonoe O'Rahilly's GFC, Brackaville Owen Roe GFC and Coalisland 
Fianna GFC.
94 Irish News, 7 April 1981.
95 Irish Times, 10 April 1981.
96 Irish News, 9 April 1981.
97 Irish News, 9 April 1981 & Ulster Herald, 11 April 1981.
98 Interview with Peter Quinn, Enniskillen, 21 June 2014.
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what actions county  boards and clubs could, or could not, take in support o f  the hunger strike. 
Those clubs and county boards that publicly supported the hunger strike, by  participating in 
marches, cancelling or curtailing G A A fixtures and w ithdraw ing from com petitions, could 
poin t to the last Central Council directive issued on the m atter, on 4 D ecem ber 1980, which 
clearly stated that ‘any genuine peaceful efforts to resolve the situation and bring the 
continuing spiral o f violence to an end is worthy o f  the support o f  all G .A.A. un its .’ GAA 
support for the candidacy o f  Sands in the Ferm anagh/South Tyrone by-election was 
interpreted by some, including Sean K ilfeather, as a breach o f  the G A A ’s ‘non party- 
po litical’ rule, but, surprisingly, and despite a direct challenge by K ilfeather to do so, the 
Central Council o f  the GAA did not intervene. A s shall be discussed below , however, the 
dynam ic o f  the G A A ’s support for the hunger strikers was radically altered when the National 
H -Block C om m ittee entered nine H -Block prisoners into the June 1981 general election in 
the R epublic o f  Ireland.
III.
This section will focus on the G A A ’s involvem ent in, and reaction to, the latter stage 
o f  the 1981 hunger strike, betw een 29 M ay and 3 October. During this period six hunger strikers 
died. Four o f  these hunger strikers, M cDonnell (St. T eresa’s GFC), H urson (G albally Pearses), 
Lynch (St. Patrick’s H urling Club) and Doherty (St. T eresa’s GFC) w ere m em bers o f  the GAA. 
This section w ill focus on the developing debate w ithin the G A A as to the appropriate level o f 
support for the hunger strikers. Crucially, it will explore how  the d ispute w as transform ed by 
the calling o f  a  general election in the Republic o f  Ireland, and by the decision o f  the National 
H-Block C om m ittee to run candidates. This section will also explore how  the GAA reacted to 
the deaths o f  the  final six hunger strikers, and the association’s reaction  to the conclusion o f 
the hunger strike itself.
O n 2 1 M ay, A n Taoiseach Charles H aughey asked President Patrick H illery to dissolve 
the Dail, and announced that a  general election w ould take p lace on 11 June. A lthough two 
hunger strikers, Raym ond M cCreesh and Patsy O ’Hara, died on the day  the general election 
was called, H aughey w as adam ant that the H-Blocks crisis had not forced him  into calling i t ."  
Follow ing the electoral success o f Bobby Sands in the Ferm anagh/South Tyrone by-election,
99 Irish Independent, 22 May 1981.
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the National H -Block Com m ittee announced on 29 M ay that they w ere going to run n ine 100 H- 
B lock and A rm agh prisoners as candidates in the general election in the R epublic .101 Follow ing 
a tw o-w eek cam paign, during which both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael candidates w ere harassed 
by  supporters o f  the hunger strikers - w ith a po t o f  paint throw n over H aughey , 102 K ieran 
D oherty (Cavan/M onaghan) and Paddy A gnew (Louth) were elected to the Dail. The Irish 
Independent com m ented that the election o f  D oherty and A gnew  was ‘a m ajor propaganda 
coup for those orchestrating support for the M aze hunger strikers’ and added that ‘the H-Blocks 
could be a  m ore serious issue throughout the R epublic than has been believed . ’ 103
A s in the Sands cam paign, both Sinn Fein and the N ational H -Block C om m ittee insisted 
that the candidatures o f  the nine prisoners was no t an attem pt to enter parliam entary politics 
but, instead, ‘its prim ary objective [was] revitalising the cam paign in support o f the hunger- 
strikers and rem obilising support’ . 104 The candidatures, however, p rom pted C on M urphy, G A A  
president betw een 1976 and 1979, to w rite to L iam  M ulvihill on 31 M ay that the N ational H- 
Block C om m ittee had entered the ‘party-political’ arena. M urphy expressed the view  that the 
GAA ‘cannot in anyw ay identify...w ith the N ational H -B lock C om m ittee or any subsidiary 
com m ittees any longer.’ M urphy further wrote that ‘apart from  going party political we have 
allied to this the distasteful conduct in the course o f  the election cam paign o f  those purporting 
to represent H -B lock and in view  o f  all this...C um ann Luth Chleas Gael m ust stay com pletely 
clear. ’ 105 Subsequently, M ulvihill issued a directive, dated 4 June 1981,106 to each county 
secretary w hich read
As you are probably aware, the National H-Block Committee has decided to enter candidates in a number 
of constituencies for the forthcoming General Election and has set up an election organisation to back 
those candidates. In view o f those developments the H Block question has now very clearly entered the 
party political arena and as such it is not possible for GAA clubs, County Boards or other units to be 
involved in any way cfRjail 7 Treorai Oifigiuil.
100 The candidates were Joe McDonnell (Sligo/Leitrim), Kieran Doherty (Cavan/Monaghan), Paddy Agnew 
(Louth), Martin Hurson (Longford/Westmeath), Tony O'Hara (Dublin West), Kevin Lynch (Waterford), Sean 
McKenna (Kerry North), Tom McAlister (Clare) and Mairead Farrell (Cork North Central).
101 Irish Independent, 30 May 1981.
102 Hennessey, Hunger Strike, p. 243.
103 Irish Independent, 13 June 1981.
104An Phoblacht/Republican News, 13 June 1981.
105 Letter from Con Murphy to Liam Mulvihill, 31 May 1981. H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
106The minute book of the GAA indicates that there was no meeting of neither the Coiste Balnisti nor the 
Central Council before Liam Mulvihill issued this directive.
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You are asked to bring the contents of this statement to all clubs and to point out that, until further notice, 
no club or unit should issue statements or show support in any other way for what has become a party 
political issue. What members do as individuals will, o f course, be their own business.107
M ulvihilPs statem ent that the ‘H-Block question’ had ‘very clearly entered the party political 
arena’ can be interpreted in two ways. The H -Block candidates had entered into a general 
election, an arena w here political parties and independent candidates com pete against one 
another, and, thus, M ulvihill is correct to say that the N ational H -B lock Com m ittee had entered 
the ‘party political a rena’. This view, however, does not take into consideration the claim  that 
the H -Block candidates entered into this ‘arena’ w ith no party political am bitions, but, instead, 
chose to contest the election in an effort to further their ow n cam paign, a cam paign that the 
GAA had already publicly  supported on hum anitarian grounds. Those opposed to the G A A ’s 
involvem ent in  the H-Blocks crisis could argue that the H -B lock candidatures w ere in breach 
o f  the G A A ’s non-party-political rule, while those in  favour o f  the association’s involvem ent 
could argue that the H -Block candidatures were hum anitarian in nature, and did not breach 
association rules.
On 3 June, the day before Liam M ulvihill issued the G A A directive, D erm ot Conw ay 
(D iarm uid O C onbhui), secretary o f  the Tyrone county board, sent a letter to M ulvihill that 
perfectly  illustrates the dilem m a faced by, and consequent dichotom y w ithin, the GAA 
throughout the 1981 hunger strike. W hile the h igher echelons o f  the GA A, as represented by 
M urphy and M ulvihill, sought to rem ove the association from  the H -Blocks crisis, a substantial 
proportion o f the ordinary m em bers in Ulster, in this case the T yrone clubs, w ere o f  the opinion 
that the association should becom e m ore involved in the H -B lock cam paign. Conw ay, in his 
letter to  M ulvihill, outlined the opinions being voiced  in clubs throughout Tyrone w ith regards 
the response o f  the Central Council to the H-Blocks crisis, and included the text o f  a statem ent 
the Tyrone county  board intended for release to the m edia. C onw ay explained that there ‘is a 
strong feeling in Tyrone by all 48 clubs that despite resolutions being passed  that no t enough 
is being done by Central Council re the w orsening situation in the H -B locks.’ Conw ay 
explained that the Tyrone county board had held tw o m eetings w ith  the T yrone clubs, at w hich 
‘all the clubs [were] o f  the opinion that Central Council o f  th e  G .A.A. m ust do som ething to 
try and help the situation .’ Conway warned that i f  ‘there is no positive action from  Croke Park 
a big num ber o f  our clubs could well pull out o f  football and that would be a disaster for u s’
107 Letter from  Liam Mulvihill to each County Board Secretary, 4 June 1981. H-Block File, GAA Library and 
Archive.
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and he urged M ulvihill ‘to act positively’ and approach m em bers o f  the ‘new ’ Irish 
governm ent, 108 and to also arrange a m eeting betw een the thirty-tw o county chairm en.
Five days later, 8 June, Conw ay sent M ulvihill a further letter, th is tim e enclosing letters 
from ten Tyrone c lubs 109 in  which the clubs expressed their disappointm ent and anger at the 
decisions taken by the Central Council in relation to  the H -B lock prison-protests. The dates o f 
these letters indicate that they were written before the 4 June directive w as issued and they 
w ere not a reaction to  the directive. A ll ten clubs requested that the GAA, at national level, take 
m ore positive action with regards to the hunger strike; six o f  the c lubs 110 m ade reference to the 
fact that m any o f  those on protest in the H-Blocks w ere G A A  m em bers, w hile four c lubs111 
threatened to  w ithdraw  from  competitions in support o f  the hunger strikers. K ildress W olfe 
Tones GFC w arned that i f  there was no positive action from  the Central Council, the club 
would ‘do our u tm ost to lobby provincial support, and failing that county support, for a m arch 
on Croke Park, calling for the GAA to act before there are further deaths.’
The statem ent that Conw ay sent to M ulvihill in his 3 June letter first appeared in the 
Irish News on  5 June, under the headline ‘GAA step into ja il crisis w ith p lea from  T yrone.’ 
This statem ent was also published on 13 June in the Ulster H erald  and Dungannon Observer. 
The statem ent, signed by fifty-two Tyrone clubs, 112 stated that the Tyrone G A A  view ed ‘with 
the deepest concern and anxiety the extremely grave and w orsening situation in the H -B locks’ 
and that the county board called ‘on the Thatcher adm inistration to  im m ediately initiate m oves 
to bring about a just, lasting and equitable solution’ and to ‘change its attitude and show a
108 As a result of the June 1981 general election in the Republic of Ireland, a Fine Gael -  Labour Party coalition 
formed the new government, with Garret Fitzgerald as Taoiseach.
109Tattyreagh GFC, Moy Tir-na-nOg, Kildress Wolfe Tones GFC, Rock St. Patricks GFC, Clogher Eire Og GFC, 
Derryloughan Kevin Barry's GFC, Brochagh Emmets GFC, Moortown St Malachys GFC, Eglish St Patricks GFC, 
Brackaville Owen Roe's GFC.
110 Moy Tir-na-nOg GFC, Rock St Patrick's GFC, Clogher Eire Og GFC, Brochagh Emmets GFC, Moortown St 
M alach/s GFC, Eglish St Patrick's GFC.
111 Tattyreagh GFC, Moy Tir-na-nOg GFC, Clogher Eire Og GFC, Brochagh Emmets GFC.
112 Ardboe O'Donovan Rossas, Augher St. Macartan's, Aghyaran St. Davogs, Aghaloo O'Neills, Aughabrack 
O'Connells, Beragh Red Knights, Brackey Handball Club, Brocagh Emmets, Ballygawley St. Ciarans, 
Brackaville Eoghain Ruaidh, Carrickmore St. Colmcilles, Cloughlin Handball Club, Coalisland Fianna, 
Cookstown Fr. Rocks, Clogher Eire Og, Clonoe O Rathallaigh, Castlederg St. Eugenes, Derrylaughan Kevin 
Barrys, Derrytresk Fir na Cnoic, Domaghamore St. Patricks, Dregish Pearse Og, Drumquin Wolfe Tones, 
Drumquin Handball Club, Drumragh Sarsfields, Dromore St. Dympnas, Dungannon Thomas Clarkes, 
Dungannon Eoghan Ruaidh, Eglish St. Patricks, Edendork St. Malachys, Eskra Emmets, Fintona Pearses, 
Glenelly St. Josephs, Gortin St. Patricks, Galbally Pearses, Greencastle St. Patricks, Kildress Wolfe Tones, 
Kileeshil St. Marys, KillyclogherSt. Marys, Loughmacrory St. Theresas, Loughmacrory Handball Club, 
Moortown St. Malachys, Moy Tir na nOg, Moutfield GFC, Newtown Stewart St Eugenes, Omagh St. Endas, 
Pomeroy Plunketts, Pomeroy Handball Club, Rock St. Patricks, Stewartstown Harps, Strabane Sigersons, 
Tattyreagh St. Patricks and Trillick St. Macartans.
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readiness to understand the inner conflicts o f the N orthern Ireland N ationalist population .’ 113 
The statem ent was w elcom ed by the group Gaels A gainst the B locks who argued that the 
Tyrone statem ent show ed ‘the genuine concern felt by G .A.A. m em bers at the continuing 
intransigence o f  the B ritish governm ent towards the situation existing w ithin the prisons o f  
N orthern Ire land . ’ 114
The Coiste Bainisti, at their 5/6 June m eeting, directed L iam  M ulvihill to w rite to 
Conway and explain  that ‘Ard-Chom hairle and A n Coiste B ainisti have m ade num erous efforts 
to influence public  representatives in this m atter...[and]...that correspondence w ith An 
Taoiseach was continuing .’ 115 On 8 June, M ulvihill w rote to An Taoiseach, Charles H aughey, 
and enclosed correspondence showing that ‘a num ber o f  G A A  clubs have w ithdraw n from  the 
A ssociation on [the H -Blocks issue]’. M ulvihill also included a copy o f  a 1 M ay 1981 letter 
from  M ulvihill and M cFlynn to A n Taoiseach, in  w hich they asked for A n Taoiseach to 
‘intervene personally ’ in the hunger strike, and to w hich they  had received no reply . 116 (On 19 
June, H aughey replied to  M ulvihill that he shared the G A A ’s concerns about the H -B locks 
crisis and included the text o f  several statements he had m ade on the issue .117)
M ulvihill, on 10 June, wrote to Conway and explained that ‘w ith  the entry o f  H  B lock 
candidates into the party  political arena in both the Six Counties and the Republic, it is no 
longer possible to  express support for the cause’. M ulvihill further explained that G A A 
m em bers could pursue the m atter in a  personal capacity and that ‘w here the best interests o f  
the A ssociation are involved it w ould be possible to  m ake approaches to  all political parties for 
a settlem ent. ’ M ulvihill outlined the steps that the GAA, at national level, had taken  w hich  
included the release o f  several strong statem ents, num erous letters to A n Taoiseach, two 
m eetings w ith the ‘M inister for External A ffairs ’ 118 and a num ber o f  m eetings w ith  the N ational 
H-Block C om m ittee ‘previous to its entry into party  po litics .’ M ulvihill, enclosing new spaper 
cuttings, cautioned that ‘this m atter is not looked upon in the sam e light all over the country. 
You will note that w e have been in controversy w ith G arda leaders in  connection w ith
113 Irish News, S June 1981.
114 Andersonstown News, 13 June 1981.
115 Coiste Bainisti minutes, 5 - 6  June 1981, CCMB 1981 (Part 2), p. 95.
116 Letter, and enclosure, from Liam Mulvihill to Charles Haughey, 8 June 1981. H-B!ock File, GAA Library and 
Archive.
117 Letter from Charles Haughey to Liam Mulvihill, 19 June 1981. H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
118 The title  'Department of External Affairs' was replaced with the title  'Department of Foreign Affairs' in 
1971. The Department of Foreign Affairs has responsibility fo r Anglo-Irish affairs, including Northern 
Ireland. The department's name, however, implies that Northern Ireland is a foreign country.
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statem ents m ade in the past.’ M ulvihill told Conw ay that the Coiste Bainisti would ‘seek a 
m eeting w ith the G overnm ent im m ediately after the General E lection and the concern o f  the 
A ssociation will be expressed very forcibly.’ Turning to the Tyrone clubs, M ulvihill 
congratulated the clubs on the ‘clear and em otive way in which the letters w ere w ritten’ but 
argued that the clubs ‘will be m uch more effective in working w ith in  the A ssociation and that 
by w ithdraw ing from  activities they are only w eakening the unit w hich they  seek to help 
them .’ 119
T he correspondence from  the Tyrone clubs, and the Coiste B ainisti’s reaction to it, 
highlight the d isparity  o f  opinion that existed am ongst the various units o f  the GAA w ith 
regards to the association’s involvem ent in the H -B locks campaign. The letters from  the Tyrone 
clubs clearly show that GA A m em bers within that county felt that the leadership o f  the G A A 
was not doing enough to  facilitate the H -Blocks cam paign, despite the repeated passing o f  
m otions in favour o f  the prisoners at county, provincial and national levels. Conversely, 
how ever, the Coiste Bainisti had to consider a num ber o f  factors, including the entry o f  H- 
Block candidates in the 1981 general election (Republic o f Ireland) and by-elections (Northern 
Ireland) and previous controversies with the leadership o f  the GRA. M ulv ih ill’s reply to 
Conw ay, that the  association had held two m eetings w ith the M inister for Foreign Affairs and 
had sent num erous letters to An Taoiseach, is, w hilst true, som ew hat m isleading. As discussed 
in Chapter Tw o, one o f  the m eetings held betw een the G A A and Brian Lenihan, M inister for 
Foreign A ffairs, was predom inantly  about the British m ilitary occupation o f  Saint O liver 
Plunkett Park (Crossm aglen) with the H-Blocks only briefly m entioned as the m eeting 
concluded . 120 Sim ilarly, w hile the GAA did w rite to An Taoiseach on tw o occasions, the 
association received only one reply from the governm ent, and it was nothing m ore than a 
standard reply. It m ust be rem em bered that the hunger strikes heightened political, sectarian 
and param ilitary tensions in N orthern Ireland to  levels previously unseen, and, for a period, it 
seem ed as i f  the  v iolence could spread to the Republic o f  Ireland - it is h ighly  unlikely that 
GAA clubs w ithdraw ing from com petitions in T yrone would have been a priority  for the Irish 
governm ent during this crisis.
Inexplicably, the 4 June directive did not becom e public know ledge until 28 July, w hen 
the Irish Times, Irish Independent and Belfast Telegraph all reported on its existence. The fact
119 Letter from liam  Mulvihill to Diarmuid 6  Conbhui, 19 June 1981. H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
120 Minutes of the meeting between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and GAA delegation, 19 November 1980. 
DFA/2011fi9/1787.
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that the directive was reported on by three new spapers on the sam e day indicates that the 
directive w as either leaked to the newspapers o r the new spapers w ere m ade aware o f  the 
directive in a  co-ordinated manner. W hile there is som e evidence that county boards did receive 
the G A A  directive in June, including the M eath121 and A rm agh122 county boards, several 
county boards, including Kerry, M onaghan and Cork, denied that they  had received, o r seen, 
the directive follow ing its 28 July ‘public release’.123 Follow ing the conclusion o f the hunger 
strike, the Dow n chairm an, Benny Crawford, to ld  critics o f  D ow n G A A that they should be 
criticising their own county secretaries for ‘keeping various docum ents’ and not discussing the 
directive w ith their c lubs.124
Som e G A A clubs and county boards continued their involvem ent in the H-Block 
cam paign throughout the period from 4 June (when the directive was issued) to 28 July  (when 
the directive was m ade public). A s m entioned above, it is som ew hat unclear i f  clubs and county 
boards realised that their continued involvem ent in  the H -B locks cam paign, post 4  June, was 
in v iolation o f  a G A A  directive, as they m ay not have received the directive. W hile it is also 
conceivable that clubs and county boards w ithin N orthern  Ireland felt that the directive did not 
apply to  them , as the election was taking place in the Republic o f  Ireland, this is unlikely as the 
directive was issued to each county secretary, w ith  no differentiation m ade in the directive 
betw een clubs from  N orthern Ireland and the Republic o f  Ireland. It m ay also have ju s t been 
the case that it  was norm al for clubs to ignore directives from  Croke Park, as they had done 
when th ey  allow ed earlier H -Block m arches to take p lace on their grounds. Som e G A A clubs 
placed notices o f  support for the hunger strikers in the Irish N ew s125 and the Fermanagh 
H erald126 during this period, although these GAA notices w ere not as num erous as before. A t 
county board  level, the Antrim  county board placed a notice in the Irish News that it ‘fully 
[supported] the prisoners on hunger strike and [urged] im m ediate action from  the British 
G overnm ent to grant their five dem ands’,127 while the D erry  county board  released a statem ent 
‘[adding] its voice to those o f  Church and state leaders calling on the  B ritish G overnm ent to
121 Meath county board minutes, 8 June 1981, Meath County Board Minute Book 1978-1982.
122 Armagh county board minutes, 25 June 1981.
123 Irish Press, 29 July 1981.
124 Irish News, 18 January 1982.
125 Faughanvale GAC (Derry), Saint Canice's GAA (Derry), Saint Teresa’s GAC (Belfast), Irish News, 20 June 1981, 
17 July 1981 & 25 July 1981.
126 Saint Patrick's GFC (Fermanagh) placed a notice in the Fermanagh Herald declaring their support 'for the 
hunger strikers and the march in their support in Enniskillen on Sunday 26th July.' This was the first GAA 
notice in the Fermanagh Herald since the hunger strike began. Fermanagh Herald, 25 July 1981.
127 Irish News, U u ly  1981.
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abandon its intransigent attitude and resolve the present deadlock in the H -Blocks o f  Long 
K esh.’128
There is also evidence o f  G A A involvem ent in the election cam paign in the Republic 
o f  Ireland. Joe K eohane was once again a prom inent m em ber o f  the H -Block election 
cam paigns and, on occasions, he used his GAA status for the advantage o f  the N ational H- 
Block Com m ittee. W hen electioneering for Joe M cD onnell (Sligo/Leitrim ), K eohane m ade a 
direct appeal to his ‘m any friends and colleagues in the G .A.A. for their fullest co-operation’ 
in getting M cD onnell elected .129 Tom m y M oyna, a w ell-know n M onaghan football player, 
‘canvassed from  door to door, and visited GAA clubs and lobbied players and m em bers on the 
prisoners [sic] beha lf throughout the county, until he was only fit to  drop .’130 Those 
cam paigning on behalf o f  Kevin Lynch (W aterford) produced an election flyer that featured a 
photograph o f  Lynch receiving the A ll-Ireland U nder-16 hurling cup from  the then GAA 
president, P at Fanning,131 with the by-line ‘This w as a proud day for K evin. Polling D ay c m  
be a Proud D ay for W aterford. Vote N o l Kevin Lynch.’132 Pat Fanning quickly, and publicly, 
disassociated h im self from  the National H-Block C om m ittee and objected to his photograph 
being used by  the N ational H-Block Com m ittee.133 N one o f  this contravened any G A A  rule or 
directive, how ever, as w ith the election cam paign for Sands, the N ational H -Block Com m ittee 
used G A A  grounds for electioneering purposes, both before and after the 4 June directive. An 
Phoblacht/Republican N ew s reported that during the M onaghan v T yrone U lster Under-21 
football m atch, held  in Clones on 31 M ay, ‘m em bers o f  the election com m ittee w ere given 
perm ission to address the crow d.’ The election cam paign also took advantage o f  G A A crow ds 
for electioneering purposes -  An Phoblacht/Republican N ew s  reported that follow ing the 
Leinster Senior football quarter-final m atch betw een Offaly and W estm eath ‘a m eeting was 
held after [the] G A A m atch in M ullingar.’134
H -B lock protests w ere also held at several G A A  grounds during the period  4 June -  28 
July; these pro tests took place at tim es when Gaelic gam es w ere being played and also on non­
128 Irish News, 18 July 1981.
129 Leitrim Observer, 6 June 1981.
130 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 20 June 1981,
131 Pat Fanning was GAA president for the period 1970 -1973 . Fanning was a native of Waterford; he played 
inter-county hurling with Waterford at minor, junior and senior levels, while he also held seven Waterford 
senior hurling medals, won with his club Mount Sion.
132 Hegarty, Kevin Lynch and the Irish Hunger Strike, p. 89.
133 Irish Independent, 12 June 1981.
134 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 6 June 1981.
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m atch days. Gaels A gainst the Blocks placed an advertisem ent in the Andersonstown News 
urging all ‘concerned G.A.A. clubs’ to participate in the 14 June hunger strike m arch in Belfast, 
a  m arch that concluded w ith speeches being m ade in Casem ent P ark .135 O n 25 July, O ’D onovan 
R ossa GA C (Belfast), held a  twelve hour vigil outside their club grounds on the Falls Road, at 
w hich the club ‘publicly  called on other GAA clubs to follow  suit and becom e actively involved 
in the hunger-strike cam paign.’136 There were also half-tim e incursions throughout the 1981 
U lster senior football cham pionship games, including the quarter-final replay betw een 
M onaghan and Dow n in Castleblaney on 28 June and the sem i-final betw een Dow n and D erry 
held in Clones on 5 July. A t the U lster football final, betw een A rm agh and Dow n in Clones on 
19 July, ‘about one hundred hunger strike protestors formed an “H ” on  the p itch  at half-tim e.’137 
This protest in particular generated a lot o f  bad publicity  for the U lster Council. Despite the 
earlier pitch incursions, Peter Quinn later wrote that ‘while there had been rum ours o f  some 
sort o f  p ro test’, the U lster Council ‘had not anticipated that it w ould occur on the p itch .’138 
Quinn later explained that the U lster Council ‘thought the protest would be outside either 
before the game s ta rted ...o r  after the game was over.’ W hen the U lster Council realised what 
form  the protest was taking, the four senior officers o f  the U lster Council ‘got together very 
quickly’ and ‘agreed that the secretary would go dow n to the Gardai and ask them  not to 
intervene’ in the protest. The U lster Council was w orried that i f  they tried to stop the protest, 
it could have caused a rio t.139
A s w ith the 1980 hunger strike dem onstrations, the G A A  were effectively pow erless to 
prevent these dem onstrations from taking place on  G A A grounds. Speaking after the 28 July  
‘public re lease’ o f  the 4 June directive, M cFlynn told both the Irish Times and the Belfast 
Telegraph that w hile the GAA did not approve o f  such dem onstrations, ‘it was difficult to 
im plem ent a  decision. E ntry  was gained by people paying in the ordinary w ay who at half-tim e 
invaded the fie ld .’ Sim ilarly, an unnamed ‘GAA O ffic ial’, presum ably Pat Quigley, in  response 
to a query about these dem onstrations, hypothetically asked Sean K ilfeather ‘H ow  could we 
refuse perm ission w hen the people asking the perm ission  w ould not take no for an answer. I f  
we tried to stop them  w e ’d have a rio t.’140
135 Andersonstown News, 13 June 1981.
136 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 1 August 1981.
137 An Phoblacht/Republicon News, 4 July 1981,11 July 1981 & 25 July 1981.
138 Quinn, The Outsider, p. 147.
139 Interview with Peter Quinn, Enniskillen, 21 June 2014.
140 Irish Times, 29 July 1981.
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Tw o hunger strikers died betw een 4 June and 28 Ju ly  - Joe M cD onnell (Belfast) died 
on 8 July  w hile M artin Hurson (Tyrone) died on 13 July. B oth M cD onnell (St. T eresa’s) and 
H urson (G albally  Pearses) were m em bers o f  the GAA, but neither St. T eresa’s nor G albally 
Pearses p laced  a sym pathy notice in the Irish N ews follow ing the  deaths o f  their m em bers. The 
w ider G A A  reaction, at club level, to these two deaths was also som ew hat m uted - the Donegal 
Celtic cam ogie team  was the only Gaelic team to place a sym pathy notice in the Irish News 
following the death o f  Joe M cD onnell,141 while no G A A club placed a sym pathy notice in the 
Irish News follow ing the death o f  M artin Hurson. This decline in public support for the hunger 
strikers was not confined to the GAA: David Beresford notes, in  Ten Men D ead, that following 
the death o f  Joe M cDonnell ‘funeral parades’ w ere held across Ireland, bu t ‘it w as noticeable 
that the crow ds w ere sm aller than previously.’142 The Tyrone county  board did, how ever, 
release a statem ent expressing sorrow at the death o f  M cD onnell and requesting that clubs and 
county boards throughout Ireland ask their public representatives to pu t pressure on the British 
and Irish governm ents to find a solution. The Tyrone county board further stated that ‘all 
peaceful efforts to have the crisis resolved are w orthy o f  the support o f  all m em bers o f  the 
A ssociation .’143
A s the health  o f  M artin H urson deteriorated, the ‘Tyrone Sm ash H -B lock A rm agh 
C om m ittee’ w rote a letter to each GAA club in Tyrone, published in the U lster H erald, asking 
G A A clubs to w ithdraw  indefinitely from all com petitions. T he Tyrone H -B lock Com m ittee, 
noting that they  w ere ‘not at loggerheads w ith the G .A .A .’, stated that they believed ‘that w hilst 
activities organised by the G.A.A. continue, m axim um  attendance at H -B lock dem onstrations 
is not possib le .’ The com m ittee asked clubs in Tyrone to ‘call an em ergency m eeting o f  your 
Club, consider our request to cancel all forthcom ing fixtures, attend the S ix-county 
dem onstration from  Belleeks to Cam lough on  Sunday Ju ly  12th and all subsequent 
dem onstrations in support o f  the hunger strike.’144 (This request is som ew hat contradictory o f  
an earlier Tyrone H -B lock Com m ittee statement, in w hich the com m ittee m ade it clear that that 
w ere no t asking ‘centres o f dancing or social entertainm ent’ to  close dow n during H urson’s 
hunger strike, as ‘such places provide invaluable outlets for publicity  e tc .’145) W hile no Tyrone 
clubs w ithdrew  from  their respective com petitions, the T yrone senior football cham pionship
141 Irish News, 10 July 1981.
142 Beresford, Ten Men Dead, pp. 309-310.
143 Irish News, 10 July 1981.
144 Ulster Herald, 11 July 1981.
145 Ulster Herald, 6 June 1981.
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quarter-final betw een Trillick and Carrickmore, scheduled for 17 July, was cancelled w ith the 
Ulster H erald  com m enting that ‘it was a case o f  putting the plum  o f  a tie o f  the com petition  in 
cold storage.’146
On 28 July, the Irish Times, Irish Independent and the Belfast Telegraph  all reported 
on the existence o f  the 4 June directive, w ith the three new spapers all stating that the leadership 
o f the G A A had prohibited any G A A involvem ent in the w ider H -B lock cam paign. Sean 
Kilfeather, in a front-page Irish Times article, entitled ‘G A A H -B lock support m ust end -  H Q ’ 
explained that ‘Previously the GAA had regarded the m atter as a “hum anitarian one” and 
throw n the w eight o f  its supporters behind the protests and the five dem ands o f  the p risoners’ 
but that ‘the  candidature and election o f H-Block hunger strikers to parliam entary  seats in 
D ublin and London has brought about the change.’147 K ilfeather predicted that the ‘change o f  
attitude is alm ost certain  to cause friction within the GAA, particularly  in the N orth, w here 
m any clubs have been  openly m arching behind G A A  banners and w here several 
dem onstrations have been staged at half-time in recent m atches.’ W hile Liam  M ulvihill, 
according to the Irish Times, refused to divulge the contents o f  the 4 June directive to  the 
new spaper, a ‘spokesm an for the G A A ’ confirmed that ‘a circular had gone out to county 
boards follow ing inquiries about what attitude should be adopted to H -B lock  candidates in  the 
recent e lection .’ K ilfeather later revealed that he telephoned Croke Park ‘at least three tim es’ 
prior to w riting the article but, on each occasion, he was refused the text o f  the d irective.148 
Kilfeather, a consistent critic o f  the 1979 party-political rule change, argued that ‘the recent 
developm ent opens up again the controversy w ithin the G A A  about Rule 7 and about the 
G A A ’s attitude to violent politics...It can, indeed, be argued that the H -B lock issue caused a 
change in  R ule 7 o f  the G A A .’ 149
There was an im m ediate reaction to the public  release o f  this statem ent from  both  the 
South A ntrim  executive and the Tyrone county board. The South A ntrim  G A A  executive 
com m ittee held a specially  convened m eeting on the day o f  the d irective’s ‘public release’, 28 
July, and released a statem ent reiterating their support for the prisoners and stating that ‘no 
m atches will be played in this D ivisional area on days o f  N ational H -B lock dem onstrations, 
w hen all m em bers are asked to m arch with their club banners in support w ith  the p risoners’
346 Ulster Herald, 18 July 1981
347 Irish Times, 28 July 1981.
342 Irish Times, 1 August 1981.
149 Irish Times, 28 July 1981.
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dem ands.,,i0 Pat O ’Neill, secretary o f  the South A ntrim  executive com m ittee, told the Irish 
Press that the  executive com m ittee w as ‘very annoyed...that we have not got a copy o f  this 
d irective’ and that ‘i f  these reports are true, it is a  drastic change as far as the GAA is concerned 
and one w hich w e will take up with the highest levels o f  authority in the association.’151 
Similarly, the Tyrone county board released a statem ent (its th ird  in three weeks) in which the 
county board restated that their policy o f  ‘rearranging the tim e o f  fixtures on the days o f  H 
B lock dem onstrations and o f  cancelling games on the occasion o f  the death o f  a hunger striker’ 
reflected the w ishes o f  G A A  m em bers in the county .152
There was also an imm ediate reaction to the ‘public release’ o f  the directive from G A A 
clubs, Belfast clubs in particular. The Andersonstown News, on its 1 A ugust front page, under 
the headline ‘G. A.A. Clubs to Continue P rotests’, reported that it had contacted GAA m em bers 
throughout Belfast, and that the ‘directive would not m ake the sligh test difference to the c lubs’ 
support for the hunger strikers.’ The new spaper quoted an unnam ed ‘prom inent G .A.A. 
official’ from  B elfast who claimed that the directive w ould ‘m ake club m em bers m ore 
determ ined to support the protests’, and that it was being view ed w ithin B elfast as ‘an 
unwarranted intrusion in  club affairs.’ The official continued that G A A  m em bers were ‘angry’ 
with the ‘illconsidered [sic] ruling’ and that it was ‘tantam ount to a stab in the back, and the 
G .A.A. m em bers in Belfast will certainly not let the m atter res t.’ In its editorial, the 
Andersonstown N ew s also criticised the directive and called for it to  be ‘opposed vigorously at 
club and county level in an effort to preserve the national identity  o f  the G. A. A. ’ The new spaper 
called the directive ‘the culm ination o f  years o f  underm ining by  the anti-N ationalist lobby in 
the organisation, w ho w ould like to see the G.A.A. abandon its national aspirations’.153 Outside 
o f  Belfast, som e clubs placed notices in the Irish News condem ning the 4 June directive,154 
with St. C anice’s stating that ‘club facilities already available to  the local H -Block Com m ittee 
over these past four years will continue to be at their d isposal.’
The Andersonstown News also published a letter, on 1 A ugust, from  Padraic O ’N eill, 
who, presum ably, is Patrick [Pat] O ’Neill -  the secretary o f  the South A ntrim  executive 
comm ittee. O ’N eill claim ed that ‘pressure from “state bodies” and Gardai in the south’ had
150 Andersonstown News, 1 August 1981.
151 Irish Press, 30 July 1981.
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caused ‘the h ierarchy o f  the G.A.A. to panic and fly in the face o f the often stated view s o f 
G.A.A. m em bers in the north on the H-Block c ris is .’ Stressing that G A A  support for the H- 
B lock prisoners was based on hum anitarian grounds only, O ’N eill suggested that ‘if  the G.A.A. 
is to be truly non-party political, then let all the Fianna Fail and Fine Gael T.D .s in the south 
resign their m em bership o f  the G .A .A .’, and added that ‘it is well know n that politics and the 
G.A.A. are too w ell m arried in the Free S tate.5 O ’Neill also questioned the tim ing o f  the 
directive. It m ust be recalled that during the April 1981 Ferm anagh/South Tyrone by-election 
som e G A A  clubs in N orthern Ireland publicly, and overtly, backed the  candidacy o f  Bobby 
Sands. The leadership o f  the GAA, during this by-election, did not issue any directive banning 
G A A support for political candidates, despite a direct challenge from  Sean K ilfeather to do so. 
The 4 June directive w as only issued when it becam e apparent that the National H-Block 
Com m ittee was going to run prisoner-candidates in the Republic o f  Ireland. O ’N eill questioned 
w hy the GAA had w aited until the Irish general election to ‘publicly prohibit the H -Block 
cam paign’ and implied that electoral results, rather than GAA policy, was the m ain m otivation 
behind the d irective.155
Surprisingly, Tom  W oulfe, a consistent opponent o f  G A A involvem ent in any political 
m atters, in particular the  H -Block crisis, reacted negatively to the 4 June directive. On 29 July 
the Irish Independent carried a front-page story in which W oulfe claim ed that the 4 June 
directive ‘had m ade a bad situation w orse’ and tha t he was ‘particularly shocked and upset 
because the organisation had changed its attitude w hen H -B lock candidates had decided to test 
the dem ocracy o f  the ballot box .’ W oulfe claim ed that ‘the ordinary m em ber doesn’t  know 
where he stands with the top brass at the m om ent’ and called on the G A A  to restore the ban on 
political participation .156 It can only be assumed that W oulfe’s position rem ained that the 4 
June directive did not go far enough and that W oulfe believed the GAA should fully revert to 
its pre-1979 non-political stance. W oulfe, correctly, m aintained that the 4 June directive 
confused G A A m em bers as to w hether they could, or could not, participate in the w ider H- 
B lock cam paign.
O utside o f  the GA A, the National H -Block Com m ittee and the republican m ovem ent 
also reacted to the public  ‘release’ o f  the 4 June directive. The N ational H -B lock Com m ittee 
released a statem ent that they ‘regretted the reported reversal o f  policy  by the  G A A  in relation 
to their cam paign in support o f  the prisoners’ five dem ands’ and reiterated that their
155 Andersonstown News, 1 August 1981.
156 Irish Independent, 29 July 1981.
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‘involvem ent in elections has only been in pursuance o f  the dem ands o f  the prisoners and has 
not been m otivated by any other political considerations.’157 The republican m ovem ent, 
through An Phoblacht/Republican News, did not condem n the GA A directive directly, but 
instead used the publicity  surrounding the directive to  call for unity am ongst the nationalist 
com m unity. An Phoblacht/Republican News, on its 1 A ugust front page, under the headline 
‘U nity Vital A gainst B ritish’, stated that whilst appeals from  the ‘Free State governm ent’, the 
Catholic Church and the SDLP to Britain to take a ‘less inflexible position’ had failed, the 
‘thinking w ith in  these three powerful bodies perm eates the centre o f  Irish society’ and that the 
‘GAA central council’s attem pts to abandon the hunger strikers is ju st one exam ple o f  the effect 
this thinking can have .’158 In  the same issue, however, in their ‘Portrait o f  a H unger-S triker’, 
focusing on Paddy Quinn, the new spaper recalled that Q uinn’s GAA club, W hitecross, had 
sent Quinn a radio w hen he was first imprisoned, in Crum lin Road Jail, and com m ented that 
‘Q uinn’s com m itm ent to gaelic sport and his c lub ’s recognition and appreciation o f  it, stands 
in stark contrast to the dishonest efforts o f elem ents w ithin the GAA this w eek to undercut the 
H -Block cam paign by urging clubs to w ithdraw  support.’159
Patrick M cFlynn, GA A president, reacted im m ediately to the public release o f  the 4 
June directive, and to the Sean K ilfeather Irish Times article in particular. E leven days before 
the ‘public release’ o f  the 4 June directive, the Coiste B ainisti had decided ‘that the Association 
should continue to pursue a ju st and hum ane solution w ithout becom ing aligned w ith any other 
grouping.’160 O n the sam e day the Irish Times article was published, 28 July, M cFlynn released 
a statem ent in w hich he accused K ilfeather o f ‘using one guideline in isolation’ w hich ‘shows 
neither understanding, concern nor regard for [the G A A ’s] independent and unequivocal stance 
on this issue.’ M cFlynn stated that K ilfeather’s article ‘gives the im pression that the G.A.A. is 
no longer concerned w ith  the sad situation in the H -Blocks -  this is not the case’ and explained 
that ‘the advice, issued on June 4, referred to the fact that the N ational H -Block Com m ittee had 
set up an election organisation to support candidates in the General Election and that because 
o f  that developm ent it was not possible for G .A.A. clubs or other units to be involved’. 
M cFlynn stressed that the GAA was ‘still m aking efforts at the highest levels to bring about a 
situation that will enable all our people to live in understanding, peace and harm ony. ’161 It m ust
157 Irish News, 29 July 1981, p. 5.
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be noted tha t this statem ent was written before clubs and county boards reacted  to the public 
release o f  the 4 June directive, and cannot therefore be attributed to the subsequent reactions 
detailed above. It appears that a  copy o f  this statem ent was sent to county boards -  the M eath 
county board, at their 17 A ugust m eeting, read M cF lynn’s ‘statem ent 28th July 1981 relation to 
Associations [sic] stand on the sad situation in the H -B locks.’162 M cFlynn also appeared on 
RTE Radio, on 28 July, to clarify the G A A ’s position. D uring the course o f  this radio interview, 
M cFlynn ‘denied that its H-Block directive m eans it is no longer concerned w ith the 
hum anitarian aspects o f  the prison issue.’163
The furore caused by the public release o f  the 4 June directive ended, for the m ost part, 
on 30 Ju ly  w hen M cFlynn contacted the group Gaels A gainst the B locks and ‘clarified the 
m atter.’ Gaels A gainst the Blocks had scheduled a ‘very  im portant m eeting o f  all G.A.A. 
concerned m em bers’164 in  St. Pauls GFC (Belfast) c lubhouse,165 on 30 July, to ‘form ulate 
policy’ in light o f  the GAA directive.166 A spokesm an for the group told the Belfast Telegraph 
that the m eeting was ‘called m ainly to define policy on beha lf o f  the Gaels in regard to the H- 
Block issue and to decide what they are going to do in reference to the ban being  im posed by 
the G A A .’167 Pat O ’N eill told the Irish Press that the clubs in his area had not received ‘any 
directive from  Croke Park banning support for the hunger strike cam paign’ and that he was 
attending the m eeting as ‘W e are the people whose relatives, w hose m em bers are in Long Kesh, 
and w e have a duty to the 103 [sic] G.A.A. m em bers and specifically  the tw o hunger strikers 
to support them .’ O ’N eill also told the Irish Press that ‘if  M r. M cFlynn is telling us in the N orth 
that we are n o t to involve ourselves in the H -B lock cam paign, obviously w e are in direct 
conflict w ith  C roke Park. That would m ean that w e w ould continue and redouble our efforts 
on the p risoners’ beha lf and we will not shirk our responsibility tow ards the prisoners.’168
A t this m eeting, however, the chairm an o f  G aels A gainst the B locks inform ed attendees 
that ‘contact had been m ade with the president o f  the [G A A ]...w ho had clarified the m atter.’ 
M cFlynn had explained to the chairm an o f  Gaels A gainst the B locks that, in response to a
162 Meath county board minutes, 17 August 1981. Meath County Board Minute Book, 1978-1982.
163 Belfast Teiegraph, 29 July 1981.
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‘num ber o f  county boards’ querying what the official position o f  the G A A was with regard to 
H-Blocks candidates, he had replied that ‘that the G.A.A. did not align them selves w ith any 
political party  as they  w ere a non-political organisation.’ M cFlynn claim ed that follow ing this, 
‘certain sections o f  the m edia had taken up the story and they  distorted it. He stated that there 
never was any directive issued to any counties or clubs to w ithdraw  their support from the 
p ro test.169 M cFlynn’s explanation, according to the Belfast Telegraph , w as fully accepted by 
all those attending the m eeting. The Belfast Telegraph reported that the ‘apparent rift’ between 
the leadership o f  the G A A  and the clubs in Antrim  had been ‘totally  resolved’, w ith an 
‘unnam ed spokesm an’ telling the newspaper that the clubs ‘w ere satisfied there had been no 
w ithdrawal o f  support for the protesting prisoners in the M aze’ and that the clubs ‘totally 
accepted there had been a m isunderstanding.’170 The Irish Times and Irish Independent also 
reported on this developm ent, w ith the Irish Independent reporting that the GAA ‘would 
continue to seek a  “hum anitarian and peaceful solution” to the cris is’ and ‘request a m eeting 
with the Taoiseach, Dr. Garret Fitzgerald, about the m atter.’171
Padraic [Pat] O ’Neill wrote another letter to the Andersonstown N ew s , published on 8 
August, w elcom ing the fact that the ‘authorities in  Croke Park on beha lf o f  the G .A.A. have 
gone to pains to point out that no “directive” as such was issued to clubs and m em bers 
instructing them  to disassociate their support from  the H -B lock cam paign’. O ’N eill (unfairly) 
criticised the slow  speed at which the GAA repudiated the Irish Times article and added that 
‘the need fo r clarity w as com pulsory.’172 This call for clarity w as also raised by  Sean K ilfeather. 
H e used his ‘Once a W eek’ sports colum n to respond to M cF lynn’s accusation that he had used 
‘one guideline in iso lation’ which showed ‘neither understanding, concern nor regard fo r [the 
G A A ’s] independent and unequivocal stance on this issue.’ K ilfeather argued that ‘Croke 
Park’s red-faced em barrassm ent about the directive on H -B lock candidates was inevitable and 
yet, apparently, took the G A A by com plete surprise. It should not have done so and the whole 
thing could have been avoided if  the GAA had not been so secretive about the w hole business.’ 
K ilfeather claim ed the G A A ’s actions ‘defied all log ic’ and explained that ‘here w as a situation 
where, apparently, a num ber o f  County Board officers acted quite properly in asking 
headquarters for guidance on a sensitive issue’ and that ‘Croke Park, obviously, saw  the 
dilem m a but, instead o f  being open and above board about it, they  w anted to keep the w hole
169 Irish Press, 31 July 1981.
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th ing secret. So they sent a directive to the County Board and left it at that.’ K ilfeather further 
stated that, before writing his 28 July article, he  telephoned Croke Park ‘at least three tim es’ 
bu t he w as refused the tex t o f the directive. K ilfeather argued that ‘had Croke Park m ade the 
directive available to the new spapers every GAA m em ber in the country w ould know  w hat the 
official line was; the new s w ould have got to the m em bers through Croke Park itse lf and the 
im pression o f having som ething to hide would not have been the resu lt.’173
The 4  June directive, and in particular its public release, once again highlighted the 
disparate opinion that existed within the GAA over the hunger strikes. A t a national level, GAA 
officials w ere tom  betw een political expediency and the letter o f  the association’s rules, but at 
club level, particularly  in the cases o f  clubs w ith m em bers in prison or on hunger strike, local 
loyalties took precedent over the rulebook o f  the association. The w ording o f  the directive, and 
M ulvihilTs subsequent correspondence to Conway, indicates that the directive sought to ban 
all GAA involvem ent in the w ider H-Block cam paign. The directive clearly stated that, as the 
H -Block question had entered the ‘party political a rena’, it was not possible for GAA m em bers 
or units ‘to  be involved in any way c f  Riail 7 Treorai O ifigiuiP and that ‘until further notice, 
no club or unit should issue statements or show support in any o ther w ay for w hat has becom e 
a party political issue.’ A s discussed, however, M cFlynn later claim ed that the directive was 
only ever m eant to apply to the G A A ’s involvem ent in the general election in the R epublic o f  
Ireland - shows o f  support for prisoner-candidates, in particular. M cFlynn blam ed the media, 
who had not seen the directive, for distorting the directives m eaning and the causing the 
resultant confusion and anger.
Whil e M cFlynn’s explanation was ‘totally accepted’ by the B elfast GA A clubs, it raises 
two obvious questions. F irst, i f  the GAA was seeking to ban G A A involvem ent in the R epublic 
o f  Ireland general election only, w hy was a  clear directive no t publicly  issued (through the 
media) stating this? A s discussed, the wording o f  the directive does not indicate that it applied 
to the general election only and it m ust be rem em bered that the directive was only issued by 
post to the county secretaries a m ere seven days before the 11 June polling day. A  clear, precise 
and public ly  issued statem ent would have been a m ore efficient w ay o f  com m unicating the 
m essage to the GA A clubs and m em bers, and could have prevented  the confusion and anger 
that arose upon  the d irective’s ‘release’. Second, i f  the directive was only concerned w ith  the 
G A A ’s participation in elections, why was a sim ilar directive not issued during the election
173 Irish T im e s ,l August 1981.
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cam paign o f  B obby Sands and the later campaign o f  Ow en C arron? W hile it is plausible (but 
unlikely) that the GAA did not foresee, or prepare for, G A A  involvem ent in the election 
cam paign o f  Sands, and therefore could not have released a sim ilar directive in advance o f  the 
cam paign, no directive was issued before or during the A ugust 1981 election cam paign o f 
Owen C arron in the Tyrone/South Fermanagh by-election that resulted from the death o f  Bobby 
Sands. As shall be discussed shortly, there were again G A A show s o f  support for Carron during 
his cam paign. Similarly, why was a further directive not issued after the June election had 
ended stating that GAA clubs could resum e their show s o f  support for the protesting-prisoners, 
if  they so-w ished?
W hen one looks at the evidence surrounding the directive, the conclusion can be 
reached that the m eaning o f  the directive was purposely  rein terpreted  by M cFlynn to quell the 
anger o f  the B elfast clubs. From  all o f  the available evidence, it seem s certain that when 
M cFlynn contacted G aels Against the Blocks to clarify  the m atter, the w ording o f  the directive 
was not supplied to the GAA m em bers in Belfast, but, instead, M cFlynn assured them that the 
directive applied to the general election only. A n ‘unnam ed spokesm an’, presum ably Pat 
O ’N eill, told the Irish Independent that GAA clubs in Antrim  ‘had been satisfied that there had 
been no directive about w ithdrawal o f support for the protesting prisoners in Long K esh’;174 
O ’N eill also told the Andersonstown News that he believed no such directive was issued by  the 
G A A .175 Clearly though, such a directive was issued. It appears that M cFlynn reinterpreted the 
m eaning o f  the  directive, one m onth after the general election in  the Republic o f  Ireland had 
ended, to apply to the general election only, in an effort to  appease the B elfast clubs. Ironically, 
the GA A used the general election in an attempt to com pletely disengage the association from  
the H -Blocks cam paign, bu t subsequently used the general election as their excuse to subdue 
the resultant anger.
In the im m ediate afterm ath o f  the controversy that erupted over the 4 June directive, 
three hunger strikers died w ithin eight days o f  each other. K evin Lynch (Derry) died on 1 
August, K ieran D oherty TD (Belfast) died on 2 August, w hile T hom as M cElw ee (Derry) died 
on 8 August. Later in the m onth, M ichael Devine (Derry) died on  20 A ugust; D evine w as the 
tenth, and final, hunger striker to die. Two of these four hunger strikers, Lynch and D oherty  
w ere m em bers o f  the GAA. As already discussed, G A A reaction to  the deaths o f  the fifth 
(M cD onnell) and sixth (Hurson) hunger strikers w as som ew hat m uted. Sim ilarly, neither the
174 Irish Independent, 1 August 1981.
175 Andersonstown News, 8 August 1981.
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Central Council nor the Coiste Bainisti passed a vote o f  sym pathy for any o f  the final four 
hunger strikers, including Lynch and Doherty. A t provincial council level, the Connacht, 
M unster and Leinster councils did not pass a vote o f  sym pathy w ith any o f the final four hunger 
strikers. A t county  board level, the m inutes for the August and Septem ber m eetings o f  the 
M eath176 and S ligo177 county boards, who had bo th  passed votes o f  sym pathies w ith previous 
hunger strikers, do not contain a vote o f  sym pathy w ith the final four hungers strikers. T he 
Anglo-Celt does not m ention if  the Cavan or M onaghan county boards m arked D oherty’s death 
or attended h is funeral -  K ieran D oherty was the TD  for the C avan/M onaghan constituency .178
This lack  o f  a public expression o f  support for the dead hunger strikers was not confined 
to the GAA. Two w eeks before the death o f  Kevin Lynch, a ‘vicious and savage’ rio t at an 18 
July  H -Block dem onstration in Ballsbridge, Dublin, resulted in  injuries to 120 gardai and 80 
protestors, and caused w idespread revulsion throughout Ireland. The Irish Independent, in a 
front-page opinion piece, labelled the events the ‘day o f  the im ported th u g ’,179 while a letter 
w riter to Irish Independent wrote that ‘the cynical and suicidal Provisionals are seek ing ...to  
extend the N orthern  strife into the R epublic.’180 F. Stuart Ross, in Smashing H-Block, calls the 
riot ‘the end o f  the road for broad-based dem onstrations in  the 26 coun ties.’181 W hile there is 
no evidence to  support it, the theory m ust be at least considered that the Ballsbridge rio t led to 
the leaking o f  the existence o f  the G A A ’s 4 June directive to the press. This could have been 
done in an attem pt to  highlight that the GAA had already disassociated itse lf from  the  H -Blocks 
cam paign. A fter the deaths o f  Lynch and Doherty a  rally o f  ‘about 400 peop le’ was held outside 
the GPO  in D ublin, on 4 August, with the m ain speaker, veteran republican Joe Cahill, later 
recalling that he ‘rem em ber[ed] being disappointed at the crow d that turned out -  it was quite 
sm all.’182 This lack o f  public expression was not consistent throughout Ireland: over 2,000 
people m arched through Cork city on 4 August in  honour o f  Lynch and D oherty, w hile several 
thousand attended the funerals o f  both men.
176 Meath county board minutes, 17 August 1981 &7 September 1981, Meath County Board Minute Book, 
1978-1982.
177 Sligo county board minutes, 7 August 1981 & 7 September 1981, Sligo County Board Minute Book, 1977- 
1985.
178 Anglo-Celt, 7 August 1981.
179 Irish Independent, 20 July 1981.
180 Irish Independent, 22 July 1981.
181 Ross, Smashing H-Block, p. 140.
182 Ross, Smashing H-Block, p. 141.
113
There was, how ever, some GAA reaction to the final four deaths at county board and 
club level in Ulster. N o GAA clubs placed a notice o f  sym pathy in the Irish News exclusive to 
Thom as M cElw ee or M ichael Devine, but following the death o f  K evin Lynch, the N orth D erry 
board ,183 the D erry county board184 and several G A A clubs185 placed sym pathy notices in the 
Irish News offering their sym pathies to the L ynch fam ily. The group ‘South Antrim  GAA 
A gainst H -B lock! also placed a notice in the Irish News extending ‘deepest sym pathy’ to the 
fam ilies and relatives o f  Lynch and D oherty.186 A t the funeral o f  K evin  Lynch, held on 3 
August, Sean Flynn, B elfast city councillor and v ice-chairm an o f  the Irish Republican Socialist 
Party (IRSP), stated in his graveside oration that ‘the D erry...and South A ntrim  county board[s] 
asked for a m inutes’ [sic] silence before the A ll-Ireland hurling sem i-final betw een Limerick 
and G alw ay’ but that th is request had been refused by ‘Croke P ark ’. F lynn  called Lynch ‘a true 
great G ael’ and stated that the IRSP would ‘w ork tirelessly for the  G A A  to act positively in 
pursuit o f  the five ju s t dem ands.’187 The week follow ing L ynch’s death, m em bers o f  the St. 
Patrick’s H urling Club (Dungiven) held a m eeting and unanim ously decided, w ith  the approval 
o f  L ynch’s father, Paddy Lynch, to change the nam e o f  their club to K evin L ynch’s Hurling 
Club. Liam  H inphey, a founding m em ber o f St. Patrick’s H urling C lub, explained that the 
decision to change the nam e o f  the club was not a political statem ent but rather ‘an emotional 
response to w hat w e thought was [Lynch’s] own particular brand o f  heroism  and generosity’, 
and that it was ‘an attem pt to honour a team m a te .. . [and].. .to in som e w ay identify w ith the 
Lynch fam ily and their tragic position .’188
Gaelic gam es in  Arm agh, Tyrone, Antrim  and D erry  w ere cancelled  or curtailed the 
w eekend (8/9 A ugust) follow ing the deaths o f  K evin Lynch and K ieran D oherty. W hile the 
South A rm agh H unger Strikers A ction Com m ittee ‘thanked and com m ended’ the ‘principled’ 
decision to cancel all gam es w ithin Armagh, and congratulated all o f  the A rm agh clubs on 
‘their com plete com pliance w ith the County B oard’s decision’,189 the cancelling o f  games was 
not universally appreciated. A  letter from  a ‘L urgan G ael’ appeared in the 21 August Irish 
News, in w hich the w riter stated that he wished to ‘express [his] concern  at the w ay our games
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are being disrupted by the Hunger Strike.’ ‘Lurgan G ael’ wrote that the postponem ent o f  gam es 
following the deaths o f  the hunger strikers was depriving the young people o f  A rm agh ‘the 
opportunity o f  playing our national gam es’ and he feared that ‘there is a very real danger o f  
young people drifting away to play other games, possible [sic] never to return to G aelic sport.’ 
‘Lurgan G ael’ further wrote that ‘anyone could be forgiven if  they w ere to com e to the 
conclusion that the G.A. A. was not its own m aster, but sim ply a tool to be used by the I.R.A. 
and I.N .L.A . for propaganda purposes’ and warned that the ‘A rm agh County B oard will have 
to grasp th is nettle, show som e m oral courage and get on w ith  the job  they  were chosen to do. 
If  they fail to do so, they  will have lost all credibility, and at least one o ffic ia l.’190 The A rm agh 
county board did lose tw o officials in September 1981 but not for the reasons ‘Lurgan G ael’ 
suggested. A t the 17 Septem ber Arm agh county board m eeting, Tom m y Lynch, vice-chairm an 
o f  the county com m ittee, and his brother, Paddy L ynch ,191 tendered their resignations ‘because 
o f  the attitude o f  the leadership, at national level, to the H -B lock situation .’ M em bers o f  the 
A rm agh county com m ittee ‘expressed sincere regret that their long and dedicated service to the 
A ssociation in the county should end in this w ay.’192
Sym pathy was also expressed with the dead hunger strikers on at least one G A A  pitch. 
The Irish Independent193 and Andersonstown News both reported that, at the request o f  the 
M onaghan H -B lock com m ittee, there was a tw o-m inute silence in m em ory o f  K evin Lynch at 
the start o f  the second ha lf o f the M onaghan senior football cham pionship gam e betw een 
Scotstown and Truagh, at Clones on 2 August, and that ‘som e o f  the Scotstow n and Truagh 
players took part in the H-Block parade on the pitch  at half-tim e.’194 The staging o f  this 
dem onstration resulted in a m em ber o f  the public, P. W alsh, w riting a letter to the Irish News, 
published on  6 August, in which he urged the GAA to ‘have the courage o f  its convictions’ and 
put a com plete end to H -B lock dem onstrations at G A A  m atches. W alsh, w ho explained that he 
had not attended a G A A  m atch in Casem ent Park since w itnessing a H -Block dem onstration in 
the stadium  in 1978, argued that GAA supporters ‘m ust be allowed to enjoy our sport in peace’ 
and ‘m ust not be forced to support one political line or another, or m ade seem  to support one 
political line or another.’ W alsh forecasted that the G A A  w ould lose m ore supporters if  the 
dem onstrations w ere not stopped, and opined that the N ational H -B lock C om m ittee could not
190 Irish News, 21 August 1981.
191 The Armagh Examiner, reporting on the death of Paddy Lynch, called Lynch 'one of Armagh's most 
respected and dedicated Gaels' and also a 'respected Irish republican.' Armagh Examiner, 4 April 2006.
192 Armagh County Board Minutes, 17 September 1981. Armagh County Board Minute Book, 1978-1988.
199 Irish Independent, 3 August 1981.
194 Andersonstown News, 8 August 1981.
115
‘m uster a ha lf decent crow d o f  their ow n’ and, as such, they w ere ‘tak ing-over’ GAA grounds 
so that they “w ere then able to claim that thousands o f  people attended their “protest.” ’195
The Coiste Bainisti met on 28/29 August and discussed the hunger strike and the effect 
the strike was having on games in  Ulster. A t this m eeting, a  14 A ugust letter from  D eclan Kelly, 
private secretary to A n Taoiseach, to Liam M ulvihill w as discussed. In this letter, K elly 
inform ed M ulvihill that, in response to his phone call requesting a m eeting betw een An 
Taoiseach and M cFlynn, An Taoiseach regretted that due to  ‘com m itm ents and a short holiday’ 
such a m eeting w as not possible. Kelly instead suggested that M cFlynn m eet w ith ‘Professor 
Dooge, M inister designate for Foreign A ffairs...at the earliest m utually  convenient date to 
discuss the H -Block issue’ and that A n Taoiseach hoped to m eet M cFlynn at a future date .196 
The Coiste B ainisti noted the contents o f  the letter concerning ‘tw o future m eetings (1. An 
tUachtaran, A rd-Stiurthoir agus P O hA irt w ith the M inister for Foreign Affairs and 2. An 
tU achtaran agus P. O hA irt with An Taoiseach)’ before hearing a verbal report from M cFlynn 
on ‘the m eeting w hich he, P. O hAirt and C. O N eill had attended in M uineachain, on 
13.8.1981, w ith C athaorligh Choisti Co. (Uladh) C .L .G .’ The Coiste B ainisti also ‘noted that 
despite the dam age caused by a national new spaper article, w hich m isrepresented the situation, 
our U lster Counties are doing everything possible to ensure that gam es schedules are adhered 
to despite intense pressure, in certain instances, to have gam es cancelled .’197
The deaths o f  the final four hunger strikers did not generate the sam e publicity  as the 
deaths o f  the first hunger strikers: while the death o f  B obby Sands m ade national and 
international headlines, the Irish Independent afforded the death o f  M ichael D evine a single 
paragraph on its back page, and the event did not even m erit its ow n head line.198 In addition to 
declining publicity, the deaths o f the final four hunger strikers w ere m arked by  the 
fragm entation o f  the nationalist comm unity. F. Stuart Ross explains that follow ing the first 
eight deaths, ‘critics o f  the anti-H-Block cam paign grew  m ore and m ore vocal’ and that while
for a T>rief moment, the H-Block hunger strikes had facilitated “a coming together o f normally divided 
sections o f  the northern nationalist community” ...as the protest continued to drag on, many moderates 
were o f  the opinion that neither Thatcher not the hunger strikers would budge. What is more, they were 
deeply concerned as to what effect the protest was having on their community and society at large.199
135 Irish News, S August 1981.
136 Letter from Declan Kelly to Liam Mulvihill, 14 August 1981. H-Block File, GAA Library and Archive.
137 Coiste Bainisti minutes, 28-29 August 1981, CCMB 1981 (Part 2), p. 212.
138 'Derry H-Block group appeals for end to violence', Irish Independent, 21August 1981.
139 Ross, Smashing H-Block, pp. 141-142.
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In the Republic o f  Ireland, the 18 July Ballsbridge rio t had a real effect on the pub lic ’s opinion 
o f  the H -Block cam paign and m arked the end o f  the m ovem ent in the Republic. This change 
o f  attitude tow ards the H -Block m ovem ent, and the hunger strikers, was also reflected w ithin 
the GAA, particularly  in the Republic o f Ireland. This is m ost evident in the m inute books o f  
the various G A A units: having released statem ents and passed  votes o f  condolences with 
Bobby Sands (who was not a GAA member), no such consideration was show n to GAA 
m em bers, K evin Lynch and Kieran Doherty. W ithin the Ulster, however, tangible signs o f  
support for the hunger strikers continued to be m aintained by the four G A A county  boards o f  
Derry, Tyrone, A ntrim  and Armagh.
The death o f  M ichael Devine (20 August) m arked the beginning-of-the-end o f  the 1981 
hunger strike, although the hunger strike did not officially  end until 3 October. Throughout the 
final tw o m onths o f  the hunger strike, August and Septem ber 1981, som e G A A  clubs continued 
their involvem ent in the w ider H-Block cam paign, m ost notably a w eek-long fast and vigil 
organised by  G aels A gainst the Blocks. H-Block cam paigners continued to  use G aelic gam es 
as a  p latform  for their m essage during this period, while, in  Septem ber 1981, Joe K eohane 
briefly  re-opened the ‘political debate’ by form ally jo in ing  the N ational H -B lock Com m ittee.
Throughout A ugust and Septem ber 1981, som e G A A  clubs200 continued to place 
notices o f  support for the hunger strikers in the Irish News. Sim ilarly, the D erry  county board 
released a statem ent deploring the lack o f initiative to resolve the hunger strike, and dem anding 
m ore action and negotiation from the Irish and B ritish  governm ent to bring the ‘im passe to an 
end .’201 T he ‘Com m ittee o f  [South Antrim] GAA Clubs against H -B lock’ inform ed the A ntrim  
executive com m ittee, on 11 August, that a vigil-fast w ould be held  outside the low er gate o f  
Casem ent Park betw een 17 August and 23 August (inclusive) betw een 10am and 10pm.202 In 
a letter to  An Phoblacht/Republican News, the ‘South A ntrim  G A A  C om m ittee against the H- 
B locks’ explained that the seven day fast would involve m em bers from  tw enty-tw o clubs20’ 
from  the South A ntrim  area, m anning the vigil-fast in  rotation. The Com m ittee, noting the
200 Eoghan Ruadh Hurling Club (Tyrone), Moortown St. Malachy GFC (Tyrone), St. Colm's Hurling Club (Derry), 
St. Gall's GAC (Belfast), Kickhams GFC Creggan (Antrim), Cardineal Ui Dhonail CLCG (Belfast), Erin's Own 
GAC (Antrim) and Shamrocks GAC (Derry). Irish News, 6 August 1981, 7 August 1981,15 August 1981, 25 
August 1981, 8 September 1981 & 9 September 1981.
201 Irish News, 9 September 1981.
202 Antrim Executive Committee minutes, 11 August 1981.
203 An Phoblacht/Republican News listed the twenty-two participating clubs as: O'Donnells, McDermotts, 
Derriaghy, Rossa, Clonard, Davitts, St Agnes, St Pauls, Gael Uladh, O'Connells, Dwyers, Lamh Dearg, 
Pearses, St Endas, St Theresas, Gort na Mona, Ardoyne, John Mitchells, Riverdale Rovers, Sarsfields, St 
Galls, St Malachys.
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‘anger...felt by many Northern Gaels after the alleged [4 June] directive’ invited other clubs 
and members to attend and support the vigil-fast.204
During this seven day vigil-fast, according to the Andersonstown News, the ‘British 
Army continually harassed [the protestors]. They tried to run the members down on the white 
line picket and finally fired two plastic bullets at them without any provocation o f any kind.’205 
While the newspapers do not give attendance figures for each day of the demonstration, the 
Irish News reported that ‘about 40’ GAA members attended the second day (18 August) of the 
demonstration.206 The week-long demonstration concluded with a ‘march...from Casement 
Park to the Gaelic pitches on the Shaw’s Road in Andersonstown, where a hurling match was 
played between a South Antrim and a North Antrim team. A social evening then followed in 
the club rooms o f St. Paul’s GAA club.’ An Phoblacht/Republican News, having previously 
explained that the fast was held to demonstrate that GAA members support the prisoners 
‘despite the hostile noises from the GAA bureaucracy in Dublin’,207 called the vigil ‘successful 
and well organised’ and commented that the ‘week of activity is a clear and encouraging 
indication ofthe solid grassroots support existing for the hunger-strikers among GAA ranks.’208
The group, Antrim GAA Against H-Block placed a front page advertisement in the 28 
August edition o f the Irish News, in which they thanked members o f the public ‘for their 
generosity and patience during the week’, reaffirmed their support for the H-Block prisoners, 
and called upon ‘County and Club teams to observe a minute’s silence at their Club games this 
Sunday.’209 While there is no evidence that a minute’s silence was held at any of the 30 August 
club or county games,210 the Dublin H-Block Committee, throughout August and September, 
organised a  series of protests connected to GAA matches taking place at Croke Park. Both the 
2 August Galway v Limerick hurling211 and 23 August Down v Offaly football212 games were 
picketed by H-Block campaigners.
204 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 15 August 1981.
205Andersonstown News, 29 August 1981.
206 Irish News, 19 August 1981.
207An Phoblacht/Republican News, 22 August 1981,
208 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 29 August 1981.
209 Irish News, 28 August 1981.
210An Phoblacht/Republican News, which meticulously reported on protests at GAA grounds, does not report 
on any minutes silence held during the weekend, It is entirely possible that minutes silence were held at 
games, but rot reported,
211 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 8 August 1981.
212 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 29 August 1981.
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In September 1981, as usual, the two All-Ireland finals were played in Croke Park. On 
6 September Galway and Offaly contested the hurling final, while on 20 September 1981 Kerry 
and Offaly contested the football final. Patrick McFlynn, in his autobiography, Leading 
Through the Troubles, states that in August 1981 a deputation from Gaels Against the Blocks 
visited his house in Down. They demanded, he claimed, that black flags be flown at both All- 
Ireland finals and that McFlynn, in his capacity as GAA president, should make a speech on 
behalf o f the H-Block prisoners at the half-time intervals o f the games. McFlynn, who had 
advance notice of these demands, told the Gaels Against the Blocks delegates that their 
demands would not be met as ‘it was something which would have offended many people at 
the game.’213 While there is no evidence for any protests being held at the hurling final, An 
Phoblacht/Republican News reported that at the football final H-Block leaflets were handed 
out and that there were ‘a number of hunger-strike banners around the ground’. The newspaper 
also reported that there was ‘a brief intervention on the pitch during half-time in support of the 
hunger-strikers.’214 The Irish Times reported less dramatically that this ‘intervention on the 
pitch’ consisted of ‘two H-Block protestors carrying a banner proclaiming that there were 179 
GAA members on the blanket’ but that the protestors ‘got little attention.’215 The Coiste 
Bainisti, at their October meeting discussed this H-Block protest and congratulated the pitch 
stewards ‘for their tact and diplomacy in dealing with the situation.’216
Throughout the August 1981 Fermanagh/South Tyrone by-election, held as a result of 
the death of Bobby Sands, Joe Keohane campaigned prominently on behalf o f the National H- 
Block Committee candidate, and eventual winner, Owen Carron. The Irish Independent, on 21 
August, reported that Keohane was ‘strongly rebuked by leading members of the G.A.A.’ 
following his appeal in Belcoo, Fermanagh for ‘all members o f the G.A.A. to show the 
Association was 100 per cent behind the H Block prisoners’ demands.’ The Irish Independent 
reported that Tom Woulfe called for Keohane to be censured and that Woulfe ‘did not believe 
[Keohane] is speaking for the G.A.A. or the Kerry County Board.’ Frank King, chairman of 
the Kerry county board, told the Irish Independent that ‘The Kerr}' County Board is abiding by 
the directive issued by the Association at Central Council level. Any statements issued by 
[Keohane] are personal and do not reflect our policy.’217
213 MacFlynn, Leading Through the Troubles, p. 18.
214 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 26 September 1981.
215 Irish Times, 21 September 1981.
216 Coiste Bainisti minutes, 9-10 October 1981, CCMB 1981 (Part 2), p. 255.
217 Irish Independent, 21 August 1981.
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Keohane was criticised again in September 1981, this time by Senator John A. Muiphy, 
when Keohane became a member o f the National H-Block Committee, although on this 
occasion McFlynn publicly defended Keohane. The National H-Block Committee held an 
emergency recall conference on 6 September, at which the 1,000 delegates were asked to 
‘redouble...[their] efforts and energies, both nationally and internationally.’218 At this 
conference Labhras Ó Murchú, president of Comhaltas Ceolteoirí na hJEireann, Tomás 
MacAnna, Director o f the National Theatre, Seán MacMathúna, Conradh na Gaelige, and Joe 
Keohane all joined the committee. An Phoblacht/Republican News welcomed this development 
and commented that ‘The addition of the leading figures from the Irish language, music and 
theatrical scene along with leading GAA member, Joe Keohane...gives the H-Block/Armagh 
campaign an outstanding opportunity of broadening support in these vital areas.’219
The Irish Independent, on 8 September, under the front-page headline ‘Row as GAA 
star joins H-Block Committee’, reported that Senator John A. Murphy had commented that it 
was ‘disastrous that such a prominent GAA figure should be on this committee. I don’t see 
how you can be a H-Block activist without implicitly favouring and giving aid to members of 
organisations such as the I.R.A. and the l.N.L.A.’ Murphy added that he considered it ‘most 
undesirable that any member of the Association should be associated with the H-Blocks 
campaign’, and suggested that ‘GAA Headquarters should clarify its position on this matter.’ 
GAA president McFlynn defended Keohane’s right to become a member o f  the National H- 
Block Committee: McFlynn told the Irish Independent that ‘GAA members are free to join any 
strictly political organisation that they wish and he felt the H-Blocks Committee came within 
this guideline.’ Frank King also defended Keohane’s decision, stating that ‘as far as he was 
concerned Mr. Keohane was a member of a political organisation and he did not see any 
conflict between this and his involvement with the GAA.’220 King, somewhat unbelievably, 
added that ‘Politics has never created any problems within the GAA in Kerry and long may 
that situation continue.’221 An Phoblacht/Republican News, when reporting on this ‘row’, 
called Murphy an ‘anti-republican senator’ and praised McFlynn and King’s defence of
218 Ross, Smashing H-Block, p. 145.
219 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 19 September 1981.
220 Irish Independent, 8 September 1981.
221 For a detailed history of the detrimental effect politics had of the GAA in Kerry between 1884 and 1934, see 
Richard McElligott, Forging a Kingdom. The GAA in Kerry, 1884-1934 (Cork: The Collins Press, 2013). See 
also Hanley, 'Irish Republican attitudes to sport since 1921' in McAnallen, Hassan & Hegarty (eds.).
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Keohane, adding that it was ‘hardly surprising...in an organisation which has launched 
countless politicians on the basis of their prowess on the playing field.’222
Throughout September 1981, a number of factors led to the ending o f the hunger strike. 
On 6 September, the INLA announced that no more o f its prisoners would embark on the 
hunger strike.223 More importantly, the families o f hunger strikers Matt Devlin (4 September) 
and Laurence McKeown (6 September) intervened in their hunger strikes and requested 
medical assistance, while Liam McCloskey ended his own hunger strike, on 26 September, 
after his parents informed him they would intervene if he lapsed into a coma.224 Father Denis 
Faul, an assistant prison chaplain in Long Kesh, met with the relatives of five of the six men 
still on hunger strike and secured a commitment that these families would sanction ‘medical 
intervention if  they failed to talk their sons off the fast.’225 A meeting was held between 
Brendan McFarlane, Prison OC, and five of the six remaining hunger strikers (Pat Sheehan was 
too ill to attend) with the decision taken to end the hunger strike. This happened on 3 October.
During the latter stage of the 1981 hunger strike, a serious difference of opinion as to 
how the GAA could, and should, react to the hunger strike, became apparent between GAA 
units in Northern Ireland and the leadership of the GAA. When the 4 June directive was issued, 
clubs in Northern Ireland openly flouted it. Belfast clubs in particular saw it as an ‘unwarranted 
intrusion in club affairs. ’ Similarly, the July Ballsbridge riot turned many moderate nationalists, 
including GAA members, away from the H-Block movement, particularly in the Republic of 
Ireland. In Northern Ireland, however, GAA clubs continued to express support for the hunger 
strikers, although there was not universal support. As seen, GAA members themselves were 
opposed to the cancellation of games and demonstrations taking place at games.
IV.
In the lengthy statement that announced the end of the hunger strike, the republican 
prisoners strongly criticised the ‘Irish Establishment, consisting o f the Catholic Church, the 
Dublin Government and the SDLPf The prisoners thanked the ‘National H-Block/Armagh
222 An Phoblccht/Republican News, 12 September 1981.
223 In their statement, the INLA explained that they had only 28 protesting prisoners in the H-Blocks and that if 
they continued to maintain the ratio of one hunger striker for every three IRA hunger strikers, all INLA 
prisoners in the H-Blocks wouid be dead within six months. The INLA pledged support for the hunger 
strikers and stated that if the hunger strike continued, the group may re-join, albeit at a lower ratio. Irish 
Independent, 6 September 1981.
224 Sunday Independent, 27 September 1981.
225 Irish Press, 3 October 1981.
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Committee, the H-Block movement, the nationalist people o f Ireland and all those who 
championed our cause abroad’ and requested that these people continue to work towards the 
five demands.226 The National H-Block Committee released their own statement announcing 
that their campaign would continue and reaffirmed ‘its pledge...to build a campaign in Ireland 
and internationally which will win...[the prisoner’s five] just demands.’ Similar to the ending 
of the 19 80 hunger strike, neither the republican prisoners nor the National H-Block Committee 
thanked or condemned the GAA. This section will analyse the reaction of the GAA to the 
ending of the hunger strike. It will analyse county and provincial conventions in an attempt to 
ascertain if  the hunger strike affected the GAA as a whole or it only affected individual clubs 
and county boards.
At national level, there was no immediate reaction from the GAA to the ending of the 
hunger strike. Neither the Coiste Bainisti227 nor the Central Council228 discussed the ending of 
the hunger strike at their October meetings. GAA county conventions were held throughout 
December 1981 and January and February 1982, while provincial conventions were held in 
February 1982, with the GAA Annual Congress held on 27 and 28 March 1982. An analysis 
of the proceedings o f the county and provincial conventions reveals that the hunger strike was 
only discussed in detail by four Ulster counties and the Ulster Council. It must be noted 
however that, unlike the ending of the 1980 hunger strike, there was a considerable passage of 
time between the ending of the 1981 hunger strike and the holding of conventions and, 
furthermore, the 1980 county conventions were held in the immediate aftermath of a high- 
profile public row between the GAA and the GRA.
Outside of Ulster, the hunger strike, and the various related H-Blocks issues, was 
referred to at only five county conventions -  Roscommon, Longford, Cork, Mayo and Dublin. 
At the Roscommon convention a motion was passed ‘reasserting the legitimate aspiration of 
the Irish people to a united Ireland, and categorically rejecting violence as a means of achieving 
this aim.’229 While the chairman of the Longford county board mentioned the hunger strike in 
passing,230 Frank Murphy placed the hunger strike in the context o f the GAA’s ‘clear policy of 
support for the ideal of the re-unification of our country...by peaceful means only’ and told
^Cam pbell, Nor Meekly Serve My Time, pp. 259-264.
227 Coiste Bainisti minutes, 9-10 October 1981 & 24 October 1981. CCMB 1981 (Part 2), pp. 2 5 4 -2 6 4  & 299 -  
309.
223 Central Council minutes, 10 October 1981. CCMB 1981 (Part 2), pp. 265 -  277.
229 Irish Independent, 18 January 1982.
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delegates that if the GAA ‘abandons our national principles and confine ourselves merely to 
the organisation o f games -  it will have lost its very soul.’231 At the Mayo county convention, 
a motion to Testore Rule 7 to its original ‘non-political’ form was defeated,232 whereas at the 
Dublin convention, Tom Woulfe (Civil Service Club) succeeded in getting a motion passed 
that the word ‘party’ should be deleted from Rule 7 of the GAA official guide. Woulfe called 
the GAA’s ‘incursion into H-Blocks politics’ a ‘blatant breach of the GAA’s charter’ and stated 
that the purpose of his motion was to restate in terms clear from confusion that the GAA has 
no business dabbling in activities not set out in the official guide.’233 Woulfe’s motion was 
forwarded for consideration at the Annual Congress, where, as shall be discussed, it was 
defeated.
Within Ulster, the hunger strike was discussed, to varying degrees, at the Derry, Down, 
Tyrone and Antrim county conventions and also at the Ulster provincial convention. Tellingly, 
the matter was not raised at the Donegal, Cavan or Monaghan conventions. While the Armagh 
secretary, Gerry Fagan, did not mention the hunger strike directly in his annual report, he did 
regret the resignation of Tommy and Paddy Lynch and added that ‘they resigned not from any 
dissatisfaction with the committee and its activities but rather with policy as dictated at higher 
level.’234 The Down chairman, Benny Crawford, criticised other county secretaries for not 
releasing the 4 June directive to their respective clubs, and claimed that Down was the ‘only 
county to follow the directive of Croke Park.’235 Patsy Mulholland (South Derry Divisional 
secretary),236 John McGlinchey (Derry secretary),237 Padraic O ’Neill (South Antrim Divisional 
secretary),233 Hugh McPoland (Antrim chairman)239 and Brendan Harkin (Tyrone chairman)240 
all lamented the deaths of the hunger strikers in the reports and addresses to their respective 
county conventions, with McGlinchey critical of the manner in which the GAA president, 
Derry bom McFlynn, was treated by the media during the crisis.
Michael Feeney, in his secretary’s report to the 1982 Ulster convention, held on 28 
February, mentioned the hunger strike, but only in the context of the effect it had on the GAA
231 Cork Examiner, 28 January 1982 & 2 March 1982.
232 Irish Independent, 11 January 1982.
233 Irish Independent, 21 December 1981.
234 Irish Times, 11 December 1981.
235 Irish News, 18 January 1982.
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237 Irish News, 12 January 1982.
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240 Ulster Herafd, 30 January 1982.
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within the province. Feeney called the hunger strike a ‘tragedy’ and wrote that ‘it must be 
regarded as nothing short of miraculous that it was at all possible to complete a full programme 
of activities.’ Feeney praised the members of the Ulster Council for their ‘sensitivity’ and 
‘wholehearted support and loyalty’ during ‘one of the most trying years of the Council’s 
history.’ In the final paragraph of his report, Feeney offered the condolences of the council to 
a number of named officials and players who had passed away during 1981, including Frank 
Maguire, but the Ulster GAA members who died on hunger strike were not named. The 
sympathies o f  the Ulster Council were, however, also offered to ‘the relatives of all our 
members bereaved during 1981’ with a mass offered ‘for the souls of the deceased members 
of the G.A.A. in Ulster’ in the Church of Saint Patrick, Donegal, on the morning of the 
convention.241
Liam Mulvihill, in his report to the 1982 Annual Congress, held on 27/28 March, called 
the hunger strike ‘a long festering sore which left considerable marks on the Association during 
the year.’ Completely ignoring the furore that surrounded the 4 June directive, Mulvihill 
commented that while GAA officials in Northern Ireland ‘were subjected to intense 
pressure... from people that felt that more sympathy should be shown with the cause o f the 
prisoners’, it was ‘to the credit of the County Committees and the leading officials [that] the 
Management Committee policy was accepted and the Association came through a severe test 
of its unity.242 When discussing Mulvihill’s report, at the Annual Congress, Frank Murphy 
(Cork) complimented Mulvihill for including the ‘H-Block’ paragraph but criticised an 
unnamed ‘individual member of the Association’, presumably Tom Woulfe, for waging an 
‘unfair’ campaign against the GAA’s attitude to ‘things that they might term National issues.’ 
Later in the Congress two motions were considered that marked the end of the GAA’s 
involvement in the H-Blocks crisis. In response to a Roscommon motion that the GAA rejects 
violence as a means of achieving a united Ireland, the amendment that the GAA ‘condemns all 
violence in Ireland’ was passed instead, following objections from the Cork, Kerry, Armagh 
and Antrim delegates that the original motion did not address British Army or RUC violence. 
Paddy Downey, Irish Times journalist, called the passing o f this motion ‘the most significant 
happening’ at the Congress and that it effectively ‘wiped out’ the 1979 motion that the GAA 
supported the ‘struggle for national liberation.’243 The next motion considered at the Congress
241 Secretary's report to the 1982 Ulster Convention, Donegal, 28 February 1982.
242 Report of the Ard Stiurthoir to the 1982 Annual Congress, p. 4A. GAA Library and Archive.
243 Irish Times, 29 March 1982.
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was the Dublin motion that proposed changing Rule 7 to its pre-1979 ‘non-political’, rather 
than ‘non-party-political’, stance. Delegates from Cork, Mayo, Tipperary and Armagh spoke 
out against the motion, with no county delegate speaking in favour of it. (Tom Woulfe was not 
present at the 1982 Annual Congress.) The defeat o f this motion marked the end of the GAA’s 
direct involvement in the hunger strike crisis.244
An analysis of the 1981/1982 GAA county and provincial conventions, and the 
proceedings of the 1982 Annual Congress, highlight that the 1981 hunger strike directly 
affected counties in Northern Ireland only, as would be expected. This chapter has detailed the 
pressure that the GAA came under, from the National H-Block Committee, Sinn Fein, the 
republican prisoners and some GAA members, to publicly support the demands of the 1981 
hunger strikers. While the GAA, at national level, was initially willing to allow clubs and 
county boards to lend limited support to the prisoners’ campaign, the entry o f prisoner- 
candidates in the 1981 general election in the Republic of Ireland changed the dynamic o f the 
relationship between the GAA and the H-Block campaign. The resultant directive, however, 
was condemned, directly challenged and openly ignored by clubs and county boards in 
Northern Ireland, the Belfast clubs in particular. The fact that the directive was issued in 
response to the general election in the Republic o f Ireland, but only challenged by clubs and 
county boards in Northern Ireland is in itself telling of the differing attitudes within the GAA, 
on both sides of the political border. In many ways, the hunger strike was the first regional 
political crisis that the GAA faced -  past political crises, including the 1887 split, the Parnell 
controversy, the Irish Civil War and the 1938 removal o f Douglas Hyde as a patron of the 
association, affected the association on a national basis. Similarly, the issue of Irish political 
prisoners was treated as a national GAA issue up until the release of the internees in 1975, but 
it became an ‘Ulster issue’ when the internees were released.
Kevin Howard, in his article ‘Competitive sports: the territorial politics of Irish cycling’ 
labels the GAA a ‘boundary-denying thirty-two county’ organisation that is characterised ‘by 
regarding partition as an illegitimate and ultimately unsustainable imposition; it is 
paradigmatically irredentist and it ignores rather than accommodates ethnic difference.’245 The 
H-Blocks crisis, the 1981 hunger strike in particular, forced home the reality that no matter
244 GAA 1982 Annual Congress Minutes, pp. 30-33. GAA Library and Archive.
245 Kevin Howard, 'Competitive sports: the territorial politics of Irish cycling1 in John Coakley and Liam O'Dowd 
(eds.), Crossing the Border: New Relationships between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland 
(Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007), pp.227-244,
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how much the GAA ‘denied’ the border, the real politic of the situation was that the GAA was 
operating in two very different sets o f political circumstances. While the abstract notion of 
‘nationalism’ can be hard to define, Paul Lawrence, in Nationalism: History and Theory, has 
offered three possible definitions whereby nationalism might ‘refer simply to an abstract 
ideology that has historically concerned itself with the belief that humanity is divided into 
nations and considered how they should be defined’; it can ‘also denote a political doctrine -  
the belief not only that homogenous, identifiable nations exist, but that they should govern 
themselves’, and, finally, nationalism ‘can be used more broadly to signify the sentiment felt 
by many people o f belonging to a particular nation on a daily basis.’246 While the GAA has 
always considered itself, and claimed to be, a nationalist but non-political (or, post-1979, non- 
party-political) organisation, the H-Blocks crisis, for the first time, exposed the inherent flaws 
in trying to hold these two positions. In the Republic o f Ireland, where all political parties are 
somewhat nationalist in nature, the GAA’s nationalist ideology could co-exist with its non­
political /  non-party political ethos, but in Northern Ireland, where to be a ‘nationalist’ 
invariably meant taking one side of the ‘political question’, nationalism was political. The 
contradiction o f the GAA defining itself as a nationalist but non-political association was 
exposed during the H-Blocks crisis, when the association came under pressure, from northern 
nationalism, to involve itself in a campaign that was seen by many within both the Republic of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland as political in nature.
Furthermore, the hunger strikes clearly showed that the troubles faced by the GAA in 
Northern Ireland were either ignored, not appreciated or misunderstood by the majority of 
GAA members in the Republic of Ireland. As shown in this chapter, the vast majority of the 
county boards in the Republic of Ireland were completely indifferent to the crisis that had 
consumed Northern Ireland, with some county boards and officials criticising the response of 
northern clubs and officials, without fully realising the daily pressures such clubs were facing. 
This chapter has further shown that even within Northern Ireland the hunger strike affected 
some counties more than others, with the Antrim, Tyrone, Derry and Armagh GAA affected to 
much a greater degree than Fermanagh and Down. This is reflective o f the reaction o f Northern 
Irish nationalism to the hunger strikes whereby the different facets of this nationalism reacted 
in a different manner to the crisis.
245 Paul Lawrence, Nationalism: History and Theory (Edinburgh: Pearson Education Limited, 2005), p. 3.
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Conclusion
While it is generally acknowledged that the H-Blocks crisis, the 1981 hunger strike in 
particular, had a lasting legacy on the history of modem Ireland and Irish republicanism, this 
conclusion will explore if the crisis had a lasting impact on the GAA. This conclusion will 
question if  the crisis affected the GAA’s medium to long term external relationships with the 
Irish and British governments and their security forces, the republican and loyalist communities 
in Northern Ireland, and the media. It will also analyse if the crisis changed the GAA; it will 
ask if  the crisis affected the relationship between the GAA in Northern Ireland and the GAA 
in the Republic of Ireland. It will also question if  the crisis influenced or changed the policies 
of the association and if the crisis affected the association’s image of itself and its sense of 
purpose.
I.
While the hunger strikes were ‘more of a problem for Dublin than for London’,1 both 
governments determinedly sought a solution to the crisis. During this period, the effects the 
hunger strikes were having on the welfare and unity of the GAA, and the potential contribution 
that the GAA could make to help end the crisis, were peripheral to the attempts of the two 
governments to end the overall H-Blocks crisis. This is acknowledged by both Liam Mulvihill 
and Peter Quinn. The Ulster Council, according to Quinn, ‘did not think that the GAA was a 
priority [for the governments] so much as getting a resolution to the hunger strikes was a 
priority.’ Quinn, however, maintains that ‘if we had been asked if we had a contribution to 
make, that would have been welcomed but actually we weren’t seen as having much influence.2 
Throughout the H-Blocks crisis, the GAA was ‘hugely influenced’ by the diplomatic efforts of 
Cardinal Tomás Ó Fiaich, who was in direct contact with both the Irish and British 
governments.3 Ó Fiaich, who had a very close relationship with the GAA at all levels,4 regularly 
met with McFlynn and Mulvihill and kept the GAA informed of his negotiations with the 
governments. Rather than have the GAA involved in negotiations with the two governments, 
the GAA were happy ‘to allow [Ó Fiaich] set the lead in terms o f contacts and what he was
1 Hennessey, Hunger Strike, p. 460.
2 Interview with Peter Quinn, Enniskillen, 21 June 2014.
3 Interview with Liam Mulvihill, Croke Park, 23 April 2014.
4 Roddy Hegarty, 'Cardinal Tomás Ó Fiaich and the GAA: an appreciation' in McAnallen, Hassan & Hegarty 
(eds.), The Evolution of the GAA, pp. 232-239.
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trying to do.’5 There is evidence, however, that the Irish government was interested in the 
GAA’s view on the hunger strikes. At a 28 July 1981 meeting, An Taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald 
told Leonard Figg, the British ambassador in Ireland, that he considered the GAA’s 4 June 
directive ‘a good development’.6
The H-Blocks crisis coincided with the GAA’s determined diplomatic effort to have 
the British Army removed from Saint Oliver Plunkett Park, Crossmaglen. In May 1980 a sub­
committee7 was established for this purpose, which held several meetings with representatives 
of the Irish8 and British9 governments. No similar meetings were held between the GAA and 
the NIO.10 The fact that the focus of these meetings was the occupation of the Crossmaglen 
GAA grounds, with the hunger strikes only raised on one occasion - at the 19 November 1980 
meeting with Brian Lenihan - is reflective of the fact that the British military occupation of 
Saint Oliver Plunkett Park was a direct GAA issue, whereas the H-Blocks crisis, while affecting 
the GAA, did not directly relate to the association. The limited, but public, support the GAA 
gave to the protesting prisoners was not an issue for either government -  neither government 
approached the GAA, at any level, and requested that association clubs and members refrain 
from publicly supporting the hunger strikes. Indeed, during the three year period 1979-1981, 
the annual grant from the Sports Council for Northern Ireland to the Ulster GAA increased 
substantially from IR£5,804 (1979) to IR£12,386 (1981).11 The level of funding received by 
the Ulster GAA was a source of contention for some Ulster unionists, with the support the 
GAA gave to the hunger strikers, used by these politicians as justification for ending such 
funding.12
5 Interview with Liam Mulvihill, Croke Park, 23 April 2014.
6 Note on the interview between An Taoiseach and the British Ambassador, 28 July 1981. DFA/2011/39/1884.
7 This sub-committee consisted of Con Murphy, Peter Harte, Donal Whelan, Aidan McGowan and Tomas 
Walsh.
8 The committee met with Brian Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Gene Fitzgerald, Minister for 
Labour, on 20 June 1980, with another meeting held with Brian Lenihan on 19 November 1980. There were 
also some informal discussions at GAA matches between association officials and An Taoiseach Charles 
Haughey, but no such discussions took place with An Taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald.
9 GAA delegates met a number of British Labour MP's in the House of Commons, on 26 June 1980,9 while 
on 17 July 1980 a GAA delegation met with Michael Alison, Minister of State at the NIO with responsibility 
for prisons, in Westminster.
10 NIO/12/155A 'Meetings between Ministers and Nl MPs and Councillors on Prison Matters (1979-1986)' & 
NIO/12/254 'Meetings in Connection with the Hunger Strike (1981)'.
11 Ulster GAA Annual Reports, 1980-1982 inclusive.
12 In 1984, during a debate as to whether Nicholas Scott, Under-Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
considered the grant to the GAA as 'money well spent and a good investment', Peter Robinson asked Scott 
'Does the Minister recognise that the GAA has permitted, if not encouraged, the use of its property by the 
IRA and that, during the hunger strike, it sent messages of support to the hunger strikers?' Hansard, House 
of Commons Debates, 26 April 1984, Volume 58, cc. 870-871.
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When discussing the effects the H-Blocks crisis had on GAA’s relationship with the 
Irish and British security forces, a number of factors must be considered. A clear distinction 
must be made between An Garda Siochana and the Garda Representative Association (GRA) 
- the GRA is the body that was established to agitate for its members in areas of pay and 
conditions of employment. The relationship between the GRA and An Garda Siochana has, at 
times, been fraught. The GAA’s relationship with the British security forces (British Army and 
RUC) must be evaluated in the context of Rule 21 (formerly Rule 15) of the GAA, which 
banned members of British security forces from becoming members of the GAA. The existence 
of Rule 21, which was abolished in 2001, meant that, for all-intents and purposes, the GAA 
was an anti-British security forces organisation -  an organisation does not ban people if  they 
are in favour or hold a neutral view of them.
Patrick McFlynn, Liam Mulvihill and Peter Quinn all agree that an excellent 
relationship existed between the GAA and the Garda Commissioner, Patrick McLaughlin,13 
and ‘the vast majority o f the people at assistant-commissioner and superintendent rank’14 
throughout the H-Blocks crisis, and beyond. McFlynn held regular informal meetings with 
McLaughlin at Garda Fleadquarters where McLaughlin was ‘very helpful in providing 
[McFlynn] with advice and had a special insight from holding regular meetings with the RUC 
Chief, John Hermon.’15 This cordial relationship also existed at Ulster Council level, perhaps 
even more so as McLaughlin was a former member of the Council. Despite this excellent 
relationship between both organisations, the perceived relationship, rather than the actual 
relationship, between the GAA and the Gardai was seriously affected by events connected to 
the H-Blocks crisis. The media coverage of the two arguments between the GAA and the GRA 
gave the impression that the GAA and An Garda Siochana were at loggerheads with one 
another when, in actual fact, it was a very small minority within the GAA and the GRA who 
were taking issue with the GAA’s attitude to republican violence. While the arguments between 
the GAA and the GRA had no real short or long term effects or consequences for the GAA’s 
relationship with An Garda Siochana, Mulvihill maintains that the arguments ‘showed that [the
13 Patrick McLaughlin was born in Malin Head in 1921. He joined the Gardai in 1943 and rose steadily through 
its ranks becoming a superintendent in 1961 and an assistant commissioner in 1972. McLaughlin was 
appointed Commissioner in 1978 and resigned the position in 1983, as a result of a telephone bugging 
controversy. The Irish Independent noted that McLaughlin 'came from a staunch Donegal Fianna Fail 
background, and his career advancement at senior level was closely associated with the periods of Fianna 
Fail government in the Seventies.' Irish Independent, 19 December 2004.
14 Interview with Liam Mulvihill, Croke Park, 23 April 2014.
15 MacFiynn, Leading Through the Troubles, p. 16.
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GAA was] very badly prepared for being involved in politics with a small p in terms of being 
able to protect ourselves.’16
Within Northern Ireland, the hunger strikes were accompanied by an upsurge in 
rioting and sustained confrontations between the republican community, which included 
GAA members, and the British security forces. On at least one occasion, at the seven day 
vigil outside Casement Park, the British security forces attacked a GAA H-Blocks 
demonstration. These confrontations hardened republican and (some) GAA attitudes against 
the British security forces. These hardened attitudes amongst the GAA Ulster (and other) 
county boards were clearly articulated in 1998 when the Ulster county boards rejected GAA 
president Joe McDonagh’s attempts to abolish Rule 21. When the Rule was abolished in 
2001, there was still some Ulster resistance to its removal. While the H-Blocks crisis 
hardened some GAA attitudes, it is hard to quantify the effect(s) they had on the long term 
relationship between the GAA and the British security forces as the crisis was only one of a 
number of factors that shaped this relationship. The persistent harassment o f GAA members, 
the unnecessary road blocks to and from Gaelic grounds, the 1988 murder of Aidan 
McAnespie and the continued occupation of Saint Oliver Plunkett Park are some of the 
factors that must also be considered when assessing the relationship.
The hunger strikes had the immediate effect of further polarising the 
nationalist/republican and unionist/loyalist communities. Des Blatherwick, Northern Ireland 
Political Affairs Division, wrote in an August 1981 memo to the Northern Ireland Central 
Secretariat that the consequences of the hunger strikes will be ‘with us for a long time’ and that 
the relationships between the ‘communities, and between the minority and the Government’ 
had been adversely affected.17 This section will ask if  the limited, but visible, support the GAA 
gave to the republican prisoners affected the relationship between the association and the 
loyalist and republican communities.
In 1984, the political historian Eamon Phoenix wrote that while many moderate 
unionists were prepared to see the GAA as a sporting and cultural organisation, the more 
hardline unionists saw the GAA as a body ‘shrouded in republicanism.’ These unionists, 
according to Phoenix, pointed to the ‘undoubted support o f many GAA clubs for the H-Block 
hunger strike’ in their attempts to deny sporting grants and recreation facilities to the GAA.18
15 Interview with Liam Mulvihill, Croke Park; 23 April 2014.
17 NIO/Cent/1/10/66.
18 Eamon Phoenix, 'G.A.A.'s Era of Turmoil in Northern Ireland', Fortnight, No. 211, December 1984, pp. 8-9.
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While a comprehensive list of all acts of alleged and real unionist political bias against the 
GAA, in addition to a list of all physical attacks upon GAA personnel and property, would be 
extremely worthwhile in compiling, in order to investigate if such acts increased as a result of 
GAA support for the hunger strikes, these lists do not exist and it is not feasible to produce 
such lists in the timeframe of this study. This section will instead use the information contained 
in the publication Lost Lives19 as the basis for a very limited investigation as to whether GAA 
support for the hunger strikes resulted in an increase in lethal loyalist attacks upon GAA 
personnel. The information contained within Lost Lives indicates that the number of lethal 
loyalist attacks on GAA members did not increase as a result of some GAA units publicly 
supporting the republican prisoners. Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding the deaths of 
the fifteen members20 of the GAA killed by loyalist paramilitaries between 1969 and 1997 
indicates that while GAA membership helped loyalist paramilitaries identify Catholic targets, 
it was not until the heightened sectarian period o f the early 1990s that the GAA became a 
‘direct target’ for militant loyalism.21 Summarily, the support given to the hunger strikers by 
the GAA had no real effect on the already-hostile relationship between the GAA and militant 
loyalism.
Physical and commemorative memorials to the hunger strikers can be found throughout 
the landscape of the GAA in Northern Ireland.22 In addition to the GAA commemorating the 
hunger strikes, several republican-organised hunger strike commemorations have taken place 
within GAA grounds. Whether these memorials and commemorations were intended as 
political statements or not, they provide a palpable link between some GAA clubs and the 
hunger strikes, and, to some people, the wider militant republican movement. When the 1981
19 David McKittrick et a I, Lost Lives, The stories of the men, women and children who died as a result of the 
Northern Ireland troubles, (London: Mainstream Publishing, 2004).
20 Frank Corr(26 July 1972), Francis H. McCaughey (8 November 1973), James Desmond Devlin (7 May 1974), 
Colm Gerard McCartney (24 August 1975), John P. Farmer (24 August 1975), Sean O'Hagan (15 May 1976), 
William Strathearn (19 April 1977), Peadar Fagan (17 November 1981), Jack Kielty (25 January 1988),
Patrick Shields (3 January 1993), Sean Fox (25 October 1993), Eamon Fox (17 May 1994), Gary Convie (17 
May 1994), Sean Brown (12 May 1997), James Gerard Devlin (5 December 1997).
21 In October 1991 the UFF declared that it considered GAA property, members and supporters as 'legitimate 
targets' although this threat was quickly moderated to GAA members and supporters 'with strong 
republican links'. In 1993 the UDA threatened to murder members of the 'pan-nationalist front' which 
consisted of the Irish government, the SDLP and the GAA. Irish Independent, 8 October 1991, 9 October 1991 
& 13 January 1993.
22 In 1986 the annual Martin Hurson Memorial Cup was inaugurated in Tyrone. In 1998 St. Teresa's GAC 
(Belfast) named their pitch 'McDonnell / Doherty Park' in honour of club members Joe McDonnell and 
Kieran Doherty. In 2004 a short-lived GAA club was formed in Twinbrook (Belfast) called Cumann na 
Fuiseoige with its name and club crest closely associated with Bobby Sands, who grew up in the Twinbrook 
area.
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hunger strike concluded, the GAA was neither thanked nor condemned by the National H- 
Block Committee, the republican prisoners nor Sinn Fein, all o f whom released statements 
thanking the groups who supported the prisoners and condemning the British government and 
the ‘Irish Establishment, consisting of the Catholic Church, the Dublin Government and the 
SDLP\ While there may have been some tension between the republican movement and the 
GAA in the immediate aftermath of the hunger strikes, this anger was very quickly channelled 
at the Irish and British governments, the SDLP and the Catholic Church.23 Furthermore, the 
actions o f the GAA at local levels were appreciated by the GAA. The republican movement, 
according to Jim Gibney, were thankful that individual members of the GAA had been involved 
in the H-Block campaign and that GAA grounds had been used for propaganda purposes. While 
there may have been a view, in the immediate aftermath of the hunger strikes, that ‘the national 
leadership [of the GAA] could have done a bit more [for the prisoners]’, with the passage of 
time many o f those who had led the prison campaign and put pressure on the GAA to support 
the demands o f the prisoners, came to realise, and somewhat appreciate, that the GAA had been 
placed in a particularly difficult situation.24 Again, the hunger strikes left no lasting legacy on 
the relationship between the GAA and the republican community in Ireland.
The relationship between the GAA and the national media (Ireland and Northern 
Ireland) during the H-Blocks crisis can be best categorised as one of open antagonism, with 
one club calling for an association-wide boycott of the Irish Independent in January 1981. From 
the outset of the hunger strikes, and throughout their entire course, the main national 
newspapers in Ireland, apart from the Irish News, were predominantly negative in their 
coverage of the hunger strikers and their aims.25 This was in contrast to the series of motions 
that were passed by the GAA that declared the association’s support for the aims of the hunger 
strikers and those motions that were perceived as expressing support for militant republicanism. 
This, according to Mulvihill, led to the situation whereby the media ‘were convinced that the 
GAA was republican, ultra-republican, probably that it supported the cause of violence in the 
North.’26 In addition to these two opposite stances taken by the GAA and the Irish media, is
23 Interview with Danny Morrison, Belfast, 22 October 2014.
24 Interview with Jim Gibney, Belfast, 4 October 2014.
25 Two studies that explore the role and attitude of the media during the hunger strikes are 1) Aogan Mulchay, 
'Claims-Making and the Construction of Legitimacy: Press Coverage of the 1981 Northern Irish Hunger 
Strike' in Society for the Study of Social Problems, Volume 42, No. 4 ,199S, pp. 449-467 and 2) Marissa 
Black, 'Starving for Attention: Legitimizing Northern Ireland's Prison Hunger Strike of 1981 through the 
Print Media', Thesis, Ohio State University, 2012.
26 Interview with Liam Mulvihill, Croke Park, 23 April 2014.
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the fact that journalism strives for sensationalism in an attempt to sell newspapers. 
Furthermore, within Northern Ireland, there was a section of the media that was politically 
biased in its coverage of any activities that it perceived as nationalist, which included the GAA.
The hostile relationship between the GAA and the media cannot be blamed wholly on 
an anti-hunger strike media. Peter Quinn admitted that, while the GAA ‘got bad coverage’, the 
association ‘were the architects of our own downfall’ as the ‘GAA didn’t really take PR 
seriously or relations with the media seriously until much later than that.’27 The GAA, at 
Central Council level, did not employ a full-time Public Relations Officer (PRO) until Patrick 
Quigley (Padraig O Coigligh)28 was appointed to the role in March 1977.29 While Quigley 
quickly established an excellent relationship with the various sports editors and journalists, a 
corresponding relationship was not established with non-sporting editors or journalists.30 At 
Ulster Council level, there was no dedicated PRO throughout the H-Blocks crisis, with the 
duties of the PRO being fulfilled by the council secretary, Michael Feeney. This meant that 
when the GAA, at all levels, got involved in the various forms of protests surrounding the H- 
Blocks crisis, the association was not readily able to explain or defend their actions. Liam 
Mulvihill considers the relationship between the GAA and the media as one o f the association’s 
‘greatest failures’ during the crisis. Mulvihill feels that the GAA should have identified the 
need to develop contacts with non-sporting journalists and editors and should have been ‘better 
at seeing how [the political and current affairs journalists and editors] perceived us.’31
Desmond Fahy, in How the GAA Survived the Troubles, credits the hunger strikes with 
giving the GAA a newfound sense of confidence and links this confidence to a ‘ten-fold 
increase’ in the coverage of Gaelic games by the Northern Irish media.32 While it is true that 
within a decade o f the hunger strikes ending the two major television companies in Northern 
Ireland (BBC and UTV) were competing for the rights to show Gaelic games, the catalyst for 
the improved coverage of Gaelic games within Northern Ireland was the October 1982 
publication o f Feargal McCormack and Colm Fitzpatrick’s analytical report which compared 
GAA coverage by the Northern Irish media to the coverage afforded to other sports within the
27 Interview with Peter Quinn, Enniskillen, 21 June 2014.
28 Pat Quigley was a news sub editor of the Irish Press between 1961 and 1970; he subsequently worked on 
the magazine This Week before becoming the sports editor of the Sunday World -  a position he kept until 
he became the GAA full-time PRO in 1977.
29 Irish Press, 22 March 1977.
30 Interview with Liam Mulvihill, Croke Park, 23 April 2014.
31 Interview with Liam Mulvihill, Croke Park, 23 April 2014.
32 Fahy, How the GAA Survived the Troubles, pp. 13-14.
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province. This report concluded that the coverage of Gaelic games was outrageously bad and, 
according to Peter Quinn, ‘had the effect that Fergal and his committee intended -  it changed 
attitudes within the media and the media started covering the GAA matches.5 It was the effects 
of this 1982 report, rather than the newfound confidence that accompanied the conclusion of 
the hunger strike, that changed the long-term relationship between the GAA and the media 
outlets in Northern Ireland. The hunger strikes, and McCormack and Fitzpatrick’s 1982 report, 
had no short term or long teim impact on Unionist-orientated newspapers, the Belfast 
Telegraph in particular, which continued to ignore Gaelic games and portray the GAA in a 
negative manner.
II.
All of the available GAA oral and written sources that make reference to the hunger 
strikes agree that the hunger strikes were one of the most difficult challenges the GAA faced. 
Liam Mulvihill, writing in 1982, called the 1981 hunger strike ‘a long festering sore which left 
considerable marks on the Association during the year5; on at least three occasions Patrick 
McFlynn paraphrased Marcus De Burca who wrote (in an unidentified article) that the three 
times the GAA looked likely to split were the Parnell controversy, the Civil War and the hunger 
strikes33 while Desmond Fahy wrote that ‘after the hunger strikes the GAA could never be the 
same again.5 This section will analyse if the crisis had a long term effect on the relationship 
between the GAA in Northern Ireland and the GAA in the Republic of Ireland. This section 
will also question if  the crisis influenced or changed the policies of the association, while at 
the same time asking if the crisis affected the association's image of itself and its sense of 
purpose.
The H-Blocks crisis, and the hunger strikes in particular, was the first regional political 
crisis the GAA faced. The hunger strikes, more than anything that had happened before them, 
forcefully expressed to the GAA as a whole that GAA members in Northern Ireland were 
operating in circumstances completely different to those in the Republic of Ireland. However, 
even when these different set of circumstances were clearly highlighted, many GAA members 
in the Republic of Ireland either failed to recognise their significance or chose to ignore them 
and continued to insist that GAA members in Northern Ireland should simply disregard the 
political crisis that had consumed the province, in favour o f the rulebook of the GAA. This led
331) Patrick McFlynn, '75 Years out of 125: A Lifetime in the GAA' in McAnallen, Hassan & Hegarty (eds.), The 
Evolution of the GAA, pp. 11-19. 2) MacFlynn, Leading Through the Troubles, pp. 18-19. 3) Interview with 
Patrick MacFlynn, 20 August 2009, GAA Oral History Project.
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to some resentment within Ulster. Peter Quinn later wrote of ‘those from outside the province 
who thought that they knew what was happening at ground level and were prone to 
pontificating on the issues involved'.34 This gulf in attitudes was not confined to the GAA and, 
in many ways, persists until today. Quinn feels that this is ‘more a border issue than a GAA 
issue’ insofar as ‘the 26 counties don’t understand northern nationalism’ and that northern 
nationalists are ‘kind o f like the child in the family who is really seen as slightly different but 
still part of the family.’35 Throughout the hunger strikes, this gulf in attitudes was somewhat 
overcome by the fact that the GAA president, Patrick McFlynn, was from Northern Ireland and 
was able to provide an ‘Ulster perspective’ to the largely southern-based Central Council. 
McFlynn, in his autobiography, wrote that his ‘northern background...provided [him] with a 
deeper understanding of the issues and people involved than might otherwise have been the 
case.,36 This, however, also worked against McFlynn who came under serious pressure to adopt 
a more hard-line approach from some high-ranking GAA officials from Northern Ireland -  
Michael Feeney and Peter Harte in particular.37
While the relationship between the Central Council and the Ulster Council was strained 
at times during the H-Blocks crisis, there were no short-term or long-term effects on this 
relationship. Liam Mulvihill called the relationship between the two governing bodies during 
this period as ‘ambivalent’ but insisted that a ‘very close working relationship’ was maintained 
throughout the crisis. Mulvihill, however, feels that the Ulster Council would have always had 
a different relationship to the Central Council, comparable to other provincial councils. The 
Ulster Council, according to Mulvihill, ‘always had a certain amount o f autonomy’ as the 
Council had to deal with issues that did not affect the rest of the GAA. Mulvihill feels that 
while the Ulster Council had this autonomy, the Council knew the extent of this autonomy and 
there ‘was never a danger that they would go too far.’38 This ‘Ulster autonomy’ was somewhat 
tested following the issuing of the 4 June 1981 directive. Peter Quinn explained that the Ulster 
Council ‘ignored’ the directive and that it was never an issue for the Council; the majority of 
Ulster county boards failed to pass the directive onto the clubs within their jurisdiction and, 
when the directive became public knowledge, it was either ignored by the majority of Ulster 
clubs or, in the case o f the South Antrim clubs, openly challenged by them. The directive was,
34 Quinn, The Outsider, p. 146.
35 Interview with Peter Quinn, Enniskillen, 21 June 2014.
36 MacFlynn, Leading Through the Troubles, p. 11.
37 interview with Liam Mulvihill, Croke Park, 23 April 2014.
33 Interview with Liam Mulvihill, Croke Park, 23 April 2014.
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however, adhered to by the Down county board. As discussed in Chapter Three, the furore over 
the 4 June directive only lasted a matter of days and did not leave a lasting legacy on the 
relationship between the Central and Ulster Councils.
While the hunger strikes had no long-term effects on the relationship between the 
Central Council and the Ulster Council, the effect the hunger strikes had on the relationship 
between some Ulster clubs and their governing bodies (county board, provincial council and 
central council) was more pronounced. The hunger strikes affected some Ulster clubs on an 
almost daily basis, whereas throughout the two hunger strikes, the topic was only mentioned 
on seven occasions at the fourteen meetings held by the national leadership bodies -  the Central 
Council (who met three times) and the Coiste Bainisti (who met eleven times). On five of these 
seven occasions the matter was only discussed in passing, i.e. replying to a letter from the 
Tyrone secretary. The H-Blocks were not a priority for the vast majority of the Coiste Bainisti 
members who were more concerned with the issues pertaining to the running of the GAA in 
their respective jurisdictions, with the responsibility for the hunger strikes largely left to 
Mulvihill and McFlynn. This disconnect, according to Peter Quinn, left a lasting legacy 
whereby in some republican areas within Northern Ireland ‘the club is the focus, the county 
board is semi-important, the Ulster Council is even less important and what happens in Croke 
Park is irrelevant.’39
During the period of the hunger strikes, some clubs withdrew from competitions in 
support of the hunger strikers, and in protest at the GAA’s response to the hunger strike, but 
this was a very short-term measure. While there is written40 and anecdotal evidence that clubs 
in all of the six Northern Ireland counties withdrew from competitions during the hunger strike, 
a thorough research o f the GAA fixture lists and results in the local newspapers41 indicates that 
only two clubs (Derrytresk (Tyrone) and Slaughneil (Derry)) withdrew fully from their 
respective competitions. It must be noted that all county leagues and championships within 
Ulster were completed in both 1980 and 1981, albeit with some delays to the schedules and the 
loss of the aforementioned clubs. The clubs that did withdraw from their respective 
competitions took what Quinn calls ‘the least worst option’ insofar as these clubs did not 
deregister or leave the association, but instead they merely temporarily curtailed their
39 Interview with Peter Quinn, Enniskillen, 21 June 2014.
40 Quinn, The Outsider, p. 148.
41 Fermanagh Herald, Ulster Herald, Derry Journal, Down Journal, Andersonstown News.
136
participation in their respective competitions.42 When the hunger strike ended these clubs 
resumed their participation.
While the change to Rule 7, in 1979, was to have major implications for the GAA’s 
involvement in the H-Blocks crisis, it must be remembered, as discussed in Chapter Two, that 
the main motivation behind this change was the British Army’s occupation of GAA grounds. 
Despite the subsequent vocal protestations of Tom Woufle, John O ’Grady and Sean Kilfeather, 
the H-Blocks crisis did not force the GAA to change their written policy or rulebook -  Rule 7 
did not revert back to its original ‘non-political’ form. The crisis did, however, affect the 
association’s image of itself and its sense of purpose. In the build-up to the crisis, between 1972 
and 1979, the GAA, on numerous occasions passed a series motions that were rhetorically 
republican, and sometimes openly-militaristic, in support of ‘the struggle for national 
liberation.’ The passing of these motions, at the highest governing level of the GAA, was 
particularly troublesome for the association during the two high-profile arguments with 
representatives of the GRA. In the decade following the conclusion of the hunger strikes, no 
such motions of a republican / militaristic nature appeared on the Annual Congress. Motions 
continued to be passed condemning the ongoing British military occupation of Saint Oliver 
Plunkett Park in Crossmaglen and on four occasions motions were discussed regarding specific 
conditions within Northern Irish prisons43 but no further stand-alone motions calling for the 
removal o f British troops from Ireland and / or support for the ‘national struggle’ appeared on 
the agenda.
As can be seen from the above two sections, the H-Blocks crisis did not leave a lasting 
legacy on the GAA’s external relationships, nor did the crisis change the GAA itself. This does 
not dismiss the severity o f the crisis for the GAA - it merely confirms that the challenges posed 
to the GAA were in the short-term. Furthermore, one could argue that it is a testament to the 
GAA officials - Peter Harte, Patrick McFlynn and Liam Mulvihill in particular - that the 
challenges the GAA faced during this period were overcome with no long-term consequences 
for the association. As discussed in earlier chapters, the H-Blocks campaign briefly facilitated 
the coming together of the nationalist community but this unity quickly disappeared; similar to 
the H-Block campaign, the GAA’s membership consisted of the various strands of nationalism
42 Interview with Peter Quinn, Enniskillen, 21 June 2014.
43 In 1985 and 1987 separate motions were passed protesting against the ban on Gaelic games in Long Kesh 
(1985) and the wider ban on the Irish language, literature and Gaelic games within Northern Irish prisons 
(1987). In 1986 and 1987 a motion was discussed, withdrawn (1986) and subsequently passed (1987) 
condemning the practice of strip-searching in prisons.
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and the association could have very easily fragmented and split over the H-Blocks issue. The 
GAA’s involvement in the H-Blocks campaign saw the association face a number o f crises of 
its own, including the two public rows with the GRA and the fallout from the 4 June 1981 
directive, but the GAA remained a united association.
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